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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Among the practitioners and the students that meet it for the first time, 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis1 easily arises some puzzlement. Nei-
ther its technical side nor its lexicon fits well with some conventional 
wisdom about methods. For instance: although QCA is portrayed as a 
qualitative strategy, it operates on formal models; however, its models 
rely on membership scores instead of probabilities and on sets instead 
of variables. Moreover, its algebra seems to speak more to electronic 
engineering than to politics, laws, or economics and may defy the sta-
tistical mindset. Instead of equivalences, it considers inequations. Its 
models assume compound factors instead of single ones. The model fit 
captures the “sufficiency” of the claim that the compound leads to the 
effect, and is decided in terms of “consistency”. Its solutions depend on 
counterfactual considerations, but the counterfactuals are listed in a 
“truth-table”, ask whether an unobserved configuration could have ob-
tained, and are routinely decided following “directional expectations.” 
QCA can claim explanatory import for inferences drawn without any 
ceteris paribus clause, and its findings do not necessarily improve with 
the number of the observations. 
 
The ground on which QCA builds its solutions, however, is less out-
landish than its technical lingo may suggest. QCA relies on logical op-
erations based on the Boolean algebra that anybody applies when que-
rying a search engine. Its algebraic structures can be rendered as set 
relationships2 of partial or complete overlapping. That the latter can be 
given a causal interpretation, however, depends on a further, and some-
times neglected side of Boolean algebra – its logical nature. Logical 
                                                          
1 Ragin, 1987, 2000, 2008; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012; Duşa, 2018. 
2 Stone, 1936. 
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algebras are literals linked by connectives that render the structural fea-
tures of our statements about the world. These statements can be as 
complex as wished and take many shapes – comprised that of a causal 
account, or an explanation. 
From Aristotle to the recent scholarship of mechanistic modeling, 
the philosophy of science has long since established that explanations 
are statements and “because-answers” to questions on why something 
is as it is. Formal logic enters the picture to ensure the “compellingness” 
of the causal arguments that support because-answers. Under the as-
sumption that compellingness also depends on structural features of the 
argument, formal logic narrows on the quality, quantity, and relation-
ships of the explanatory statements. Its syntax provides both the princi-
ples of valid accounts and the yardsticks to assess their empirical im-
port.  
For ensuring validity, logic takes a toll in terms of information loss. 
Its formalization invites to abstract reality away unless we are left with 
few relevant facets. Like maps, these reductions serve a purpose, how-
ever. They contain the relevant information to recognize the phenome-
non across its diverse manifestations and, were it the case, to operate on 
it effectively3. Even when inadequate, moreover, logical models can 
draw our attention to what is missing from an account and can be im-
proved by filling the gaps. QCA belongs to this tradition as a technique 
geared to mold, test, and refine an explanatory model according to the 
rules of logic. Although not unique in its commitment to this rationale4, 
its reliance on sets does impart a twist to its analytic operations.  
A full causal argument consists of three pieces of knowledge: the 
observation that some phenomenon occurs; the tenet that the phenome-
non arises from the flow of behavior, activities, or interactions of the 
individual entities of a particular class; and the bundle of conditions 
under which the flow obtains5. The “oomph” of classical explanations 
consists of accounting for the occurrence of the phenomenon by expos-
ing the compelling connections that the flow establishes between cer-
tain conditions and the occurrence of the phenomenon. The flow, how-
ever, has long been taken for granted under the unproven metaphysical 
assumption that it followed some capacity that “inhered” to the mem-
bers of the class. Just the opposite, modernity requires that the standing 
                                                          
3 Craver and Kaplan 2018. 
4 e.g., Pearl, 2015; Morgan and Winship, 2015; Humphreys and Jacobs 2015; Bennett 
and Checkel 2015; van Evera 1997; Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter, 1994. 
5 Craver and Kaplan, 2018; Salmon, 1984, 1998. 
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of any statement in science is questioned and tested before it is believed, 
and none of the three components of an explanation escapes the skepti-
cal attitude. The common wisdom about methods then portrays a divi-
sion of labor among techniques and approaches that address the phe-
nomenon, the flow, and the relevant conditions as proxies of the elusive 
concept of generative capacities. The criteria that inform such a division 
of labor, however, are far from neat or unquestionable. 
The portrayal that Ragin6 invoked to justify the proposal of Quali-
tative Comparative Analysis is quite conventional in pitting “variable-
oriented” correlational studies against “case-oriented” narratives. The 
contrast has been variously reformulated to emphasize the different 
goals, mindsets, assumptions, and pitfalls of these scholarships7. The 
contrast inevitably emphasizes some features and may result in ungen-
erous representations, but it clarifies the place that QCA was intended 
to take among the existing alternatives. From this perspective, correla-
tions narrow on the connection between the phenomenon and selected 
facets related to the flow to ascertain whether it holds regardless of the 
background conditions, which will prove its robustness across contexts. 
Correlations, hence, imply that has explanatory power what, on aver-
age, improves the probability that the phenomenon occurs: but robust-
ness and context-insensitivity alone cannot prevent correlations from 
mistaking the barometer for the cause of the storm, or the shadow of the 
flagpole for the reason of the rising sun. Narratives, in contrast, are por-
trayed narrowing on one or few contexts to advance the classical claim 
that the explanatory power lies in the local bundle of conditions, as it is 
their interplay that arises or suffocates the tendency of the individuals 
to behave, act, and interact. Moreover, they often show how the flow in 
a correlational model is not the only path to the phenomenon to con-
clude that, eventually, models lie. However, in-depth renderings of the 
local intersection seldom leave us with valid accounts, as they may ex-
plain that salt dissolved in water because someone cast a spell.  
QCA was designed to occupy a middle ground and combine the 
“best” features of the two strategies. It agrees with case-oriented anal-
yses (hence, its “qualitative” nature) that the flow depends on the local 
conjunction of the right conditions – and that these “scope conditions” 
do the explaining. At the same time, QCA provides a solution to the 
relative inability of local narratives to discriminate between relevant 
                                                          
6 Ragin, 1987, 2000, 2008. 
7 e.g., Goertz and Mahoney, 2012; Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Brady, 2008; Ragin 
1998; Verba, 1967. 
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and irrelevant conditions8. It tackles the problem with the rules of logic: 
it models all the possible variations from a rich hypothesis, then as-
cribes explanatory power to those bundles of conditions that survive 
established criteria9.  
 
It will be shown in the following that QCA can yield useful and 
credible explanatory accounts, although its solutions hold within the 
boundaries of the observations from which they have been drawn, pend-
ing further proofs10. The argument develops in the light of the experi-
ence that the tools and practices of QCA are deeply engrained in the 
philosophical discourse on explanation and its evolution, so that, in 
turn, the familiarity with this discourse improves the understanding of 
the power and limits of the technique. Consistently, the argument pro-
ceeds vertically through the scholarship. The strategy sacrifices many 
details and alternative applications of QCA11 to elucidate the rationale 
of its explanatory usage. 
Thus, chapters one and two are intended to set the stage. The first 
introduces the Aristotelean definition of explanation and its relationship 
with the idea of episteme as reliable knowledge about causation. It clar-
ifies the role that logical syllogistic structures play in connecting the 
sparse pieces of knowledge into valid inferences and introduces the 
minimal notions of categorical logic required to understand the compo-
sition and functioning of the inferential machinery. The doctrine of the 
four causes is then presented as the metaphysical warranty that the Ar-
istotelean system requires to ensure that a syllogism is causal, meaning-
ful, and sound. The second chapter widens the inferential toolbox to the 
alternative logic developed within the Athenian Stoic school. The chap-
ter is intended as a discursive rough guide to the principles of the prop-
ositional logic later developed by Frege, Wittgenstein, Russell, Carnap, 
Quine, and Hempel, among others12. Chapter three accounts for the 
seminal moment when the modern approach to explanation took its 
                                                          
8 e.g., Compton et al., 2019. 
9 Ragin, 1987, 1999, 2008; Quine, 1952; Verba, 1967; Walker and Cohen, 1985; 
Salmon, 1998; Cartwright, 1999. 
10 However, see Blair et al., 2019. 
11 e.g., Hino, 2009; García-Castro and Arino, 2016; Blatter and Haverland, 2012; 
Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013; Rohlfing and Schneider, 2013; Baumgartner, 2013; Baum-
gartner and Thiem, 2015; Goertz 2017. 
12 All the notions of propositional logic in use in QCA will nevertheless be system-
atically presented in Part II. 
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shape around the problem of providing a firmer empirical ground to 
syllogistic inferences through induction.  
After a short tribute to Hume, the chapter enters into some details of 
Mill’s contribution, for many reasons. The System of Logic brings ex-
planation on the terrain of modern methodology and tackles several of 
the problems that will later animate the debate in the philosophy and 
social sciences. Ragin’s idea that QCA is better suited to render “chem-
ical causation” instead of the usual physical chain of events explicitly 
borrows from the distinction established by Mill when reasoning about 
the plausible shapes of causation. The same holds of the tenet that the 
“empirical laws of the effect” are a complex interplay of causes, condi-
tions, and obstructions – or the preference for counterfactual elimina-
tive proofs to ascertain the causal import of a factor. The section also 
calls for attention to Mill’s particular understanding of explanation as 
the self-standing attempts at “resolving” some actual or hypothetical 
regular association into equivalent relationships. 
Although often neglected, Mill’s “modes of explanation” have par-
ticular importance for the social sciences as they properly apply to those 
units that are too complex to undergo experimentation, like societies or 
policy decisions. Their validity does not require any previous “law-
like” knowledge, as their standing is established in the inferences by the 
evidence that supports them. In short, Mill’s modes posit explanation 
between induction and deduction, where Quine, then Ragin, will later 
operate. Hempel’s rendering is addressed in the last parts of the chapter. 
The portrayal focuses on a mature version of the “covering law model” 
that popularized the identity of explanation and prediction based on the 
principle of expectability. The mature version emphasizes that general 
law-like statements may provide a weak explanatory basis unless the 
conditions are brought into the picture under which the law-like state-
ment holds. With Carnap, this version considers that the general state-
ment asserts the capacity or disposition of something to contribute to 
the occurrence of the effect. Conditions are required as the “contrast 
agent” that reveals the capacity while accounting for its unleashing. 
Hempel also identifies the strategy of validation that suits sentences un-
der different quantifiers, and adds “observational reports” to each strat-
egy so to avoid the shortcomings of the naïve approach to validation – 
which casts light on the use of the truth table in QCA.  
The concluding section outlines the contemporary mechanistic ap-
proaches to explanation as the last influential proposal offered by 
 20 
Salmon, Woodward, and the stream of mechanistic modelers in re-
sponse to the covering law model. The proposal integrates knowledge 
about causal processes and knowledge about causal structures into a 
single, conceptually consistent picture – dubbed “mechanism” – to ac-
count for the occurrence or the non-occurrence of a phenomenon. The 
conclusion of the chapters and Part I reports Craver and Kaplan’s cur-
rent recommendations about the suitable level of abstraction in model-
ing a mechanism, and the reasons that suggest locating it somewhere 
between the two poles of phenomenological descriptions and bare func-
tional sketches13. 
 
Against this backdrop, Part II presents QCA as a technique for mod-
eling the structural part of a mechanism to an outcome around the as-
sumption of a particular underlying process that remains unobserved. 
Chapter five clarifies that the contribution of QCA consists of specify-
ing the “black box” – Mackie’s “machine”, Cartwright’s “nomological 
machine”14, or Walker and Cohen’s “scope statements” – within which 
the flow can emerge and unfold until the outcome. The chapter identi-
fies the analytic capability of QCA in it modeling and testing a “ma-
chine” as a complete bundle of relevant conditions to the occurrence of 
the effect. Chapter six addresses the problem of how to learn from the 
previous literature, then how to select conditions to render a machine. 
Chapter seven recalls the part of propositional logic in use in QCA, and 
clarifies the relationship between set-theoretical and logical constructs. 
Chapter eight addresses the delicate operation of classifying cases as 
instances of a configuration with the support of set theory and measure-
ment operations. Chapter nine summarizes the protocol, and opens to 
Part III.  
 
In the last Part, a configurational model is developed around the ac-
counts of the social mechanism of corruption that is fueled by the per-
ception that the policymaking system is illegitimately biased. The con-
figurational model, then, includes the policy levers and pulleys that can 
be deployed to block the unfolding of the social mechanism. The pro-
tocol is therefore applied to test the hypothesis that the differences in 
the perception of corruption can be explained by the differences in the 
perceived effectiveness of the constraints that ensure the government is 
                                                          
13 Craver and Kaplan, 2018. 
14 Cartwright, 1989, 1999; Mackie, 1974, 1977; Walker and Cohen, 1985. 
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accountable to the citizens. The conclusions summarize the features of 
a configurational explanatory model and discusses its limits. 
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1. Explanations as deductions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Western philosophy of science owes the demanding equation of 
deductive reasoning, scientific knowledge, and causal explanations to 
Aristotle1. In his Physics2, he defines knowledge as the episteme that 
follows from proper response to a why-questions. The episteme, to him, 
arises from a “syllogism,” that is 
 
a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than 
what is stated follows of necessity from their being so. I mean by the 
last phrase that it follows because of them, and by this, that no further 
term is required in order to make the consequence necessary3. 
 
The definition highlights two essential features. First, the hybrid na-
ture: the explanation is an argument and, as such, is composed of sen-
tences; at the same time, its sentences are statements about the world. 
Second, its compellingness. An explanation orders and connects its 
statements so that the last appears as an inevitable consequence of the 
previous ones. As a whole, moreover, the argument is self-standing, as 
it contains every information required to get to the conclusion. It does 
not aim to yield new knowledge but to organize the existing one and 
illuminate unnoticed connections. 
The Aristotelean definition entails a bold assumption: the sentences 
about the world do mirror the world itself, and the rules of compelling 
arguments reflect the rules that govern the relationship among phenom-
ena in the world. From time to time, the mirroring assumption will be 
debated, exploited to impose specific worldviews, repudiated as void of 
                                                          
1 See Corcoran, 1974; Barnes, 1991; Harari, 2004; Malink, 2013; Bronstein, 2016. 
2 Aristotle, Physics, 194b16-195a3. 
3 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 24b18-20. 
26 
any cogency, elaborated upon, and problematized. In no case, however, 
the Aristotelean machinery that embeds this assumption went disre-
garded. The reason for such an enduring legacy lies in the unquestion-
able merit of the Organon, which first set the ground for logic as a for-
mal language.  
 
 
1.1 The shape of a statement 
 
The strength of an explanation originates from the formal features of 
the statements that compose it, and on the structure of their connection. 
The formal part of the syllogistic system is introduced in Categories 
and On Interpretation. The system builds on the assumption that we can 
formulate either true or false sentences about the world. Their truth, in 
turn, depends on whether the sentence corresponds to the empirical state 
of the world “in one of the divisions of time”4. Thus, to Aristotle, the 
statement that Socrates is sitting is true unless Socrates gets up, at which 
point the assertion becomes false. The change in the “truth value” of a 
sentence, then, depends on the change in the state of the actual thing, 
and in its misalignment with the corresponding state of the world5.  
The Aristotelian sentences are the most elementary part of the dis-
course that cannot be further divided without losing the capacity to bear 
a truth value. They always include a property or attribute (katēgoroume-
non) that takes the place of the predicate 𝑃 and a subject 𝑆 (hupoke-
imenon) of which 𝑃 is predicated (katēgoreitai). Besides, all these state-
ments can vary along two dimensions: their quality and their number. 
The quality of a sentence is decided by its predicate, that is, by 
whether the property is affirmed or negated. An affirmative sentence 
predicates 𝑃 of 𝑆 and takes the form ˹𝑆 is 𝑃˺. A negative sentence pred-
icates not-𝑃 of 𝑆 and takes the form ˹𝑆 is not-𝑃˺. The relationship be-
tween affirmative and negative sentences is assumed to be exclusive: 
“It is evident that a single affirmation has a single negation. For the 
negation must deny the same thing as the affirmation affirmed, and of 
the same thing”6. 
The quantity of a sentence, instead, depends on the subject and de-
termines the number of a categorical sentence. When the subject refers 
                                                          
4 Aristotle, On Interpretation, 17a20-17a24. 
5 Aristotle, Categories, 4a21-4b19. 
6 Aristotle, On Interpretation, 17b38-18a7. 
27 
to one or few entities of a class, the sentence is particular; when it co-
vers a whole class, the sentence becomes universal: “I call universal 
that which is by its nature predicated of a number of things, and partic-
ular that which is not; man, for instance, is a universal, Callias a partic-
ular”7. 
Therefore, affirmation can be predicated of the whole class, as in 
˹every 𝑆 is 𝑃˺, or of a part of it, as in ˹not every 𝑆 is 𝑃˺: the former 
portrays a universal affirmative sentence; the latter, a particular affirm-
ative sentence. The negation, too, can be predicated of a part or the 
whole of a category. A particular negative sentence takes the shape of 
˹some 𝑆 is not-𝑃˺. A universal negative sentence states that ˹every 𝑆 is 
not-𝑃˺ or, indifferently, that ˹no 𝑆 is 𝑃˺ – the two conveying the same 
meaning. 
 
 
1.2 Relationships and rules 
 
The compelling nature of an explanation follows from the logical 
relationships among the sentences that compose it. These relationships 
arise from symmetries and asymmetries in the quality and numbers of 
the sentences independent of their substantive content. In better detail8: 
 
1. Universal sentences of different quality are contrary opposites: 
they cannot be true together, although, in the Aristotelean system, 
they can be false together.  
Thus, it cannot be true that ˹every 𝑆 is 𝑃˺ and, at the same time 
and in the same way, that ˹every 𝑆 is not 𝑃˺. With an example, it 
cannot be true that every swan is white and, together, that every 
swan is not white. The same holds for the singular subject: it can-
not be said of the same swan at the same time in the same sense 
that it is white, and it is not. 
Known as the principles of the “Excluded Middle” and of “Non-
Contradiction,” these impossibilities constitute the standard axi-
oms of classical logic, and any logical system characterizes itself 
for the position it takes on both. 
2. Within the same quality, the particular is subaltern of the univer-
sal. When the universal is true, its particular shall be true, too – 
and the false particular makes the universal false. Thus, from the 
                                                          
7 Aristotle, On Interpretation, 17a37-17b16. 
8 Aristotle, On Interpretation, 17a37-18a12. 
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true sentence that ˹every 𝑆 is 𝑃˺, it follows that ˹some 𝑆 is 𝑃˺ is 
true. The rule is not symmetric, though, as a true particular does 
not warrant the truth of its universal. Being it true that ˹some swan 
is white˺ does not grant the inference that ˹every swan is white˺ – 
whereas the reverse holds instead. Moreover, from the false sen-
tence that ˹every 𝑆 is 𝑃˺, it does not follow that ˹some 𝑆 is 𝑃˺ is 
false. Being false that ˹every swan is white˺ can mean either that 
every swan is not white, or that some are not.  
In short, truth only flows downward – it extends from a true uni-
versal to its particular, but not vice-versa. Instead, falsehood only 
flows upward: a false particular justifies our inference that its uni-
versal is false, but not vice-versa.  
3. The particulars of different quality are known as subcontraries. 
Given their relationship with their universal, and given the rela-
tionship between universals, they cannot be false together, so that 
at least one is always true; however, they may be true together. 
It can be true that ˹some swan is white˺ and together that ˹some 
swan is black˺ if it is said of different swans at the same time or of 
the same swans at different times; in both cases, none of the re-
spective universal statements can be true.  
4. Sentences form contradictory opposites if they variate in both 
quality and quantity. In the Aristotelean system, contradictory 
statements are connected by a relationship of mutual exclusion, so 
the one being true necessitates the other being false.  
Thus, being true that ˹every swan is white˺ makes false that ˹some 
swan is black˺; being false that ˹every swan is black˺ entails that 
it is true that at least ˹some swan is white˺. The evidence (truth) of 
a particular contradicts the truth (falsifies) the universal of the con-
trary quality. This rule of falsification will find application beyond 
the Peripatetic tradition. 
 
A later convention denotes the universal affirmative as 𝑎, and the 
particular affirmative as 𝑖, from the two first vowels of the Latin word 
affirmo. Similarly, the universal negative is denoted as 𝑒, and the par-
ticular negative as 𝑜 from the two first vowels of the Latin word nego. 
Then, the relationships between the possible types of sentences taken 
pairwise yield the renowned square of opposition in Figure 1.  
The relationships between the corners in the square license the fol-
lowing inferences independent on the content of the sentences: 
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A1. true 𝑃𝑎𝑆 means 
-  𝑃𝑖𝑆 is certainly true;  
- 𝑃𝑜𝑆 is certainly false;  
- 𝑃𝑒𝑆 is certainly false. 
 
A2. true 𝑃𝑒𝑆 means 
- 𝑃𝑜𝑆 is certainly true;  
- 𝑃𝑖𝑆 is certainly false,  
- 𝑃𝑎𝑆 is certainly false. 
 
A3. true 𝑃𝑖𝑆 means: 
-  𝑃𝑒𝑆 is certainly false,  
- 𝑃𝑎𝑆 and 𝑃𝑜𝑆 are possibly true, 
- either 𝑃𝑎𝑆 or 𝑃𝑜𝑆 is certainly true. 
A4. true 𝑃𝑜𝑆 means 
- 𝑃𝑎𝑆 is certainly false,  
- 𝑃𝑒𝑆 and 𝑃𝑖𝑆 are possibly true, 
- either 𝑃𝑒𝑆 or 𝑃𝑖𝑆 is certainly true. 
 
 
Figure 1. The square of opposition 
˹every 𝑆 is 𝑃˺ 
𝑷𝒂𝑺 
 
contrary 
˹no 𝑆 is 𝑃˺ 
𝑷𝒆𝑺 
 
su
b
al
te
rn
 
contradictory 
opposites 
 
su
b
altern
 
𝑷𝒊𝑺 
˹some 𝑆 is 𝑃˺ 
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𝑷𝒐𝑺 
˹some 𝑆 is not 𝑃˺ 
 
Universals license a higher number of sure inferences than particu-
lars. Particulars, instead, only have the logical power of contradicting – 
that is, of falsifying – the universal of their subcontrary. Unsurprisingly, 
Aristotle established universals as the proper ground for episteme as 
sure knowledge. The tenet has proven enduring, at least as a desirable 
ground to the validity of inferences9. The issue appears less problematic 
in the Aristotelean than in alternative systems. For one thing, categori-
cal logic rested on the assumption of a closed universe, which makes 
universals easier to establish. Second, categorical logic excludes that 
we can build a syllogism on accidental phenomena: chance or sponta-
neity provide no ground to the episteme.  
As a further consideration, the relationships between categorical 
sentences allow for two related interpretations – the intensional, and the 
extensional. The intensional reading narrows on those abstract features 
                                                          
9 Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Cook and Campbell, 1979; cfr. Hempel, 1965; Cart-
wright, 1979. 
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that qualify a predicate as non-accidental in se and opens to considera-
tions about the possibility of some occurrence. The extensional inter-
pretation refers to observed actualized phenomena. Along with the ex-
tensional reading, Venn10 will later show that the relationships in the 
square of opposition can be rendered as a special overlapping of the 
class of objects 𝑆 and the class of objects with the property 𝑃. There-
fore, 𝑃𝑎𝑆, 𝑃𝑖𝑆, 𝑃𝑒𝑆, 𝑃𝑜𝑆 find correspondence with at least one of the 
diagrams in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Venn’s rendering of the basic Aristotelian relations 
(1) 𝑃𝑎𝑆 (2) 𝑃𝑎𝑆 (3) 𝑃𝑖𝑆 
   
(4) 𝑃𝑖𝑆, 𝑃𝑜𝑆 (5) 𝑃𝑒𝑆 
  
 
Source: Venn (1881: 6 ff.) 
 
As Venn underlines, the ambiguity of linguistic statements prevents 
a clear-cut rendering. The only categorical statement that proves im-
mune to ambiguity is the universal negative 𝑃𝑒𝑆, which indicates the 
class of 𝑃 objects and the class of 𝑆 objects do not overlap as in diagram 
(5) of Figure 2. The picture also intuitively conveys a further property 
of the negative universal: it ensures that the operation of conversion is 
truth-preserving. 
As applied in Prior Analytics, conversion refers to the predicate and 
the subject switching their positions in a sentence. The conversion is 
truth-preserving when the new sentence maintains its original general-
ity. This is the case of negative universals, as ˹no 𝑃 is 𝑆˺ and ˹no 𝑆 is 
                                                          
10 Venn, 1881; Stone, 1937. 
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𝑃˺ hold equally true. That that no human is immortal is as true as that 
no immortal is human. Conversion does not safely apply to positive 
universals, instead. The statement ˹all 𝑃 is 𝑆˺ fits diagram (1) as much 
as diagram (2) of Figure 2, although only diagram (1) supports truth-
preserving conversion. That is, one can safely state that all humans are 
mortal, yet not that all mortals are humans – the class of mortals being 
broader than that of humans. Direct conversion of a universal positive 
𝑃𝑎𝑆 is only allowed if we can rule out that its contradictory ˹some 𝑃 is 
not 𝑆˺ is false, as this proves the overlapping of 𝑆 and 𝑃 as in diagram 
(1). Affirmative universals, as diagram (2) displays, only support the 
conversion into their particular – from 𝑃𝑎𝑆 into 𝑆𝑖𝑃. Indeed, if it is true 
that all humans are mortal yet not that all mortals are human, it never-
theless holds that some mortal beings are human. As a general pruden-
tial rule, therefore, any affirmative universal is considered as the class 
of 𝑆-objects that is at least contained in the class of 𝑃-objects. Their 
identity provides a special case of inclusion that requires empirical pro-
bation – for instance, like in geometrical proofs, by showing that absurd 
conclusions would follow if we assumed the identity false. 
The last categorical safe conversion is between positive particulars 
– 𝑃𝑖𝑆 and 𝑆𝑖𝑃. This particular again arises an ambiguity, as it may refer 
to the class of 𝑃-objects being perfectly included in the class of 𝑆-ob-
jects (diagram 3 in Figure 2), or only partially overlapping it (diagram 
4 in Figure 2). Only perfect inclusion rules out that 𝑃𝑜𝑆 is true. How-
ever, the positive particular as such can be logically insensitive to this 
ambiguity. If it is true that some 𝑆 is 𝑃, it also is true that at least some 
𝑃 is 𝑆: so, the partial intersection constitutes the default relationship of 
reference, of which the full inclusion again provides a special case. Par-
tial intersections, however, also occur by accident, hence cannot be re-
garded as meaningful as the special case of full inclusion. 
The rules of conversion under ambiguity entail a further logical 
principle11. As a chain is no stronger than its weakest link, so the valid 
inference cannot advance claims stronger than the weakest of the rela-
tionship among quantities on which it builds.  
These few relations and principles provide the ground for establish-
ing truth-preserving explanatory inferences.  
 
 
                                                          
11 Malink 2016, Patterson 2002:75 ff. 
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1.3 The ideal shape of a valid deduction 
 
To find which relationships support valid inferences, Prior Analytics 
proceeds deductively from basic stipulations. It establishes every ex-
planatory inference can be reduced to a scheme involving three terms – 
the subject 𝑆, the predicate 𝑃, and a middle term 𝑀. The three terms are 
organized into two premisses and one conclusion. The major premiss 
establishes a general rule connecting 𝑃 and 𝑀; the minor premiss in-
stead makes a case relating 𝑆 and 𝑀; the conclusion reports the claim 
about the relationship of 𝑆 and 𝑃 that the two premisses should demon-
strate. The demonstration depends on 𝑀, which provides the logical 
connection between 𝑆 and 𝑃 while falling in the conclusion. Otherwise 
said, the syllogistic machinery is geared to demonstrate that 𝑆 is 𝑃 be-
cause of 𝑀. 
The position of 𝑀 across the premisses determines the figure of the 
syllogism. In the first figure, 𝑀 takes the place of the subject in the 
major premiss and of the predicate in the minor; in the second figure, it 
takes the position of the predicate in both premisses; in the third, it al-
ways takes that of the subject. A fourth figure, acknowledged yet not 
discussed by Aristotle12, would be later developed in which the middle 
term is given the position of the predicate in the major premiss and the 
subject in the minor. 
The figures display a different mood depending on the combination 
of quality and number of the categorical sentences that make the prem-
isses and the conclusion. The possible combinations per figure are 64, 
ranging from the 𝑎𝑎𝑎 of the syllogism with all positive universal state-
ments to the 𝑜𝑜𝑜 of the syllogism of all negative particulars.  
Of these possible combinations, Aristotle proved that only a limited 
number of them were valid, that is, truth-preserving. Among the valid 
syllogisms, those directly associated with the scientific discourse are in 
the first figure. Known with the mnemonic names of barbara, celarent, 
darii, and ferio, they portray the relations among 𝑃, 𝑆, and 𝑀 as dis-
played in Table 1. 
These syllogisms are “perfect” (anapodeiktos) as the consequence 
can be grasped by referring solely to the fundamental relationships be-
tween qualities and numbers. Of them, the barbara and the celarent are 
of particular import as they portray the fundamental axioms by way of 
which the darii and the ferio, too, can be perfected. In the Aristotelean 
                                                          
12 Łukasiewicz, 1957. 
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system, the first two moods of the first figure, the conversion rules, and 
the principle of non-contradiction applied as argument ad absurdum to-
gether suffice to prove – or disprove – the validity of any remaining 
syllogisms, hence of every argument offered as an explanation.  
The perfect syllogisms clarify that the middle term explains as it 
establishes the relevant link. The process is exceptionally transparent in 
the case of the barbara syllogism, which renders the rule of transitivity 
as chained identities as in Figure 3. 
 
Table 1. Valid moods of the first figure  
and related set structures 
Mood Deduction Set structure 
barbara 
𝑃𝑎𝑴      𝑴𝑎𝑆
𝑃𝑎𝑆
 
 
celarent 
𝑃𝑒𝑴      𝑴𝑎𝑆
𝑃𝑒𝑆
 
 
darii 
𝑃𝑎𝑴      𝑴𝑖𝑆
𝑃𝑖𝑆
 
 
ferio 
𝑃𝑒𝑴      𝑴𝑖𝑆
𝑃𝑜𝑆
 
 
Keys: in each cell of the deduction column, the two statements above the line correspond 
to the major premiss (on the left), and the minor premiss (on the right); below the line is 
the conclusion. 
Source: Malink (2017); Venn (1881). 
 
Figure 3. The barbara syllogism as transitivity 
 
Source: adaptation from Malink (2017). 
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Thus, when the chosen middle terms cannot connect 𝑆 and 𝑃 in one 
single step, new premisses can be added as links in a longer chain13. 
Such a mechanism illuminates Aristotelean definition of explanations 
as self-standing arguments that expose meaningful connections other-
wise unnoticed.  
The logical chain between 𝑃 and 𝑆 cannot close if any middle link 
is missing – which lies the inference open to an infinite regress. In the 
Aristotelian system, however, such a risk is defused ontologically: the 
regress ends when the middle term is a cause. Causal middle terms also 
warrant the syllogism is genuinely explanatory. 
 
 
1.4 The “becauses” that make syllogisms causal 
 
From the Posterior Analytics, we learn that while all valid explanations 
are valid syllogisms, the reverse does not hold. To illustrate the point, 
Aristotle contrasts the following two arguments: 
 
B1 Near things do not twinkle B2 Near things do not twinkle 
 Planets do not twinkle  Planets are near things 
 Planets are near things  Planets do not twinkle 
 
Both display the same major premiss – the rule connecting “near 
things” and “not twinkling.” In both, the minor premiss makes the case 
about “planets.” What changes from B1 to B2 is the term from the major 
premiss that is used as 𝑀 in the minor.  
In B1, the minor premiss assigns the position of 𝑀 to the property 
of not twinkling; in B2, 𝑀 is the property of being a near thing. Aristotle 
clarifies syllogism B1 provides the “knowledge-that” (oti), establishing 
in agreement with our senses that planets are near things. Just the op-
posite, syllogism B2 offers the “knowledge-why” (dioti), as its conclu-
sion goes beyond our perception while establishing the reason for an 
occurrence such as that planets do not twinkle.  
The latter explains as it appeals to a causal feature of 𝑆 – the nature 
of planets that, in Aristotle’s cosmology, is of near wandering stars. Be-
                                                          
13 Malink, 2013, 2017. 
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ing near, to Aristotle, is part of the essence of a planet, while not twin-
kling is a secondary property – an attribute, a mark – that follows from 
it. Hence, nearness can be invoked as the middle term that turns the 
valid syllogism into an explanation. 
In an explanatory syllogism, “the middle term is an account of the 
major term, which is why all the sciences come about through defini-
tion”14. Here, “account” (logos) is to be understood as the sentence that 
defines the nature of the subject – the higher property that justifies the 
compelling linkage between the subject 𝑆 and the predicate 𝑃15. This 
assumption about 𝑀, however, seemingly opens a metaphysical breach 
in the formal construction. It makes proper scientific knowledge depend 
on the content of the premisses – namely, on the fact that they invoke 
right, although given, “explanatory factors” or “becauses” (aitia). 
 
1.4.1 The four causes 
The Aristotelean ontology is deemed pluralist as it famously con-
siders that we can speak of aitia as of four kinds: material, formal, effi-
cient, and final16. 
The material principle narrows on the constituents or the potential 
(dynamis) of the subject. Examples are the bronze of a statue or the 
letters of a syllable. The formal principle refers to its structure instead 
– understood as its realized shape (entelecheia), spatial arrangement, or 
essential relationships binding the constituents together into a whole 
broader the sum of its parts. Such is the syllable with regard to the let-
ters, or the form to the statue. Together, the formal and material reasons 
constitute the “nature” of a thing.  
The efficient reason captures the capacity that activates in the mak-
ing of the explanandum, such as the skill of the sculptor in molding the 
statue or the ability of the doctor in ensuring someone’s good health, 
and more generally, all those factors that initiate or impede a process of 
change. The final reason recognizes functions and purposes, such as 
celebrating an athlete of molding a statue or being healthy of someone’s 
walking. Efficient and final reasons complement the nature of things 
and account for them becoming 𝑃 or ceasing to be so in the actual 
                                                          
14 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 99a21-3. 
15 Bronstein, 2016; Malink, 2013. 
16 Aristotle, Physics 194b24-195a2; 195a15-195a26; Hocutt, 1974. 
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world17. Reasons, too, can be either potential or actual18. Their mani-
festation is revealed in the process of change and ceases with it: the 
molding sculptor is the actual reason for the being-molded statue as 
long as the molding endures. In their potential state, instead, they exist 
before and after the process: a sculptor’s capability survives the mold-
ing of the particular statue. A relationship of priority is established as 
the art – or capacity, or capability – accounts for the skills that qualify 
the maker.  
Together, these four principles are the constitutive epistemic dimen-
sions of the Aristotelian substances as the physis of everything. Hence, 
they can be understood as four different criteria to decide on the explan-
atory relevance of some 𝑀 rather than as a straightforward list of causal 
entities.  
That which “brings about” 𝑃 is anything that qualifies as both an 
efficient and a final aitia. To fully account for the inherence of 𝑃 to 𝑆, 
however, the efficient and final causes are seldom enough. 𝑆 can be-
come  𝑃, or manifest it, only when efficient and final factors interact 
with 𝑆’s substantial and formal nature, that is, when they affect the fea-
tures of its constituents and their organization or binding rules. Besides, 
to Aristotle, too, an explanation is driven by what we want to explain, 
which also provides the ground on which ˹𝑆 is 𝑃˺ holds. Therefore, the 
same factor may enter different explanations with different roles; more-
over, different factors can play complementary roles in the same expla-
nation19.  
The usage of the aitia as the criteria for deciding on the explanatory 
relevance of properties becomes evident in Aristotle’s discussion of ac-
cidental causal factors. In this system, only a general property can close 
the chain of transitivity and compel a conclusion20. The accidental prop-
erty, instead, becomes explanatory only when conjoined with a proper 
general factor. Thus, Polykleitos is the valid accidental reason for the 
statue, because the skills of a sculptor constitute an appropriate, effi-
cient reason for its making, and because being Polykleitos was “acci-
dentally conjoined” with being a sculptor21. When the accidental reason 
cannot be conjoined with a proper general reason, the explanandum is 
ascribed to chance or spontaneity.  
                                                          
17 e.g., Annas, 1982. 
18 Aristotle, Physics, 195b17-20. 
19 Moravcsic, 1974. 
20 Aristotle, Physics, 195a27. 
21 Aristotle, Physics, 195a30-35. 
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Aristotle’s Physics does not deny that the world has a stochastic el-
ement. However, it does not admit valid syllogisms about stochastic 
occurrences. A set of purely accidental reasons makes the explanation 
“indeterminable”: an accidental maker has “innumerable” properties 
(such as of being pale, young, a flute player, …) none of which is con-
nected to the explanandum by the sake of its constituents, organization, 
capacity, or purpose. Because of Socrates’ human nature, his death can 
be expected as inevitable: but its actual occurrence can be explained by 
his choice of drinking hemlock and by the poisonous effect of hemlock 
on humans. The color of the cup in which the hemlock was poured or 
the day it was drunk, instead, count as irrelevant conjoined circum-
stances on the sole basis of which no explanation could be possible. 
Syllogisms can only be about “things” that “always come to pass in the 
same way, or for the most part”22. 
The explanation of an occurrence, therefore, consists of the conjunc-
tions of the local factors that account for the “necessary” actualization 
of a general property. The relevance of the particular circumstances, in 
turn, is decided by their contribution to the actualization of the potential 
intrinsic to the subject’s property. In short, the four aitia define the Ar-
istotelean why questions as a matter of accounting for the reasons that 
make 𝑆 being 𝑃. The aitia also point to the complementaries that the 
proper explanation should consider: (1) the nature of 𝑆 – its constitu-
ents, their bound – that makes it possible that 𝑃 inheres in it; (2) the 
factors – willingness, capacity – that can precipitate 𝑃’s inherence in 𝑆. 
Together, these two facets provide the full definition of the subject23. 
The explanatory syllogism, moreover, qualifies as an ex-post exer-
cise. In the Aristotelean ontology, general properties entail a potential 
(dynamis) that remains unrealized unless some conjunction of particular 
circumstances is given. The past, therefore, can be given a truth value, 
whereas the future remains open unless some constellation of circum-
stances rises that turns the potential into actual. Thus, we can establish 
why yesterday a sea battle took place, and we can speculate on the cir-
cumstances that will make it possible that a sea battle takes place to-
morrow. Whether it is true or false that a battle will take place tomor-
row, instead, only tomorrow will say24. 
 
 
                                                          
22 Aristotle, Physics, 196b10, 198a5. 
23 e.g., Hocutt, 1974. 
24 Aristotle, On interpretation 18b17-18b25; Malink, 2013; Frede, 1992. 
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1.5 Limits of categorical deductions  
 
The Aristotelean syllogism holds when the bundle of causal properties 
𝑀 groups every instance of 𝑆 together as a homogeneous partition of 
𝑃25. In turn, the holding of the chain of identities depends on the truth-
values of the atomic sentences in the premisses, which is ultimately 
warranted when the bundle of causal properties is a true universal. The 
bundles of properties, however, suggest that universals are a conditional 
matter: the reason for 𝑆 being 𝑃 depends on the efficient and final con-
ditions under which 𝑆’s potential nature can actualize. As the argument 
of the sea battle emphasizes, 𝑆’s potential remains dormant unless it 
meets the right conditions, and unactualized potentials leave the truth-
values open.  
Logical languages can acknowledge the problem of future contin-
gencies by introducing modal operators. Modals render the necessity, 
possibility, impossibility of some occurrence. They signal whether a 
statement holds in “every possible world,” or accidentally in some of 
them only26. If the statement ˹every 𝑆 is 𝑃˺ is a true universal and holds 
in every place at every time, it can be reformulated as ˹necessarily, 𝑆 is 
𝑃˺. If the same holds in no place and at no time, we can reformulate the 
statement as ˹necessarily, it is not the case that 𝑆 is 𝑃˺ – which has the 
same meaning as ˹it is impossible that 𝑆 is 𝑃˺.  
The Aristotelean categorical logic does support a modal reading. 
Moreover, the Organon acknowledges modal concerns and, implicitly, 
develops some rules to handle them. For instance, the square of oppo-
sition allows maintaining that when the universal 𝑎 holds, it entails a 
necessity shared by any particular 𝑖 and the symmetric impossibility of 
both 𝑒 and 𝑜. Hence, if ˹all swans are white˺ is necessary, then both 
˹every swan is black˺, and ˹some swan is black˺ become impossible 
statements. 
When we only know the particulars, however, the concepts of pos-
sibility and impossibility acquire an epistemic meaning. Thus, the true 
particular  𝑖 entails 𝑒 is impossible, yet allows both 𝑎 and 𝑜 being pos-
sible – and so it becomes a “logical necessity” that either one or the 
other is true. If it is the case that ˹some swan is white˺, it is impossible 
that ˹every swan is black˺, and it is either possible that ˹every swan is 
white˺ or that ˹some swan is black˺, although not both at once. This 
                                                          
25 Brody, 1972. 
26 Lewis et al., 1951; Rescher, 2007; Hintikka, 1969; Mates, 1968; Kripke, 1959. 
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necessity is purely logical, as the actual quality of the next swan remains 
open. Such openness in truth can only vanish if we find the bundle of 
conditions that, once given, rules out the possibility of a black swan and 
makes the occurrence of a white swan certain. In themselves, unactual-
ized possibilities only license conclusions of little factual content such 
as ˹therefore, every swan is either white or not˺ – which is a tautology. 
As it contains all the possible truth values yet does not specify any, it 
does certify our ignorance.  
Although void of factual content, these statements still allow valid 
inferences. This point has been of primary interest to a different tradi-
tion in logic that will become dominant in modern times, but whose 
roots lie in another Athenian school of philosophy27.  
                                                          
27 Mates, 1949, 1961; Bochenski, 1951; Frede, 1974. 
  
 
 
2. Inference as propositional calculus 
 
 
 
 
 
Parallel – and rival – to the Peripatetic, the Stoic school flourished with 
Chrysippus two generations after Aristotle. Although old catalogs sug-
gest an abundant intellectual production, only a few fragments of the 
original teaching have survived, mainly through later unsympathetic 
Greek and Latin sources. Nevertheless, the Stoic fragments exerted an 
uncontested influence on modern logic1. 
Given the many positions the Stoic philosophers took on several 
fundamental issues, theirs cannot be considered a single consistent doc-
trine. However, the school stands out as distinct philosophical kin by at 
least two features. First, their lexicon: philological portrayals empha-
size the accuracy and continuity in the Stoic usage of technical terms. 
Second, their ontology: in contrast with the Platonic assumption of met-
aphysical essences, the Stoics only acknowledged the existence of indi-
vidual bodies in the natural world, about which our mind develops im-
ages (phantasia) shared through sentences or “sayables” (lekta). Thus, 
Stoic categories – namely, substratum (hypokeimenon), qualities 
(poion), state or condition (poion pòs echon), and relative condition 
(proion pros ti pos echon) – are inventories of “what can be said” about 
individual bodies2. Based on fragments, never these categories licensed 
universal statements as in the Aristotelean logic. Instead, they only ap-
plied to some individual subjects – either determined, such as ˹Dion˺, 
or undetermined, such as ˹this˺ and ˹that˺, ˹the first˺ and ˹the second˺. 
Subjects, in turn, could be known: as the unique bundle of substratum, 
qualities, and conditions that single them out as individual bodies in the 
world. 
Such a position has remarkable consequences on logic. The Stoics 
considered the Aristotelean type of deductions – based on transitive 
                                                          
1 e.g., Mates, 1961; Kneale and Kneale, 1965; Łukasiewicz, 1952. 
2 Rist 1969: 55-56. 
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identities and warranted by ontological assumptions about universals – 
be “unmethodically” valid arguments. In contrast, they developed an 
understanding of logical validity independent on the number of the sub-
ject. Valid inferences follow from the connection among complete 
statements arranged into distinctive moods, or schemata, when the con-
nection proves consistent to few rules basic rules, or themata.  
Validity in Stoic logic, in short, mainly depends on the relationships 
within and among sentences and on their fit to given rules of composi-
tion. The truth of the inferences about singular occurrences is decided 
by the rules of formal consistency and independent on the content of 
the statements. Moreover, the validity of sentences depends on stipula-
tions and is determined independently of their use in a syllogistic chain. 
Thus, the Stoic logic includes reflexive propositions – such as that 𝑃 is, 
and that it follows from itself – that the Peripatetic school dismissed as 
redundant, pedantic, and in any case irrelevant to the syllogistic argu-
ment3. However, this signals the remarkable analytic effort that the 
Stoic made to define the object of their logic – the lekta. 
 
 
2.1 Stoic sentences 
 
Although insensitive to the substantive content of sentences, valid Stoic 
inferences do set requirements. Schemata properly apply to a particular 
subclass of lekta – the ones that have a complete enunciation, i.e., that 
contain both the subject and the predicate and hence are self-standing. 
Of the complete lekta, moreover, the Stoic logic excludes several com-
plete lekta from the proper scope of logic – such as those conveying 
questions, commands, oaths, salutations, suggestions, wishes, or curses. 
Valid inferences only rest on complete assertoric sentences, as they can 
bear truth-values. 
Complete assertoric propositions can be simple or non-simple. The 
two kinds differ in their constitutive elements: a non-simple proposition 
is made of propositions; just the opposite, a simple proposition is that 
which does not contain any further proposition. Non-simple proposi-
tions of interest to logic come in three basic types depending on the 
connective (syndesmos) that binds them together: 
 
                                                          
3 Frede, 1974:23. 
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a) a conjunction (sympeplegmenon) is the non-simple proposition 
compounded by the connective ˹and˺ (kai), as in ˹it is day, and it is 
light˺.  
b) a disjunction (dieteygmenon) is the one compounded by the con-
nective ˹or˺ (e), as in ˹it is day, or it is night˺. In the Stoic usage, a 
disjunction compounds exclusive alternatives. The inclusive dis-
junction, allowing for one, the other, or both alternatives together, 
is dubbed a pseudo-disjunction (paradieteygmenon). 
c) the connective ˹if˺ (ei) or ˹if indeed˺ (eiper) yields the conditional 
(synemmenon) non-simple proposition, and signals that the part not 
immediately introduced by the connective, dubbed “the second” 
regardless of its appearance in the discourse, is the consequence of 
the proposition directly introduced by the connective, which is gen-
erally indicated as “the first.” Thus, a conditional can take the 
shape ˹if (ei) the first, the first˺ or ˹the second, if indeed (eiper) the 
first˺.  
 
The Stoic syntax also recognizes further non-simple propositions – 
among which, the ones compounded by the connective ˹because˺, or by 
the connective ˹since˺. Fragments, however, leave the reader clueless 
about their standing, making room to the hypothesis that they may have 
been denied the same import of the three basic connectives, as they can 
be formally reduced to the others4.  
Furthermore, the Stoic logic discriminates among different types of 
negation, depending on whether it applies within a proposition, or to the 
whole of the proposition. Within a proposition, the denial of the subject 
(oudeis) voids the predicate of any scope without exception, as in ˹no-
one walks˺. Privative prefixes (steretikon) only deny the predicate in-
stead, as in aphylanthropos, “un-kind.” The negation of a whole prop-
osition follows from an introductory ˹not˺ (ouchi), which governs its 
quality and yields its opposite (apophaticon assiomata), as in ˹not: it is 
day, and it is night˺.  
 
 
2.2 The truth of simple sentences 
 
Negation is intertwined with the concept of truth and falsity of a prop-
osition. Fragments suggest that the Stoics define as true “what is real 
                                                          
4 Mates 1961:55. 
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and contradicts something” and as false “what is not real and contradicts 
something” – where “things that contradict are those of which one goes 
beyond the other by a negative”5. Truth, then, can be “in” or “about” 
propositions. A proposition is true in itself when the portrayals it con-
veys about the world (phantasia) is accurate and, at the same time, cor-
responds to some actual state of affair. Thus, the proposition ˹this oar is 
bent˺ is correct yet false if the oar is straight but partially underwater. 
The truth or falsity of a proposition may also be impossible to establish 
– for instance, when the predicate correctly applies to a part only of the 
subject. For example, some men are Greek, and some others are barbar-
ian: so, the generic man can be neither truthfully said Greek nor barbar-
ian. The truth “in” a proposition, therefore, is decided by the alignment 
of the predicates that the subject can truthfully bear with the truth of the 
particular predicate that actual sentence attaches to the subject6. Other-
wise said, the Stoic truth in a proposition is a modal matter. However, 
it is not rendered through modal operators. Instead, the issue is ad-
dressed by stipulating the meaning of the connectives – hence, by orig-
inating different logical systems or languages.  
These developments seemingly stemmed from Aristotle’s sea battle 
argument, which the first head of the Stoic school, Diodorus Chronus, 
developed as a trilemma, known as the “Master Argument”7. The Ar-
gument maintains that the following three tenets are jointly inconsistent 
– namely: 
 
(1) what is past and true is necessary;  
(2) the impossible does not follow the possible;  
(3) what neither is nor will be is possible. 
 
The Stoics never challenged the claim that the three statements are 
inconsistent, although the motivation is uncertain. The point was, to re-
gain consistency, one tenet must be rejected as false. Fragments indicate 
a debate spurred about which was the illicit one. Diodorus himself re-
fused the third, and classified propositions as possible when true, either 
now or in the future; nonnecessary when false, either now or in the fu-
ture; necessary when true now, and not false the future; impossible 
when false now, and not true in the future. 
                                                          
5 Bett, 2005:106. 
6 Reesor, 1965. 
7 e.g., Gaskin, 1995; Michaels, 1976; Reesor, 1965; Mates, 1961; Bochenski, 1951. 
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Against Diodorus, and more in line with the Peripatetic positions, 
Chrysippus rejected the second tenet of the trilemma instead. Possible 
events could never occur, and a possible statement could never prove 
true because of its circumstances despite the subject has the potential to 
be. Thus: ˹the log at the bottom of the ocean is combustible˺ qualifies 
as an impossibility, hence a false statement, under Diodorean rules, and 
as a possibility, hence a true statement, under Chrysippean rules. The 
Chrysippean truth entails the assumption of the homogeneity of nature 
– so that what happens once can happen again – and counterfactual con-
siderations about circumstances. According to his criteria, hence, pos-
sible are those propositions in which the subject has a true predicate 
unless external concurrent circumstances do not prevent it from being 
true. Nonnecessary are those propositions in which the subject receives 
a false predicate unless external concomitant conditions do not prevent 
it from being false. Necessary are those propositions that are true or do 
not admit of being false, and impossible are those propositions that are 
false or do not admit of being true. 
When applied to simple propositions, Chrysippean modalities can 
be understood as the intensional counterpart of the extensional Peripa-
tetic categories. Impossibility yields the negative universal, necessity, 
the positive one. Possibility and nonnecessity, instead, recall positive 
and negative particulars. This correspondence, however, weakens when 
the rules are applied to decide on the truth-value of singular non-simple 
propositions.  
 
 
2.3 The truth of compound sentences  
 
The rules of composition apply to each of the lekta compounded by 
conjunction, disjunction, and conditional. 
 
2.3.1 Conjunctions 
Fragments report a conjunction is true when all of its conjuncts are 
true. To those who argued a conjunction could still be true when the 
majority of its conjuncts are true, the Stoic responded that  
 
just as in life we do not say that the piece of clothing that is sound in 
most parts, but torn in a small part, is sound (on the basis of its sound 
parts, which is most of them), but torn (on the basis of its small torn 
part), so too the conjunction, even if it has only one false component 
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and a majority of true ones, will as a whole be called false on the basis 
of that one8. 
 
The response suggests, the Stoic rule of composition maintains that 
a compound is qualitatively different from the sum of its part. The truth-
value about a non-simple proposition renders the truth of the special 
relationship that the connective establishes among its components. The 
conjunction, from this perspective, provides a straightforward logical 
strategy to identify a body as the bundle of properties and conditions 
that qualify it. The statement ˹Scipio was the son of Aemilius Paullus 
and twice consul and censor, and the defeater of Hannibal˺ would be 
false because the first three statements are true of Scipio Aemilianus, 
while the latter is true of his adoptive grandfather instead9. On a similar 
vein, ˹it is day, and I am conversing˺ is a false statement unless all the 
corresponding states of affairs are jointly given in the world – and, ac-
cording to the Diodorean understanding, only if they jointly hold at any 
time and cannot change. 
Interestingly, the assignment of a truth value to a conjunction of 
propositions follows the rationale of the weakest link that we found em-
bedded in the chains of identities that shape the Aristotelean syllogisms. 
The Stoic logic considers that the principle of the weakest link estab-
lishes the formal equivalence of conjunctions and transitive identities. 
Formal equivalence will prove a convenient property of propositions, 
as it turns inference into a straightforward calculus – at least, a more 
straightforward one than the Aristotelean oppositions and conversions. 
 
2.3.2 Disjunctions 
A disjunction is true if any of its disjuncts is true; an exclusive dis-
junction is stricter as it is true when only one of the disjuncts is true. Its 
rationale recalls a decision among rival alternatives. The fragments 
agree, Chrysippus maintained this was proper of any rational animal – 
for instance, of a chasing dog that comes 
 
to a crossroad and, having tracked down the two roads along which 
the wild animal did not go, starts off at once along the third without 
tracking down it [… The dog] is implicitly reasoning as follows: ‘The 
                                                          
8 Bettl, 2005:126. 
9 Mates, 1961:54. 
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animal went either this way or this way or this or this; but neither this 
way nor this: therefore this way’10. 
 
To be valid, therefore, the alternatives in an exclusive disjunction 
have to be mutually incompatible and jointly exhaustive. Of the two, 
incompatibility was recognized higher import, as it had the convenient 
property of ensuring that, when the disjuncts are two, they are contra-
dictory to one another. Thus, ˹it is day, or it is night˺ qualifies a true 
disjunction as either one or the other disjunct is true, yet not both. From 
a truth-functional perspective, the incompatibility of two alternatives 
establishes them as contraries – same objects related by the negation 
connective11. Hence, alternatives entail identities – although through 
negation. 
 
2.3.3 Conditional 
According to fragments, a Stoic conditional is a non-simple propo-
sition in which the connective conveys the second component is a con-
sequence of the first. Here, the debate about the standards for truth has 
long proved as thorny as consequential. Fragments12 report four criteria 
were advocated within the Stoic school. 
 
The Philonean criterion establishes a conditional relationship that is 
always true except when its first is true and its second is false. So, the 
link “is true in three ways and false in one way” – namely, 
 
(a) it is true when both the first and the second are true, as in ˹if 
it is day, it is light˺; 
(b) it is false when the first is true, and the second is false, as in 
˹if the soil exists, it flies˺. 
(c) it is true – although “vacuously” so – when the first is false 
and the second is true, as in ˹if the soil flies, it exists˺; 
(d) it is true when both the first and the second are false, as in ˹if 
the soil flies, it has wings˺. 
 
                                                          
10 Annas and Barnes, 2000: 20. 
11 Bett, 2005:110. 
12 Mates, 1961:47 ff; Kneale and Kneale 1962: 128 ff.; Frede, 1974:4ff; Bobzien, 
1996:185ff; Annas and Barnes, 2000: 95ff; Priest and Hyde, 2003; Bett, 2005:112ff. 
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We will find the Philonean conditional in modern formal logic as 
the “material implication” codified by Whitehead and Russell13, and the 
attribution of truth values to a connective as the truth-function ˹true-
false-true-true˺ formalized by Wittgenstein14.  
Over time, the Philonean truth-value assigned to (c) has spurred 
lively philosophical debates. On the one hand, it mirrors the principle, 
enduring in classical logic, that ex falso quodlibet – anything can follow 
from a false premiss. On the other hand, it seems too lax to render a 
real-world implication – particularly when the implication is endowed 
with the causal meaning that follows from the “if indeed” connective. 
 
The Diodorean criterion maintains the conditional is true that nei-
ther was nor is able to begin with a true proposition and finish with a 
false one. This is a stricter standard than the Philonean in two respects. 
˹If it is day, Socrates is conversing˺ is Philonean-true if, at the time 
of its utterance, it was day and Socrates was having a conversation. It 
is Diodorean-false, instead, as it is possible that, during the day, Socra-
tes turns silent: thus, the conditional can have a true first and a false 
second. 
˹If it is night, it is day˺ again qualifies as true during the day accord-
ing to Philo, as the conditional would have a false first and a true sec-
ond. In Diodorean terms, it qualifies as false even during the day be-
cause the day can turn into night, and when uttered at night, the condi-
tional has a true first and a false second. 
In short, the Diodorean criterion requires the conditional is true that 
holds “eternally”15. It finds its modern match in the strict conditional – 
the implication that holds in every possible world16. 
 
The allegedly Chrysippean criterion appeals to “correctness” in-
stead. It maintains that a conditional is sound when the opposite of the 
second “conflicts” with the first. In short, a conditional is Chrysippean-
valid if it supports counterfactual reasoning. The definition resonates 
with the Peripatetic doctrine in proving a syllogistic connection ad ab-
surdum as it was a geometrical theorem. The proof suggests that the 
syllogistic chain of identities and the Chrysippean conditional render 
                                                          
13 Whitehead and Russell, 1927. 
14 Wittgenstein, 1922. 
15 Quine, 1960. 
16 e.g., Lewis, 1918. 
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the same kind of dependency. Aristotle’s ˹is˺ and Chrysippus ˹if-then˺ 
are homologs as they apply to terms with the same extension. 
A typical illustration of the Chrysippean conditional considers the 
statement: ˹ if not: atoms constitute things, then atoms constitute things˺. 
Both Philo’s and Diodorus’ criteria would license it as true: the ante-
cedent does not and can never hold true, the consequent does and can 
always hold true. By the Chrysippean criterion, however, the condi-
tional is unsound. The contrary of the second, ˹atoms constitute things˺, 
is ˹not: atoms constitute things˺, which is identical to the first and hence 
fails the requirement of contradiction. In contrast, the conditional ˹if it 
is day, it is day˺ is Chrysippean-true, as the opposite of the second reads 
˹not: it is day˺, which does contradict the first. 
The criterion entails that a conditional relationship mirrors a real 
world connection (synartesis) between the first state of affairs and the 
second state of affairs. The rule rejects connections between incon-
sistent terms, such as ˹if Socrates is a triangle, then Socrates is a philos-
opher˺, that the Philonean would license instead, and from which the 
Diodorean is not immune, as is could happen with the assertion ˹if at-
oms constitute things, then Socrates is a philosopher˺.  
We find the rationale of the Chrysippean rule in the modern coun-
terfactual or subjunctive conditional17. 
 
Last, fragments report a position generally ascribed to those Stoics 
who decide on truth based on the content of the statement – in this, 
closer to the essentialism in the Peripatetic positions. To them, the “du-
plicated” conditional ˹if it is day, it is day˺ is in itself unsound because 
conditionality requires that the first contains the second, and nothing 
can be contained in itself. In the shape of the axiom of reflexivity, this 
implication is instead accepted and proven in many, although not all, of 
the modern “possible world semantics”18. 
 
These different definitions of conditionality prove especially conse-
quential as they define the boundaries within which complex statements 
can be treated as formally equivalent, and inferences can be drawn. 
 
                                                          
17 e.g., Goodman 1947, 1955. 
18 Cresswell 2017; Stakelum, 1940. 
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2.3.4 Formal equivalences 
Conjunction, disjunction, and conditionality suggest that simple 
statements can entertain three kinds of relationships with each other, 
corresponding to as many types of relationships in the world19. They 
can be mutually incompatible, partially compatible, or fully compatible. 
Incompatibility entails simultaneous coexistence is as impossible as 
simultaneous absence. Captured by the exclusive disjunction, it recalls 
the relationship between Aristotelean contradictory opposites – a uni-
versal and a particular of different quality. Consequence rises among 
those states that always coexist. It is captured by the conjunction and 
conveys that simultaneous presence is as necessary as simultaneous ab-
sence – relative to the time constraints to which the definition is com-
mitted. Then, incompatibility and consequence are one the mirror im-
age of the other. Partial compatibility, instead, is captured by the inclu-
sive disjunction; it conveys a weaker if not an accidental conditionality 
and is similar to the relationship between Aristotelean subcontraries. 
An enduring feature of Stoic propositional logic is that different 
complexes of sentences can convey the same relationship among states 
of affairs. Statements compounded by conjunction, disjunction, and 
conditional, then, become inter-definable following rules of formal 
equivalence.  
Many sources20 report that Chrysippus applied the property of inter-
definability to conditionals and oracles. These fragments allow infer-
ring that he recommended oracles such as  
 
˹if anyone is born under the Dog Star,  
then he will not drown in the sea˺ 
[0.0s] 
 
be rephrased as pseudo-disjunctions, as under any stricter interpreta-
tion, even a single drowning sailor born under the Dog Star would have 
proven the oracle false. Seemingly, the argument went as follows. He 
claimed the conditional could be restated as  
 
˹not both: born under the Dog Star,  
 and drowning in the sea˺ 
[0.1s] 
 
which, in turn, can be rendered as  
 
                                                          
19 Stakelum, 1940:48-53. 
20 Long and Sedley, 2012:232. 
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˹born under the Dog Star,  
 or not drowning in the sea˺ 
[0.2s] 
 
If the latter is understood as a pseudo-disjunction, anybody will 
make it true that meets at least one of the two conditions. The weak 
disjunction does not establish compelling connections of consequenti-
ality between two sentences. Hence, it can preserve the assumption that 
the oracles are true without being necessarily-true – which leaves room 
for free will, human responsibility, and open futures. 
Inter-definability was later formalized as laws of complementarity21. 
The laws developed from the principles that  
 
[C1] the negation of a negation affirms,  
[C2] the negation of a conjunction is a disjunction and vice versa.  
 
The two principles reduce the essential axioms required to develop 
a logical language to three – namely, identity, negation, and either con-
junction or disjunction22. Whitehead and Russell, in laying the founda-
tion of modern propositional logic, accept inter-definability as a conse-
quence of their axiom of reducibility. The axiom commits to the as-
sumption that propositions can be reduced to truth functions, although 
on pain of a loss in modality, intension, and meaning. About such a 
costly trade-off, they noted that 
 
This axiom has a purely pragmatic justification: it leads to the desired 
results, and to no others. But clearly it is not the sort of axiom with 
which we can rest content. On this subject, however, it cannot be said 
that a satisfactory solution is as yet obtainable23. 
 
As an illustration of the working of the reduction, let us adopt the 
next convention in notation, as follows. 
 
 Let us indicate the connective of the negation with the logical ˹ not˺ 
indicated either as an overbar or a curl so that ?̅? means the same 
as ~𝑃 and reads ˹it is not the case that 𝑃˺, or ˹not 𝑃˺ for short. 
Extensionally, the negation of the sentence 𝑃 can be depicted as 
the shadowed area of the Venn diagram (𝛼) in Figure 4. 
                                                          
21 De Morgan, 1847. 
22 Tarski, 1956; Quine, 1960, 1982. 
23 Whitehead and Russell, 1927:xiv. 
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 Let us indicate the connective of the conjunction with the logical 
˹and˺, indicated by a wedge. So, 𝑃 ∧ 𝑄 reads ˹it is the case that 𝑃 
and it is the case that 𝑄˺ or, for short, ˹𝑃 and 𝑄˺. 
Extensionally, the compound of 𝑃 and 𝑄 can be depicted as the 
shadowed area of the Venn diagram (𝛽) in Figure 4. 
 Let us indicate the connective of the disjunction with the logical 
˹or˺, indicated by a vee, so that 𝑃 ∨ 𝑄 reads, ˹it is the case that 𝑃 
or it is the case that 𝑄˺ or, for short, ˹𝑃 or 𝑄˺.  
It is worth noting that, unless otherwise stipulated, the vee is for 
the inclusive disjunction: hence, it covers anything that is 𝑃 yet 
not 𝑄, plus anything that is 𝑄 yet not 𝑃, plus anything that is both 
𝑃 and 𝑄. The inclusive disjunction entails the more demanding 
exclusive disjunction, as the latter covers the same kinds of ob-
jects except for those which are both 𝑃 and 𝑄. 
Extensionally, the holding of the exclusive disjunction corre-
sponds to the shadowed area of the Venn diagram (𝜒.1) in Figure 
4; that of the inclusive disjunction, to the shaded area of the Venn 
diagram (𝜒.2) in the same Figure. 
 Let us indicate the connective of the Philonean or material condi-
tional with the horseshoe open toward the antecedent, so that 𝑃 ⊃
𝑄 reads ˹if it is the case that 𝑃, then it is the case that 𝑄˺ or, for 
short, ˹𝑄, if 𝑃˺. 
Extensionally, the Philonean conditional holds in the shadowed 
area of the Venn diagram (𝛿) in Figure 4.  
 
Now, we can read 𝑃 as the statement ˹𝑥 is born under the Dog Star˺, 
𝑄 as the statement ˹𝑥 will not drown in the sea˺, and, in each, 𝑥 as the 
post-holder for the same subject – understood either as a subject of the 
same type, or the same individual. As both the statements in the oracle 
structure refer to the same subject, however, we can drop the reference 
to 𝑥 in the following. Given these stipulations, we can render the oracle 
statement [0.0s] as the formula [0.0] below:  
 
𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄  [0.0] 
 
The suggestion to rephrase it as [0.1s] yields [0.1]: 
 
~ (𝑃 ∧ ~𝑄)  [0.1] 
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Figure 4. Venn’s representation of complex sentences 
(α) not 𝑃 (𝛽) 𝑃 and 𝑄 
  
(𝜒.1) either 𝑃 or 𝑄 (𝜒.2) 𝑃 or 𝑄 
  
(𝛿) if 𝑃, 𝑄 (𝜀) iff 𝑃, 𝑄  
  
 
Keys: The sentence 𝑃 holds in the areas marked as 1; else, its negation, ~𝑃, 
holds instead. The sentence 𝑄 holds in the areas marked as 2; else, its negation, 
~𝑄, holds instead. In the area marked as 0, only negations hold. In each diagram, 
the compound stated in the subheading is true in any shadowed area. 
 
The formula reads that it is not the case – it cannot be – that the 
sentence 𝑃 be true and 𝑄 be false. It requires that 𝑄 certainly occurs 
under 𝑃 and that, in the absence of 𝑃, 𝑄 does not happen. In short, the 
two propositions are true together or false together. This means the 
same as the disjunction in [0.2] 
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~𝑃 ∨ 𝑄  [0.2] 
 
[0.2] reads that either 𝑃 is not, or 𝑄 happens. The slippage in mean-
ing occurs as [0.2] draws attention to anything that is ~𝑃, regardless of 
whether it is 𝑄 or ~𝑄, and to anything that is 𝑄, regardless of it being 
𝑃. The equivalence relaxes the requirement of being 𝑃 for having 𝑄. 
This relaxation will later be deplored as a source of paradoxical assump-
tions about the probative import of red herrings, or white shoes, to pro-
vide evidence that all ravens are black24.  
In short, the transformation of [0.0] into [0.1] is generally accepted 
across logical languages and entails the counterfactual reading of the 
conditional. Instead, the equivalence of [0.0] as [0.2] is rejected by 
those understandings that convey a difference between a true relation-
ship of causation, such as ˹if it is heated, then it will burn˺, and conver-
sational compositions such as ˹if you want cookies, then you’ll find 
some in that box˺ – both of which fit the material horseshoe, and bear 
its truth function.  
The departure of these logics from the truth-functional definition of 
the conditional is often signaled by the introduction of different opera-
tors for conditionality, such as Lewis’ strict analytic implication and the 
corresponding “real connection” (→) reading ˹if, then in result˺25. 
 
 
2.4 Schemata 
 
The issue of the inter-definability of connectives is especially conse-
quential, as it opens to inference by propositional calculus. The opera-
tion consists in assigning a truth value to a component of a compound 
once we know the truth value of the others and the basic rules for cal-
culating the truth values. The Stoic schemata provide the prototypical 
structures that display the application of these rules for valid inferences. 
They were deemed “indemonstrable” as axioms that “have no need of 
demonstration”26.  
Here again, in each schema, the argument is structured into at least 
three sentences: the first stating the rule that governs the relationship 
among simple terms, the second making the case about one of the terms, 
and a third drawing the conclusion. Fragments report that at least five 
                                                          
24 Good, 1967; Maher, 1999; cfr Hempel, 1965. 
25 Lewis 1946:184, 248; Lewis and Langford, 1959; Quine, 1960. 
26 Bett, 2005:132. 
54 
of these indemonstrable schemata were in use in the Stoic canon of 
logic.  
 
2.4.1 The first indemonstrable 
Later known as the modus ponendo ponens or method of affirming, 
the schema reads as in [1.a] below: 
 
If the first, the second. 
But: the first. 
Then: the second. 
[1.a] 
 
The usual illustration runs as follows: “If it is day, it is light. But: it 
is day. Then: it is light”. Given the notation (𝛼) to (𝛿), the first inde-
monstrable can be formalized as in [1] below: 
 
𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄  
  𝑃 
 [1] 
     ∴ 𝑄   
 
the symbol ∴ reading ˹therefore˺ and introducing a logical conclusion.  
The formalization clarifies the structure of the argument. The con-
ditional 𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄 plays as the major premiss, establishing a general rule. 
The argument, then, makes the case that 𝑃. The conclusion follows as 
the inference of the truth value of the unknown component, given the 
truth function of the conditional and the knowledge from the case.  
Notwithstanding the Stoic labels for the schemes, truth-functional 
logic can prove the first indemonstrable is a formally valid inference by 
appealing to inter-definability. The proof runs as follows. The condi-
tional in [0.0] 𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄 can be restated as the disjunction [0.1] ~(𝑃 ∧
~𝑄). The first indemonstrable allows us assuming the substitutability 
of 𝑄 with 𝑃: hence, we can rewrite [0.1] as [0.1a] ~(𝑃 ∧ ~𝑃). The new 
conjunction, then, denies the non-simple sentence 𝑃 ∧ ~𝑃. However, 
the conjunction of a proposition and the negation of itself is a contra-
diction – that is, a compound that contains every quality and, hence, is 
a latent construct without corresponding observed instances27. Its nega-
tion, thus, portrays the principle of noncontradiction, to which classical 
logic is committed as it preserves the axiom of the identity of the sub-
ject. When developed, it yields [0.2a] ~𝑃 ∨ 𝑃, which renders the same 
                                                          
27 Wittgenstein, 1922: 4.463. 
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as the principle of the excluded middle. [0.2a] contains all the possible 
truth-values of 𝑃 at once; hence, it is trivially true ahead of any actual-
ization, as it can never be false. Such a transformation of a true condi-
tional into a tautology proves the first schema is formally valid28. Nev-
ertheless, as Wittgenstein himself had to conclude, this proof says noth-
ing about the actual grasp that the conditional has of the real world.  
Saying something about the world is the particular task of the prac-
tical application of logic as the methodological blueprint of modern re-
search29. From this perspective, the modus ponens clarifies the empiri-
cal expectation about the relationship between 𝑃 and 𝑄. The schema 
states that, whenever we observe 𝑃, we can expect 𝑄. Hence, we can 
prove the conditional true by confirmation if we select instances dis-
playing 𝑃 and find them non-accidentally associated with 𝑄30. 
 
2.4.2 The second indemonstrable 
Later known as modus tollendo tollens or method of denying, the 
second schema stipulates that, as in [2.a]: 
 
If the first, the second. 
But: not the second. 
Then: not the first. 
[2.a] 
 
The typical Stoic example that illustrates its usage reads: ˹ if it is day, 
it is light. But: it is not light. Then: it is not day˺. The second indemon-
strable, hence, can be formalized as in [2] below: 
 
𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄 
~𝑄  
 [2] 
∴ ~𝑃    
 
The argument again considers that a conditional relationship exists 
between 𝑃 and 𝑄, but then it makes the case that the consequent is false: 
~𝑄. The conclusion infers that, therefore, the antecedent in the condi-
tional is false, too: it is not the case that 𝑃.  
                                                          
28 Wittgenstein, 1922: 4.46, 6.1. 
29 e.g., Mill, 1843. 
30 e.g., King et al. 1994:137; Carnap, 1949. 
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From the truth-functional perspective, the logical validity of this ar-
gument, too, can be demonstrated. The schema establishes the substi-
tutability of ~𝑄 with ~𝑃. Applied to [0.1] ~(𝑃 ∧ ~𝑄), the substitution 
again yields the relationship [0.1a] ~(𝑃 ∧ ~𝑃), whose development is 
[0.2a] ~𝑃 ∨ 𝑃, which again proves the argument logically valid alt-
hough factually void. 
From the pragmatic viewpoint of methods, the modus tollendo tol-
lens is the contrapositive of the modus ponendo ponens – that is, its 
negation. As such, it provides the terms under which the empirical im-
port of a conditional hypothesis can be tested by falsification. It entails 
a conditional hypothesis holds unless instances are observed that con-
tradict it. The strategy proves especially useful when the universe of 
reference is infinite, and the confirmation from the modus ponendo po-
nens cannot prove conclusive31.  
 
2.4.3 Further schemata 
The remaining indemonstrables all develop from exclusive alterna-
tives established as conjunctions or disjunctions. They again will pre-
serve their value over time as the blueprint of inference, as especially 
Mill’ canons show. 
 
The third indemonstrable, known as modus ponendo tollens, con-
cludes the opposite of a conjunct from the negation of a conjunction of 
two. Fragments illustrate it as in [3.a]: 
 
Not: the first and the second. 
But: the first. 
Then: not the second. 
[3.a] 
 
The schema generalizes the example: ˹not: it is day, and it is night. 
But it is day. Then, it is not night˺ and can be formalized as in [3] below: 
 
~(𝑃 ∧ 𝑄) 
𝑃  
 [3] 
∴ ~𝑄    
 
The argument renders an exclusive alternative as the situation in 
which 𝑃 and 𝑄 cannot be jointly given. 
                                                          
31 Mill, 1843; Popper, 1937; Hempel, 1965. 
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The same is established by the fourth indemonstrable. From an ex-
clusive disjunction and one of the disjuncts, the argument concludes the 
other disjunct – as in [4.a]: 
 
Either the first or the second. 
But: the first. 
Then: not the second. 
[4.a] 
 
The illustrative example states ˹either it is day, or it is night. But it 
is day. Therefore, it is not night˺. The formalization follows the struc-
ture in [4]:  
 
𝑃 ∨ 𝑄 
 𝑃 
 [4] 
∴ ~𝑄    
 
The third and fourth indemonstrables conclude the same (𝑃) after 
observing the same (~𝑄) despite the premiss being different. This li-
censes the conclusion that the negation of the conjunction and the ex-
clusive disjunction of two terms convey the same underlying relation-
ship between the terms. 
The last indemonstrable of sure Stoic origin will be later known as 
the modus tollendo ponens, to indicate that the schema affirms by deny-
ing. From an exclusive disjunction, the argument allows inferring the 
one disjunct from the negation of the other. Fragments portray it as in 
[5.a] below: 
 
Either the first or the second. 
But: not the second. 
Then: the first. 
[5.a] 
 
often illustrated as ˹either it is day or it is night. But it is not night. 
Therefore, it is day˺. The structure can be formalized as in [5] below: 
 
𝑃 ∨ 𝑄 
 ~𝑄 
 [5] 
∴ 𝑃    
 
58 
The structure abstracts the schema of the chasing dog argument that 
Chrisyppus reportedly used to support his definition of the exclusive 
disjunction.  
 
The schemata, then, can be understood as the operational definitions 
of the connectives employed in the Stoic logic. Thus, they are exten-
sions of the relationships in categorical logic, as in [A.1] to [A.4]. The 
proper Stoic syllogistic reasoning, however, can be found in the analy-
sis of complex arguments.  
 
 
2.5 Themata  
 
The Stoic “analysis,” much like modern analysis, consists of reducing 
complex arguments to tautologies. The five indemonstrables were rou-
tinely applied to transform the initial argument to the disjunction of a 
term and its negation. Their application was codified into specific pro-
cedures, called themata, and structures, called theorema.  
Only two reliable examples of Stoic analysis have reached us. The 
first is found in Sextus Empiricus32, who reports the following:  
 
If the first and the second, the third. 
Not the third, 
but the first. 
Then: not the second. 
[6.a] 
 
The unfolding of the analysis can be formalized as in [6] below: 
 
(𝑃 ∧ 𝑄) ⊃ 𝑅 
 ~𝑅  
 [6] 
∴ ~(𝑃 ∧ 𝑄) 
         𝑃 
  
∴ ~𝑄   
 
The analysis of the argument clarifies that, whenever 𝑅 follows 
from 𝑃 and 𝑄, but not-𝑅 is observed, the conjunction shall be false; this, 
however, only can be when at least one of the two conjuncts is false – 
                                                          
32 Bett, 2005: 135-136; Mates, 1961:77. 
59 
no matter if 𝑃 or 𝑄. In the illustration, 𝑃 is observed: therefore, 𝑄 must 
be false for the argument to hold. 
The other recognized example allows maintaining that if a third 
proposition is deduced from two conjuncts, and one conjunct follows 
from a fourth proposition, then the fourth proposition with the other 
conjunct yields the conclusion. The thema runs as in [7.a]: 
 
If the first and the second, the third. 
If the fourth, the second. 
But: the first and the fourth. 
Then: the third. 
[7.a] 
 
The unfolding of the analysis can be formalized as in [7] below: 
 
(𝑃 ∧ 𝑄) ⊃ 𝑅 
𝑆 ⊃ 𝑄 
 [7] 
∴ (𝑃 ∧ 𝑆) ⊃ 𝑅 
 𝑃 ∧ 𝑆  
  
∴ 𝑅    
 
The procedure justifies substituting a proposition with some equiv-
alent statement until it dissolves33. 
 
 
2.6 Strengths and limits of schemata 
 
Arguments that unfold along valid schemata and themata were deemed 
valid and conclusive in the formal sense. 
Valid patterns could not ensure the arguments were meaningful, 
however. Meaningful or demonstrative arguments are valid structures 
that, moreover, cast light on an unclear consequence. Thus, ˹if it is day, 
then it is day, but it is day; therefore, it is day˺ is conclusive according 
to many criteria, despite its poor content. In contrast, arguments of the 
kind: ˹if one has a healed wound, then he has a scar, but he has no scars; 
therefore, he has no healed wounds˺ are conclusive, valid, and demon-
strative at once.  
                                                          
33 The procedure is now performed in proof theory, for instance, through semantic 
tableaux: e.g., Horrocks, 1996; Carnielli, 1987. 
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Nevertheless, the formal validity of schemata and themata can at 
least ensure that arguments escape four major structural faults – namely, 
disconnectedness, redundancy, bad patterns, and deficiency. 
 
2.6.1 Disconnected arguments 
Disconnectedness arises when a conclusion is drawn, but the prem-
isses are unrelated to one another or the conclusion. ˹If it is day, it is 
light. But wheat is sold in the market. Therefore, Dion is walking˺ il-
lustrates a rule, a case, and a conclusion that share no ground, and that 
the indemonstrables can dismiss as invalid. Indeed, a schema reading 
𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄, 𝑆, ∴ 𝑅 provides no element for decision. 
 
2.6.2 Redundant arguments 
Redundancy is disconnectedness of a particular kind. It arises when 
superfluous terms are inserted in the argument. The usual example elab-
orates on the indemonstrables with the conditional and includes three 
terms: an antecedent 𝑃, such as ˹it is day˺; a consequent 𝑄, such as ˹it 
is light˺; and the redundant insertion 𝑅, such as ˹Dion is walking˺.  
When the redundant term is added to the case in a schema based on 
the first indemonstrable, we have  
 
𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄  
𝑃 ∧ 𝑅  
∴ 𝑄  
[1.b] 
 
reading ˹If it is day, it is light, but it is day and Dion is walking, there-
fore it is light˺. From a formal perspective, the schema is unaffected by 
the insertion. The conditional in the argument does not provide us with 
any expectation about the contribution that walking Dion brings to the 
relationship between day and light. Thus, the validity of the argument 
does not depend on the truth value of Dion’s state. The pertinent ante-
cedent is observed as true, and true is the conclusion, too. The redun-
dancy of the insertion, moreover, is evident as the conclusion is ob-
tained regardless of the state of the superfluous conjunct. 
Validity is preserved even when the redundant term is added to the 
antecedent of the conditional, which makes the insertion relevant to the 
argument instead. A modern version of the riddle34 portrays a salt dis-
solving (𝑄) if put in water (𝑃) after casting a spell (𝑅). The antecedent 
                                                          
34 Kyburg, 1965; Salmon, 1984; Fetzer, 2000. 
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requires that the case is made that the whole antecedent be true, as in 
[1.c]  
 
(𝑃 ∧ 𝑅) ⊃ 𝑄  
𝑃 ∧ 𝑅  
∴ 𝑄  
[1.c] 
 
The argument reads: ˹if one puts salt in water and casts a spell, then 
the salt dissolves; but it is the case that one puts salt in water and casts 
a spell – therefore, the salt dissolves˺. The argument is valid as the con-
clusion follows. However, the argument is valid despite the redundant 
term makes the premiss substantively false as a false premiss does not 
affect the truth of conclusions.  
That this schema draws the right conclusions on the wrong ground, 
however, arises a concern. It shows that the first indemonstrable – hence 
the modus ponens, or any pure strategy of confirmation – cannot dis-
criminate between a real conjunct and a redundant insertion in the an-
tecedent of a conditional. In short, as especially Mill would later under-
line, when the antecedent is a conjunction, confirmation cannot 
properly support causal claims – and leaves the explanation on shaky 
ground.  
 
2.6.3 Fallacies 
The next structural faults, bad schemata, are better known as falla-
cies. They occur when the argument violates the closer valid schema. 
The known Stoic examples refer to the first and the second indemon-
strable.  
Recall the pattern of the second indemonstrable maintains that [2] 
𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄,~𝑄, ∴ ~𝑃. The related illicit schema, later known as “denying 
the antecedent,” unfolds as in [2.f] below: 
 
𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄 
~𝑃 
 [2.f] 
   ∴ ~𝑄   
 
The fallacy rules out as invalid those inferences that lead to the ne-
gation of the consequent, having observed the negation of the anteced-
ent. In other terms, it considers illicit reasoning that ˹if it is day, it is 
light; but it is not day; therefore, it is not light˺. The rejection of this 
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pattern of inference as fallacious preserves the truth function of the ma-
terial conditional. From the substantive perspective of methods, more-
over, the rejection of the inference as fallacious is justified by a prag-
matic consideration: otherwise, we would be presuming, yet not prov-
ing, that the day is the sure and irreplaceable antecedent of light.  
 
The other violation challenges the first indemonstrable, with an il-
licit schema dubbed “affirming the consequent.” The schema unfolds 
as in [1.f] below: 
 
𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄 
 𝑄  
 [1.f] 
∴ 𝑃   
 
The conclusion is faulty as we cannot conclude the antecedent from 
the hypothesis of a conditional and the case of the consequent. ˹If it is 
day it is light; but it is light; therefore, it is day˺ does not qualify as 
valid: the light about which the case is made may come from other 
sources. The schema is illicit as, again, it stipulates yet does not prove 
the assumption that 𝑃 is the certain and irreplaceable antecedent of 𝑄. 
 
The inference from the consequent to the antecedent and from the 
negation of the antecedent to the negation of the consequent becomes 
licit when the relationship between 𝑃 and 𝑄 is biconditional. The rela-
tionship is signaled by  
 
 the iff connective. Indicated by a double-headed arrow ⇔ or with 
the triple bar ≡, it entails that the antecedent implies the conse-
quent and vice versa: (𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄) ∧ (𝑄 ⊃ 𝑃). Hence, 𝑃 ≡ 𝑄 reads ˹if 
and only if 𝑃, 𝑄˺. Extensionally, it holds in the shadowed area of 
the Venn diagram (𝜀) in Figure 4 – which also shows it be the 
complement of the exclusive disjunction (𝜒.1). 
 
Biconditionals, in short, establish identities between the antecedent 
and the consequent. This symmetry allows for commutations and sub-
stitutions that widen the interdefinability of sentences and ease the in-
ference. True biconditionals, however, may prove circular unless they 
draw upon the identity of an object and its qualifying parts. Thus, both 
arguments: ˹if and only if it has three straight sides, it is a triangle. But 
it has not three straight sides. Therefore, it is not a triangle˺, and: ˹if, 
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and only if it has three straight sides, it is a triangle. But it is a triangle. 
Therefore, it has three straight sides˺ hold and are demonstrative. ˹If, 
and only if it is day, it is day˺, instead, is formally valid yet not demon-
strative at all.  
 
2.6.4 Incomplete arguments 
The last source of inconclusive arguments lies in deficiency – what 
we can now identify as a problem of omitted variables or ill-structured 
problems. In the original fragments, the issue is illustrated with the fifth 
indemonstrable; however, it follows from the violation of exhaustive-
ness and, hence, it applies to any argument based on disjunction. Sextus 
Empiricus, seldom generous with Stoic logic, endorses the principle 
that the conclusion from an incomplete list of alternatives is flawed. He, 
for instance, rejects the argument that: 
 
˹Either wealth is a bad thing or wealth is a good thing; but wealth is 
not a bad thing; therefore wealth is a good thing˺. For wealth’s being 
an indifferent thing is missing in the disjunction, so that the sound 
version is, rather, like this: ˹Either wealth is a good thing or a bad 
thing or an indifferent thing; but wealth is neither a good thing nor a 
bad thing; therefore it is an indifferent thing˺35. 
 
As in the case of redundancies, deficient arguments show that infer-
ences are sensitive to the structure of the content of their “major prem-
iss” – especially when the deficiency is embedded in a logically com-
plex theorema.  
 
Themata, schemata, and predicate calculus provide an inventory of 
the logical problems and the solutions that will shape the modern phi-
losophy of science and methods. In the passage to the modern discourse 
on explanation, the primary issue has become the tenability of the major 
premiss and the criteria to establish it. The issue will prove consequen-
tial on the whole explanatory machinery.  
                                                          
35 Bett, 2005: 174. 
  
 
 
3. Modern explanation 
 
 
 
 
 
Over time, the original works of the Stoic school went almost lost, 
while the Peripatetic doctrine was employed to support dogmatic posi-
tions about the necessity of being. Under the pressure of political and 
religious censorship, Aristotelianism institutionalized as the “received 
view”1. In 1787 Kant could famously declare that, since Aristotle, logic 
had “been unable to take a single step forward, and therefore” seemed 
“to all appearance to be finished and complete” – which also read as a 
verdict of ossification2.  
The Aristotelean teaching fell into overt disrepute, indicted for a 
tendency to cultivate inutilis subtilitas. The fault was diagnosed in its 
reliance on ill-defined syllogistic premisses, from which science had to 
be freed: 
 
The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words, 
and words are counters for notions. Hence if the notions themselves 
(this is the basis of the matter) are confused and abstracted from things 
without care, there is nothing sound in what is built on them. The only 
hope is true induction3. 
 
Supported by the progress of mathematics and statistics, the new 
“philosophy of nature” embraced the idea of the world as a self-moving 
mechanism and confined inferences on the empirical terrain. The pri-
mary motivation became pragmatic, and efforts narrowed down on how 
to establish notions and propositions to “control and regulate future 
events by their causes”4. The principal test bench of induction became 
experimental. The original structures of explanation, however, survived 
                                                          
1 Israel, 2001; Grant, 1978. 
2 Guyer and Wood, 1998:106 B viii; Kneale and Kneale, 1962. 
3 Bacon, 1620 [2000]: I, xiv. 
4 Hume, 1748, section VII; Bacon, 1620; Wiener, 1932; Rossi, 1996. 
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in modern scientific practices as the rationale to establish the tenability 
of causal claims.  
 
 
3.1 Sitting the major premisses on the empirical ground 
 
The modern detachment of the scientific discourse from metaphysical 
assumptions is often associated with Hume and his explicit rejection of 
the ultimate causes of being as a proper scientific concern.  
Borrowing from Skeptical arguments, Hume influentially conceded 
such ultimate causes may exist, yet contended their knowledge was ac-
cessible to the human mind. Popper5 would later dub “the doctrine of 
the psychological primacy of repetition” Hume’s tenet that the mind 
can only learn from the direct experience of particular occurrences and 
incrementally, from the cumulation of evidence. Indeed, the corner-
stone of the doctrine is the tenet that a single unprecedented occurrence 
is not sufficient to generate knowledge. Single unusual events only 
compel hypotheses about their generation, as  
 
every effect is distinct from its cause. It could not, therefore, be dis-
covered in the cause; and the first invention or conception of it, a pri-
ori, must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the con-
junction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary; since there 
are always many other effects, which, to reason, must seem fully as 
consistent and natural6.  
 
In this doctrine, knowledge of the world arises after multiple obser-
vations have induced the idea into the mind that “species” of similar 
objects are related. Hempel maintained that the human mind recognizes 
three fundamental relationships as meaningful: Resemblance, Contigu-
ity, and Causation. He dismissed Contrast or Contrariety from the set 
of the primary relationships, as it could be derived from the combina-
tion of causation and resemblance: “where two objects are contrary, the 
one destroys the other; […] and the idea of the annihilation of an object 
implies the idea of its former existence”7. 
                                                          
5 Popper,1959:420. 
6 Hume, 1748, section IV. 
7 Hume, 1748, section IV, note e. 
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It may fall beyond the mind’s capacity to establish whether these 
relationships are genuinely ontological principles that shape the “mat-
ters of fact” in the world. Nevertheless, resemblance, contiguity, and 
causation provide the epistemic principles that our mind applies to ar-
range events into consistent narratives. As the work of poets and histo-
rians clearly shows, 
 
the most usual species of connexion among the different events, 
which enter into any narrative composition, is that of cause and effect; 
while the historian traces the series of actions according to their nat-
ural order, remounts to their secret springs and principles, and delin-
eates their most remote consequences. […] And always, he is sensible 
that the more unbroken the chain is, which he presents to his readers, 
the more perfect is his production. He sees that the knowledge of 
causes is not only the most satisfactory, this relation or connexion be-
ing the strongest of all others, but also the most instructive; since it is 
by this knowledge alone we are enabled to control events and govern 
futurity8.  
 
Despite their epistemic quality, Hume believed the fundamental re-
lationships afford faithful images of the world. He reasoned the relia-
bility of these images is “so essential to the subsistence of all human 
creatures” that Nature must have implanted them as the “instinct” of 
carrying forward “the thought in a correspondent course to that which 
she has established among external objects”9. Such an instinct – 
namely, “custom or habit” – does not open us the knowledge of the 
“hidden powers and forces on which the regular course and succession 
of objects totally depend.” However, it persuades us believing that fu-
ture occurrences will conform to past patterns. Such a belief is different 
from mere fiction because it ultimately rests on actual experiences and 
observations – which gives our inferences “a more vivid, lively, forci-
ble, firm, steady conception […] than what the imagination alone is ever 
able to attain”10.  
Given the correspondence of our mind’s images to the actual world, 
and given the mechanism through which our beliefs take their shape, 
we identify causes in those objects that seem “entirely uniform and con-
stant in producing a particular effect.” We know that fire is the cause of 
burning, water of suffocation, and impulse of motion by the regularity 
                                                          
8 Hume, 1748, section IV, note 3. 
9 Hume, 1748, section V. 
10 Hume, 1748, section V. 
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of their joint occurrence. Causes are those which arise “universal laws” 
of association and admit “of no exception.” These constant conjunc-
tions properly support the supposition that some necessary connection 
exists. Necessary connections, in turn, arise when one “object Cause” 
exerts its power to produce the other “object Effect” so that  
 
all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to 
the second. Or, in other words, if the first object had not been, the 
second had never existed11.  
 
Hume defines causation as a generative connection that we can as-
sume after observing a regular association between an objects-cause 
and an objects-effect. To characterize its shape, he resorts to two well 
known logical tenets, as the formalization of his definition of necessary 
connection shows.  
Let us indicate the class of the objects-cause with 𝑃 and the class of 
objects-effect with 𝑄. The stance ˹all the objects, similar to the first, 
followed by objects similar to the second˺ then takes the shape of the 
Stoic first indemonstrable [1] 𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄, 𝑃, ∴ 𝑄. In Humean terms, it says 
that the implication qualifies as causal when 𝑃-type occurrences regu-
larly – certainly – anticipate 𝑄-type occurrences. The rephrasing ˹if the 
first object had not been, the second never had existed˺, instead, em-
bodies the second indemonstrable as the counterproof that the associa-
tion of 𝑃 and 𝑄 is causal. However, Humes invokes it in its fallacious 
pattern [2.f] 𝑃 ⊃ 𝑄,~𝑃, ∴ ~𝑄. The pattern licenses the expectation of 
no 𝑄-type occurrences, based on the observation of no 𝑃-type occur-
rences. In itself, this expectation can expose us to consequential sur-
prises12 – unless 𝑃 is proven the unique type of cause of 𝑄. Neverthe-
less, the clause establishes that Hume’s idea of a necessary connection 
is, again, a biconditional relationship.  
Evidence of a biconditional relationship, hence, can convince us that 
objects-cause and objects-effect are necessarily connected by some fun-
damental power. Although we cannot know whether such a relationship 
embodies any ontological necessity, this evidence satisfies our idea of 
necessity: and this is enough to give our expectations the character of a 
firm belief. However, our mind also tends to develop expectations from 
“irregular and uncertain” observations. In this regard, Hume’s philoso-
phy becomes prescriptive.  
                                                          
11 Hume, 1748, section VII. 
12 Nassim, 2008. 
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He concedes that irregular evidence licenses a probabilistic expec-
tation about the most frequent “effect” given an intermittent “cause.” 
However, he warns the reader against dismissing alternative effects as 
irrelevant. 
 
Though we give the preference to that which has been found most 
usual, and believe that this effect will exist, we must not overlook 
other effects, but must assign to each of them a particular weight and 
authority in proportion as we have found it to be more or less fre-
quent13.  
 
Expectations of irregular phenomena based on frequencies come 
with further considerations. Irregularities are not evenly distributed; in-
stead, they change with circumstances. The prospect of frost is high in 
January “in almost every country of Europe,” although it “approaches 
to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms”14. Similarly affected by 
local circumstances are the uniformities and regularities about human 
behavior: “Even the characters which are peculiar to each individual 
have a uniformity in their influence”15. Irregular connections, he con-
cludes, are less the actual manifestation of chance than of the limits of 
our mind.  
To Hume, too, the understanding of irregularities as the limits of our 
knowledge marks the distance between the “philosophical” ascription 
of causation and the everyday ascription by habit: 
 
philosophers, observing that almost in every part of nature there is 
contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid by 
reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find that it is at least possi-
ble the contrariety of events may not proceed from contingency in the 
cause, but from the secret operation of contrary causes. This possibil-
ity is converted into certainty by farther observation, when they re-
mark that, upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always be-
trays a contrariety of causes and proceeds from their mutual opposi-
tion. […] Thus, for instance, in the human body, when the usual 
symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation; when 
medicines operate not with their wonted powers; when irregular 
events follow from any particular cause: the philosopher and the phy-
sician are not surprised at the matter, not are ever tempted to deny, in 
                                                          
13 Hume, 1748, section VI. 
14 Hume, 1748, section VI. 
15 Hume, 1748, section VIII. 
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general, the necessity and uniformity of those principles by which the 
animal economy is conducted. They know that a human body is a 
mighty complicated machine: That many secret powers lurk in it, 
which are altogether beyond our comprehension […] And that there-
fore the irregular events, which outwardly discover themselves, can 
be no proof that the laws of Nature are not observed with the greatest 
regularity in its internal operations and government […] though not 
easily discoverable by human sagacity and inquiry16. 
 
Despite his pessimism in the human capacity to grasp ultimate 
causal knowledge, Hume maintains that Nature is uniform: any occur-
rence has a cause, and the same cause under the same circumstances 
always yields the same effect. What we may mistake for the failure of 
a regular pattern, then, signals the local interaction among causes of 
different signs. In short, the Humean philosophy, too, underwrites the 
long-honored position that actual causation is true although complex 
and hard to grasp.  
 
 
3.2 Unraveling complex causation 
 
Similar recognition of causal complexity animates the influential work 
that John Stuart Mill wrote during the 1830s and first published in 1843. 
In it, the recognition marries with a more optimistic view on the capac-
ity of the human mind to make sense of it – at least, to make enough 
sense to serve practical purposes. 
The System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive again motivates 
from the concern that classical logic had moved out of tune with scien-
tific practices. The Logic still concedes that the deductive and syllo-
gistic reasoning provides proper devices to unravel complex causation. 
However, it emphasizes that deduction only becomes possible after es-
tablishing credible statements. The major problem of both modern phi-
losophy and science, then, is to determine such statements without ap-
pealing to metaphysical entities. Hence, the Logic posits induction as 
the leading problem that affects deduction and identifies its solution in 
methods for organizing experience into credible evidence of causation.  
From the successful practices of sciences such as physics and chem-
istry, the Logic borrows the idea that the assumption of the uniformity 
of nature can be deployed to identify compelling evidence of causation. 
                                                          
16 Hume, 1748, section VIII. 
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Such persuasive evidence can be found, as in observational strategies, 
or it can be made, as in experimental strategies. In both observational 
and experimental inquiries, however, evidence proves compelling if it 
is collected or generated to fit those comparisons that, alone, allow ad-
judicating on the causal nature of the relationship between two phenom-
ena.  
 
3.2.1 Mill’s problem of induction, and his solutions 
The distinctive contribution of the Logic to the scientific discourse 
lies in the codification of rules and methods to infer general statements 
from experimental and observational instances. These rules, moreover, 
are designed to overcome the limits of the consolidated mode of gener-
alization per enumerationem simplicem that affect the probabilistic ap-
proaches, too17.  
Simple enumeration generalizes the connection between two phe-
nomena based on the many instances that, to our knowledge, confirm 
the link. Mill reasons that the strategy “affords in general a precarious 
and unsafe ground of assurance, for such generalizations are incessantly 
discovered, on further experience, to be false”18. Simple enumeration, 
in short, yields general statements that are vulnerable to instantia con-
tradictoria. Hence, in Mill’s system, it may provide the first step toward 
generalization, seldom the conclusive one. A reliable generalization, 
Mill notes, is far more formidable than the inventory of positive in-
stances. It must allow us assuming that 
 
what we found true in those instances holds in all similar ones, past, 
present, and future, however numerous they may be. We then, by that 
valuable contrivance of language which enables us to speak of many 
as if they were one, record all that we have observed, together with 
all that we infer from our observations, in one concise expression; and 
have thus only one proposition […] to remember or to communicate.19 
 
Mill reasons that learning can occur independently of general state-
ments. Inference always proceeds from the past to the next particular 
experience, and we do not need the “maxim” that fire burns to escape 
the next flame once we got a scald. Nevertheless, knowing the maxim 
                                                          
17 Mill, 1843, III, viii, §7. 
18 Mill, 1843, III, xxi, §2. 
19 Mill, 1843, II, iii, §3. 
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could have spared us the injury. General statements, then, are conven-
ient implements that convey abridged knowledge. Distilling them is 
worth as it allows knowledge circulating beyond individual experience. 
Abridged knowledge takes the form of definitions, axioms, or laws 
of nature, establishing “a specimen or paradigm of the whole class of 
cases” of interest20. They connect observable attributes – such as those 
that denote a being as human – and those properties that instead are 
hidden to the eye, or that manifest themselves only once in each case, 
but about which we want to know – such as being mortal. Abridging 
statements convey the experience that the former are marks of the latter 
– as in ˹any human is mortal˺. In such a shape, these statements “vouch 
for the legitimacy” of inferring the unobserved property of mortality in 
any other instance of humanity, given the attribute.  
In short, the general statement – the “law” – conveys sufficient 
knowledge that the relationship holds between different attributes based 
on the properties that connect them at some more profound level. The 
sufficiency of such knowledge depends less on the number of collected 
instances than on the nature of the observed regularity. The relationship 
is credible that points to a causal connection in the real world beyond 
the frequency of its manifestations. The problem of induction, then, is 
that of the criteria to discriminate evidence of causation from a noisy 
background.  
 
a) Space and time of causation 
To advance his solution, Mill reduces the causal relationships to two 
basic types, depending on whether they manifest themselves as simul-
taneous events or as a succession21. Simultaneity characterizes causal 
relationships in the space dimension, and becomes visible as the regular 
coexistence of phenomena or as the pattern in the arrangement of some 
“bodies.” Succession, instead, connects phenomena and bodies along 
the temporal dimension and becomes visible as recurrent sequences. 
The parallel with the Aristotelean causes of stability and change is strik-
ing, but secondary in Mill’s general framework. The crucial point in it 
is, both types of relationships are “coextensive” with the “laws of num-
bers” – especially with algebraic rules22. This ensures their reduction in 
transmissible formulas.  
                                                          
20 Mill, 1843, II, iii, §3. 
21 Mill, 1843, III, v, §1. 
22 Mill, 1843, III, vi, §1. 
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Moreover, he contends that a relationship qualifies as causal when 
it displays both, as the tenet that cessante causa cessa et effectus had 
long established23. The endurance of a cause may keep the effect alive, 
as high temperatures that keep metals molten; however, the effect may 
also outlast the cause, as a house that survives its building. Thus, Mill 
concludes, succession remains the only solid test-bench for assessing 
the causal nature of a relationship. However, succession may or may 
not be visible as a lapse between the manifestations of the antecedent 
and its consequent. In short, Mill’s succession renders the intuition that 
the occurrence of the latter depends on the former – as if the antecedent 
was prior. 
The centrality of dependence as the criterion of causation is con-
firmed by the further consideration that “invariable sequence […] is not 
synonymous with causation, unless the sequence, besides being invari-
able, is unconditional”24. The requisite of “unconditionality” is intro-
duced to discriminate actual from mistaken causes in the sequence to-
ward the effect. The night is not the cause of the day, despite their reg-
ular succession, as both the day and the night depend on the position of 
the sun above the horizon – i.e., both manifestations are conditional on 
something else. The lighting power of the sun, in turn, is an uncondi-
tional cause of the day and, therefore, its actual antecedent. To prove 
unconditionality, Mill advances a counterfactual argument: the lighting 
power of the sun is an unconditional cause because, were it removed, 
there would be no day at all. 
Notably, in Mill’s view as in Chrysippus’ before, the requisite of 
unconditionality is satisfied independent on third phenomena impeding 
the relationship – such as an eclipse. This point allows him preserving 
the definition of a causal relationship as that which always obtains, as 
failures are ascribed to meddling third causes. The distinction is justi-
fied by the analytical possibility of discerning between those factors 
that raise a causal relationship and those that impede it, as each type 
contributes to the effect differently. Causes are those occurrences that 
have to be present for the relationship to obtain; just the opposite, im-
peding occurrences have to be absent for effect to happen. Hence, 
causes enter the abridging formula with a plus sign, while hindering 
factors can be invoked to account for failures as they subtract from the 
effect. 
 
                                                          
23 Mill, 1843, III, v, §7. 
24 Mill, 1843, III, v, §5. 
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b) Causes versus conditions 
Even after discounting hindrances, Mill notes, an antecedent can 
seldom be reduced to a simple single factor. Instead, a relationship of 
causal succession 
 
is usually between a consequent and the sum of several antecedents; 
the concurrence of all of them being the requisite to produce, that is, 
to be certain of being followed by, the consequent. In such a case it is 
very common to single out one only of the antecedents under the de-
nomination of Cause, calling the other merely Conditions25. 
 
Both causes and conditions are required to “produce” the effect. The 
difference between them, according to Mill, only depends on our per-
ception of their different permanence. We usually indicate as the cause 
that which we perceive as an undue antecedent change or event – such 
as the slipping foot when falling from a ladder or the sentinel off his 
post when the enemy surprised the army. Then, we treat as conditions 
those antecedents that we understand as more stable states – such as, 
weight and the related gravitational attraction, or military establish-
ments and their operations. The “conditions,” however, are no less in-
dispensable to the effect than the “cause.” Although we may take the 
conditions for granted to the point of omitting them, in scientific ascrip-
tion “the statement of the cause is incomplete, unless in some shape or 
other we introduce them all”26.  
The need for providing complete statements is especially compel-
ling in the light of further consideration. A condition can be a compound 
obtained at an earlier stage and arranged so that “in given circumstances 
certain results will take place”27. Although they do not yield any imme-
diate visible effect, these compounds are the product of spatial relation-
ships that “predispose the constitution to some mode of action”28. Edu-
cation, training, or the making of gunpowder are all examples of this 
type of causal factor. Due to the new arrangements of their components, 
the mind, the body, or the chemical mixture are “endowed with the 
property” of contributing to some effect. The new arrangement, in 
short, entails a potential – that Mill defines “the contingent future fact 
                                                          
25 Mill, 1843, III, v, §3, emphasis added. 
26 Mill, 1843, III, v, §3. 
27 Mill, 1843, III, v, §5. 
28 Mill, 1843, III, v, §5. 
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brought back under another name”29. A complete statement of the 
cause, hence, has to include any such “constitution of things” capable 
of generating the effect. 
 
c) Mechanical and chemical causation 
Mill maintains that the relationship among the components of an 
antecedent and the ultimate effect can be of two types30. The one type 
embodies a classical mechanical rationale: causation consists in the 
transmission of something by interaction among components, and the 
joint effect is of the same kind as the effects of each separate element, 
like in a billiard stroke. The other type embodies a chemical rationale: 
as when oxygen and hydrogen combine in making water, the interaction 
of the components results in a compound that is qualitatively different 
from its constituents taken in insulation.  
Chemical causation, Mill emphasizes, is harder to grasp than the 
mechanical one. In mechanical causation, the nature of the components 
is clear from the effect; we can observe the elements and their interac-
tions at the same time; and the result can be easily reduced to the arith-
metic sum of the interactions. In contrast, in chemical causation, the 
nature of the components can only be discovered by disassembling the 
compound in its constitutive elements. Either we observe the compo-
nents by disrupting their interaction, or we observe the effect – and the 
result is not fully captured by the relationship among the quantities of 
the elements.  
The relationships among quantities, however, are that which laws 
render to convey experience. Then, given the antecedents, laws of me-
chanical causation allow calculating the consequent in advance and 
with good approximation – which Mill equates to deduction as “demon-
strative science.” The “heteropathic” relationships of chemical causa-
tion, instead, limit predictions to those quantities of the antecedents that 
also characterize the consequent – for instance, mass, or the ratio of the 
components. To Mill – who recognized the value of statistical render-
ings yet was unsympathetic with the formalization of logic that De Mor-
gan was developing at the time – the qualitative facets of the effects of 
chemical causation defy calculation and prediction. 
Either entirely or in some vital facet, nevertheless, both mechanical 
and chemical causation follow a fundamental principle that Mill calls 
the Composition of Causes. By analogy with the physical principle of 
                                                          
29 Mill, 1843, III, v, §6. 
30 Mill, 1843, III, vi, §1. 
75 
the composition of forces, the Composition of Causes stipulates that 
any consequent is connected to its antecedents by regular relationships 
that can be known and rendered through algebraic formulas. In short, 
regularity can be conveniently captured by some empirical rule of com-
position. Being the rule constant, we can know the causes from their 
effect. These assumptions, Mill maintains, provide the ground of any 
induction. 
 
3.2.2 Canons and Methods of induction 
Mill defines induction as an analytical operation, consisting of “the 
resolution of a complex whole into the component elements” (ivi, III, 
vii, §1). A complex whole first requires that we establish some “mental 
partition” of the world into “single facts” that can be later systematically 
observed or reproduced as experiments: 
 
the order of nature, as perceived at first glance, presents at every in-
stant a chaos followed by another chaos. We must decompose each 
chaos into single facts. We must learn to see in the chaotic antecedent 
a multitude of distinct antecedents, in the chaotic consequent a multi-
tude of distinct consequents. This, supposing it done, will not of itself 
tell us on which of the antecedents each consequent is invariably at-
tendant. To determine that point, we must endeavour to effect a sepa-
ration of the facts from one another, not in our minds only, but in 
nature. The mental analysis, however, must take place first31. 
 
To insulate such relevant “facts” and test their connection in nature, 
Mill holds we must follow the “rule of varying the circumstances”32. 
Both observations and experiments suit the purpose of providing such 
a variation, although from causal relationships with different structures. 
To distill knowledge effectively, then, Mill establishes different canons 
of induction33, each corresponding to a method – namely, Agreement, 
Difference, Indirect Difference, Residues, and Concomitant Variations. 
 
a) The first canon  
The first canon stipulates that 
 
                                                          
31 Mill, 1843, III, vi, §1. 
32 Mill, 1843, III, vi, §1. 
33 Mill, 1943, III, viii. 
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if two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have 
only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone 
all the instances agree, is the cause (or the effect) of the given phe-
nomenon34. 
 
To illustrate its point, Mill sketches a formalization that in later no-
tation can be rendered as follows. Let be: 
 
- 𝐴, the presence of the candidate antecedents of a phenomenon of 
interest, and with ?̅?, its absence; 
- 𝛷, other circumstances in a particular state, and with ?̅?  the same 
circumstances in a different state; 
- 𝑌, the presence of the phenomenon of interest, and with ?̅?, its ab-
sence.  
 
The first canon then runs as in expression [8] below: 
 
 𝑨 ∧ 𝛷 ∧ 𝒀 
 𝑨 ∧ 𝛷 ∧ 𝒀 
Observed in one (set of) instance(s) 
Observed in another (set of) instance(s) 
[8] 
∴ 𝑨 ∘ 𝒀 Conclusion  
 
where the symbol ∘ indicates a regular – then, possibly, causal – rela-
tionship connecting the term on the left to that on the right. 
The related method of Agreement applies when we cannot resort to 
the experimental strategy and have to rely on the instances that nature 
provides. It stipulates that a meaningful connection exists between that 
antecedent that does “unvary” with the consequent, everything else be-
ing different. The conclusion “stands on the ground that whatever can 
be eliminated is not connected with the phenomenon by any law” or, in 
a word, proves “irrelevant”35. The conclusion, moreover, can be 
reached backward if we compare instances selected on the effect 𝑌, or 
forward if we compare cases selected on the antecedent 𝐴. 
The backward selection narrows the induction on two types of in-
stances: 𝐴 ∧ 𝑌 and ?̅? ∧ 𝑌. Their analysis brings to light whether 𝑌 re-
quires 𝐴. However, the backward selection prevents us from knowing 
whether 𝐴 can also be associated with ?̅? – i.e., whether contradictory 
instances can arise that weaken the relationship. Hence, the conclusions 
that we can draw from this set of instances are affected by the biases 
                                                          
34 Mill, 1943, III, viii, §1. 
35 Mill, 1843, III, vii, §3, emphasis added. 
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allowed by simple enumeration and may convey false certainties about 
the relationship. 
The forward selection, instead, narrows on two types of instances: 
𝐴 ∧ 𝑌 and 𝐴 ∧ ?̅?. Their analysis allows establishing whether 𝑌 follows 
from 𝐴 without contradictory instances. However, based on this evi-
dence, we cannot know whether 𝐴 is the unique antecedent of 𝑌36.  
Regardless of the selection of evidence, moreover, if the effect 𝑌 
depends on the compound antecedent 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 in one instance and on 𝐴 ∧
𝐷 in another, the method of Agreement always dismisses 𝐶 and 𝐷 as 
varying circumstances of 𝛷, hence irrelevant to its occurrence, and as-
cribes causation to 𝐴 alone. If, instead, the effect depends on simple yet 
functionally equivalent antecedents – that is, on 𝐴 in one instance and 
on 𝐵 in the other, so that the complete factor reads as the exclusive 
“plural” cause 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 – then the method of Agreement fails to recognize 
any factor as causal37. 
 
b) The second canon  
This canon again relies on elimination but applies the opposite ra-
tionale. The foundation of the conclusion is that whatever cannot be 
logically eliminated is not connected with the phenomenon of interest38. 
Thus, the second canon stipulates the following: 
 
if an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, 
and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance 
in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the cir-
cumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the 
cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon39. 
 
As such, then, the second canon can be summarized as in expression 
[9]: 
 
 𝑨 ∧ 𝛷 ∧ 𝒀 
 ?̅? ∧ 𝛷 ∧ ?̅? 
Observed in a set of instances 
Observed in a set of twin instances 
[9] 
∴ 𝑨 ∘ 𝒀 Conclusion  
 
                                                          
36 Mill, 1843, III, x, §1. 
37 Mill, 1843, III, x, §1. 
38 Mill, 1843, III, viii, §3. 
39 Mill, 1843, III, viii, §2. 
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The related method, dubbed of Difference, maintains that a causal 
relationship connects two co-varying factors when everything else re-
mains the same. The requisite of similarity in the background circum-
stances entails that the second canon better applies to identical instances 
except for the causal attribute under analysis. Although Mill does not 
require the complete similarity of the instances under comparison – “it 
needs not extend to such as are already known to be immaterial to the 
result”40 – he considers that seldom nature can afford instances suitable 
to this type of induction. The method better applies to experimental 
studies where the instances can be made similar in all the relevant at-
tributes except for the one under analysis, whose variation is purpose-
fully induced.  
Through the control of the relevant circumstances, experiments also 
allow dispelling the doubt that the relationship between 𝐴 and 𝑌 is con-
ditional on third factors. The claim that 𝐴 unconditionally causes 𝑌 
stands strong after observing that we can induce or suppress 𝑌 just by 
compelling or suppressing an insulated 𝐴. The manipulation of the 
cause through which the method of Difference establishes its conclu-
sions so proves causation as an asymmetric relationship of actual de-
pendence of 𝑌 on 𝐴.  
In contrast to the method of Agreement, Mill emphasizes, the issue 
of the Plurality of Causes does not affect the experimental application 
of the Method of Difference41. Even if the exclusive 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 is the real 
antecedent of 𝑌, the manipulation of 𝐴 can still be detected by observing 
the generation and suppression of the effect in the smaller set of in-
stances with the attribute.  
However, as the prudential wording of the canon admits, the method 
of Difference has limits, too. If the true antecedent consists of a con-
junction – so that (𝐴 ∧ 𝐶) ∘ 𝑌 – and one of the conjuncts, say 𝐴, is caus-
ally required yet empirically associated with both 𝑌 and ?̅? like oxygen 
in combustion, then the method fails to recognize its contribution – un-
less it is explicitly hypothesized and tested. Hence, the method of Dif-
ference can detect causation from simple equivalent antecedents, yet 
may be blind to “chemically” relevant factors that we can perceive as 
background conditions. The problem worsens when chemical causation 
depends on multiple conjuncts, as their effect only materializes when 
the components are all joined together42. 
                                                          
40 Mill, 1943, III, viii, §3. 
41 Mill, 1843, III, x, §2. 
42 Mill, 1843, III, viii, §4. 
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c) The third canon  
Chemical causation arises a methodological challenge: the method 
of Difference may fail to single out the joint constituents, while the 
method of Agreement is poorly equipped to yield reliable conclusions 
from substitutes. Mill then develops the Indirect method of Difference 
to exploit the capacity of both and compensate for their weaknesses43.  
The method relies on the third canon, maintaining that: 
 
If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only 
one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which 
it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that 
circumstance; the circumstance in which alone the two sets of in-
stances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of 
the cause, of the phenomenon44. 
 
So defined, the canon would read as in [10] below: 
 
 𝑨 ∧ 𝛷 ∧ 𝒀 
 𝑨 ∧ ?̅? ∧ 𝒀 
 ?̅? ∧ 𝛷 ∧ ?̅? 
 ?̅? ∧ ?̅? ∧ ?̅? 
in instances of 𝐴 
in instances of 𝐴 
in instances of ?̅? 
in instances of ?̅? 
[10] 
 ∴ 𝑨 ∘ 𝒀 Conclusion  
 
The Indirect Method consists of applying the method of Agreement 
twice. The first analysis is performed forward on the instances of the 
antecedent 𝐴, to check whether they agree on displaying the consequent 
𝑌. These instances only contain information to establish that 𝐴 is the 
invariant antecedent of 𝑌, saying nothing about the antecedents of ?̅?. 
The second step addresses this problem and performs the analysis on 
the instances of the absence of the consequent, 𝐴?̅? and 𝐴𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ , to check if 
they invariably lack the antecedent so that ?̅? ∘ ?̅?. 
In short, without ever mentioning them, the Indirect method of Dif-
ference applies the first and the second Stoic indemonstrable as two 
tests of the hypothesis that 𝐴 yields 𝑌 – “each proof being independent 
of the other, and corroborating it”45.  
                                                          
43 Mill, 1843, III, x, §3. 
44 Mill, 1843, III, viii, §4. 
45 Mill, 1843, III, viii, §4. 
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d) The fourth and fifth canon 
The fourth canon addresses the issue of ascribing causation when an 
effect is an assemblage of effects of which some antecedent is known, 
but not all. It stipulates that 
 
Subduct any phenomenon such part as is known by previous induc-
tions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the 
phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents46. 
 
The corresponding method of Residues is again reminiscent of the 
Stoic schemata for conjuncts and disjuncts. It ascribes the unexplained 
part of a phenomenon to that further invariant antecedent that acts to-
gether with the known one. Mill presents the method as specially suited 
to pinpoint the constituents of chemical causation. Thus, we can explain 
water as the interaction of oxygen and hydrogen when we know rust is 
the effect of oxidation, and we observe that iron rusts when exposed to 
water while hydrogen appears and water disappears, the overall weight 
remaining constant.  
Mill holds the method of Residues is the “most fertile,” as it compels 
the search for the important yet initially disregarded “obscure circum-
stance” beneath the effect. However, Mill warns, we cannot be sure of 
the contribution of such an additional antecedent to the occurrence of 
the effect until we properly test it with a method of Difference. 
 
The fifth and last canon addresses the problem of ascertaining the 
relationship between an effect and a “Permanent Cause” or “indestructi-
ble agent.” These types of causes defy the experimental strategy due to 
the technical impossibility of either excluding or destroying them47. 
These causes, however, do admit variation. Hence, the relationship with 
the effect can still be ascertained by the strategy of Difference that nar-
rows on the changes in the antecedent and the consequent when any 
other relevant circumstance remains the same.  
The method of Concomitant Variations applies the rationale of the 
Method of Difference on partial changes in the antecedent and the con-
sequent. The corresponding fifth canon stipulates that 
 
                                                          
46 Mill, 1843, III, viii, §6. 
47 Mill, 1843, III, viii, §6. 
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whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phe-
nomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an ef-
fect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of 
causation48. 
 
Mill hinges the causal nature of the induction by Difference on the 
proof that the antecedent is the only varying circumstance. The method 
of Concomitant Variations, then, can serve as the extension of the 
method of Difference to render the relationship between factors into the 
ratios of their quantities – and to better control for the variation of rival 
or background circumstances.  
The quantification approach to Difference introduces new prob-
lems, however. As its conclusions depend on measurement, quantifica-
tion lies induction open to mistaking measurement errors for meaning-
ful changes and vice-versa. Better gauges and broader evidence base 
can overcome this limit, but arise a new issue. When the consequent 
depends on a plurality of causes, the relationship between one of the 
antecedents of interest and the consequent can go dismissed if rare. The 
limit, Mill emphasizes, does not affect the other versions of the methods 
of Difference, in which every evidence counts instead.  
 
3.2.3 The many issues of complex causation 
In discussing his canons and methods, Mill establishes four require-
ments that evidence should meet before we can believe ˹𝐴 causes 𝑌˺ 
when we cannot provoke and suppress the consequent by manipulating 
the antecedent.  
The first two requirements – that we can call R1 and R2 – render the 
cases that fit the first and the second indemonstrable, respectively: 
 
R1. whenever the antecedent, then the consequent: 
if 𝐴 causes 𝑌, under 𝐴, always observe 𝑌; 
R2. whenever not the consequent, then not the antecedent:  
if 𝐴 causes 𝑌, under ?̅?, always observe ?̅?. 
 
Thus, R1 and R2 establish that evidence of 𝐴 ∧ 𝑌 or ?̅? ∧ ?̅? confirms 
the conditional 𝐴 ⊃ 𝑌. However, Mill repeatedly underlines that R1 and 
R2 together do not ensure the conditional relationship is causal “unless 
we can be quite sure either that the instances affirmative of [the effect] 
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agree in no antecedent whatever but 𝐴, or that the instances negative of 
[the effect] agree in nothing but the negation of 𝐴”49.  
Mill’s causal factor then requires two counterproofs that our ante-
cedent is the single factor in the unconditional relationship, and hence 
the sole reason for the occurrence of the consequent. The counterproofs 
– that we will call R3 and R4 – establish that real causes impose two 
impossibilities to the diversity of instances – namely, 
 
R3. the consequent only when the antecedent –  
 then 𝑌 cannot be observed under ?̅?; 
R4. not the consequent only when not the antecedent – 
 then ?̅? cannot be observed under 𝐴. 
 
Hence, according to R3 and R4, evidence of ?̅? ∧ 𝑌 or 𝐴 ∧ ?̅? discon-
firms the conditional 𝐴 ⊃ 𝑌. The two requisites and the two counter-
proofs together ensure the antecedent is the single factor responsible for 
both the occurrence (R1, R3) and the suppression (R2, R4) of the effect 
– as in (𝜀). Together they operationalize the ideal biconditional relation-
ship like the one between Aristotelean universals50. Biconditionality 
also warrants Mill’s desideratum that the knowledge of the antecedent 
allows anticipating the consequent. However, Mill also recognizes that 
the ideal situation is seldom true in actual settings – because of the Plu-
rality of Causes, their Composition, and their Constitution. 
 
a) Issues of Plurality  
The Plurality of Cause challenges the experimental ideal of causa-
tion by recognizing that 
 
 It is not true […] that each phenomenon can be produced only in one 
way. There are often several independent modes in which the same 
phenomenon could have originated. […] A given effect may really be 
produced by a certain cause, and yet be perfectly capable of being 
produced without it51.  
 
As we have seen, when the antecedent takes the form of a disjunc-
tion 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵, the alternatives weakens the cogency of the results from the 
method of Agreement. The solution rests less on increasing the number 
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of same instances under analysis – which only serves the purpose of 
correcting a measurement error – than on increasing their diversity – as 
even one observation can lead to the elimination of a circumstance and 
the clarification52.  
The suitable strategy is the Indirect method of Difference. Its second 
step satisfies R2 and controls whether the absence of the consequent 
can be ascribed to the sole absence of the antecedent of interest; the 
ascription does not hold when more than one antecedent is at work as 
R4 requires. This failed ascription compels the “conjecture” that the an-
tecedent is plural – at least in its manifestations, as to Mill alternative 
causes signal a common source of causation to which we can ascend by 
further inquiry. In the more usual case that “we cannot take this ulterior 
step, the different antecedents must be set provisionally as distinct 
causes, each sufficient of itself to produce the effect”53.  
On a general note, Mill imputes the higher credibility of the various 
versions of the method of Difference to their reliance on the negative 
instances. These instances strengthen the reason to trust that a cause is 
sufficient to the effect, as they expose non-causal factors that would 
pass the test of Agreement54.  
 
b) Issues of Composition and Constitution  
The main challenges to R4 arise from issues in the Composition or 
the Constitution of Causes.  
The Constitution occurs when the effect arises by the “chemical 
transformation” of the causal elements, but we have not identified all 
the components: thus, some instances may violate R4 because of the 
absence of omitted factors. The Composition, instead, concerns the ef-
fect of which we have identified the full cause, but that in some in-
stances is impeded by intervening causes with opposite sign, again man-
ifesting a violation of R4. In both cases, the cause is a compound by 
conjunction: but while Constitution compounds include positive fac-
tors, Composition compounds also include negative hindrances. In both 
circumstances, then, the recognition of the relationship is blurred by in-
stances where the effect is void, although the antecedent is observed.  
With Hume, Mill suggests these occurrences should first be ad-
dressed semantically: general statements as expressions of the law 
should not convey that the violation necessarily falsifies the relationship 
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between a single factor and the effect. However, this caution follows 
from the consideration that a single factor does not capture the whole 
of the causation: 
 
It is clear that the general proposition, though it would be true under 
a certain hypothesis, would not express the facts as they actually oc-
cur. To accommodate the expression of the law to the real phenom-
ena, we must say, not that the object moves, but that it tends to move, 
in the direction and with the velocity specified. We might, indeed, 
guard our expression in a different mode, by saying that the body 
moves in that manner unless prevented, or except in so far as pre-
vented, by some counteracting cause. But the body does not only 
move in that manner unless counteracted; it tends to move in that 
manner even when counteracted55. 
 
Thus, correct general statements about single causal factors refer to 
their tendency to obtain56. The difference between mature and rough 
generalizations, to Mill, lies in the fact that the former deploys an “ac-
curate nomenclature” of tendencies and forces, while the latter speaks 
of rules and exceptions. Truly general statements have no exception – 
only “disturbances” that affect their unfolding in actual contexts. 
Then, Mill advances practical recommendations for investigating 
causal conjunctions. The Logic contends that any inductive method 
alone can succeed in unraveling it. Counteracting causes may count as 
idiosyncratic circumstances, which inductive methods disregard to nar-
row on constitutive antecedents. The proper method to grasp causation 
as the complex of causes, conditions, and disturbances proceeds deduc-
tively and integrates induction with two additional operations: ratioci-
nation, and verification. 
 
c) the Deductive Method 
The processes that Mill envisages as deductive resembles the Peri-
patetic syllogism in their structure, yet not in their aim. Instead of rear-
ranging previous knowledge to cast new light on their connections, it 
casts old light – that of the experience abridged into laws – on a new 
event. The dismissal of metaphysical grounding implies that deductions 
can be ampliative. Were syllogisms not applicable to new instances, 
they would establish tautologies – which he understood as a sophistic 
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trick to induce begging the assumption instead of proving an argu-
ment57.  
The syllogistic structure, then, brings possible “inconclusiveness to 
light” in the inference from known particulars to a new one. A correct 
conclusion “is not an inference drawn from the formula, but an infer-
ence drawn according to the formula”58. The Deductive method applies 
these structures “to find the law of an effect from the laws of the differ-
ent tendencies of which it is the joint result”59.  
The first step consists of identifying the tendencies at work beneath 
the effect. These can be captured with the method of Concomitant Var-
iation as empirical laws – that is, regularities “respecting which we can-
not yet decide whether they are cases of causation or mere results if 
it”60. As alternative points of departure, Mill suggests some application 
of the method of Difference to comparatively more uncomplicated in-
stances or a separate round of deductions. Mill also considers that this 
first stage can be suppressed when the deduction proceeds from a hy-
pothesis that assumes the relationships of causation instead of having 
them proved61. The Hypothetical deduction then directly commences 
from the second step.  
Ratiocination consists of “determining from the laws of the causes 
what effect any given combination of those causes will produce”62. To 
Mill, this operation is “a process of calculation in the wider sense of the 
term” that may involve calculation in the narrower sense – mathemati-
cal or geometrical – when our knowledge of tendencies allows it. That 
of ratiocination, in short, is the stage for setting expectations about com-
plexes and compounds and can be drawn at different levels of precision. 
 
All that is essential in it is reasoning from a general law to a particular 
case, that is, determining by means of the particular circumstances of 
that case what result is required to fulfil the law. 
[…] By such ratiocinations from the separate laws of the causes, we 
may, to a certain extent, succeed in answering either of the following 
questions: Given a certain combination of causes, what effect will fol-
low? and, What combination of causes, if it existed, would produce a 
given effect? In the one case, we determine the effect to be expected 
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60 Mill, 1843, III, xi, §2. 
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in any complex circumstances of which the different elements are 
known: in the other case we learn according to what law –under what 
antecedent conditions– a given complex effect will occur”63. 
 
The ratiocination stage, then, generates “conjectures” about the 
composition of tendencies and circumstances but void of actual import, 
and about which we may even be unsure of their completeness. To rule 
out the possibility that we omitted some relevant components, the 
method of Deduction requires verification as its third and essential 
stage.  
Verification consists of retrieving the conjectured balance in actual 
cases. 
 
To warrant reliance on the general conclusion arrived at by deduction, 
these conclusions must be found, on careful comparison, to accord 
with the results of direct observation wherever it can be had. If, when 
we have experience to compare with them, this experience confirms 
them, we may safely trust to them in other cases of which our specific 
experience is yet to come. But if our deductions have led to the con-
clusion that from a particular combination of causes a given effect 
would result, then in all known cases where that combination can be 
shown to have existed and where the effect has not followed, we must 
be able to show (or at least to make a probable surmise) what frus-
trated it: if we cannot, the theory is imperfect, and not yet to be relied 
upon. Nor is the verification complete, unless some of the cases in 
which the theory is borne out by the observed result, are of at least 
equal complexity with any other cases in which its application could 
be called for64.  
 
Actual instances that would have been too complicated for serving 
to induce single general tendencies now become “a new experiment” of 
the conjecture – “a new trial of the principle in a different set of circum-
stances” that, moreover, “occasionally serves to eliminate some circum-
stance not previously excluded”65. When the Deductive method applies 
to hypotheses, moreover, the verification stage can amount to a com-
plete induction if the “very complete” compound meets all the requi-
sites of the Indirect method of Difference66.  
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As ratiocination and verification, the method of Deduction is for 
proving the interaction of the laws about the tendencies. To it, Mill adds 
a “secondary application”: Deduction is for “explaining the laws” about 
tendencies67.  
 
3.2.4 Modes of explanation 
Mill establishes the operation of explaining consists of resolving a 
“law of the effect” into other general statements, and distinguishes three 
modes of resolution68 that we can understand as combination, interme-
diation, and subsumption.  
 
a) First mode: combination 
In the first mode of explanation, a causal relationship is explained 
by the tendency of the factors that constitute it plus the “fact of their 
combination” that renders their “collocation” – that is, their simultane-
ity in space. To illustrate this kind of explanation, Mill recalls that the 
law of the motion of a planet consists of the law of the acquired force, 
of the law of centripetal force, and of their coexistence given certain 
circumstances of place and time. 
The first mode, therefore, corresponds to the Deductive method, and 
can be portrayed as in [11] below: 
 
Φ⟺ 𝑌  
Φ = ⋀𝜑𝑖  
𝜑1:  𝐴 ⇒ 𝑌 
𝜑2.1:  𝐶 ⇒ 𝑌 
𝜑2.2:  𝐷 ⇒ 𝑌 
𝐶 ∨ 𝐷 = 𝐵 
𝜑𝑘:  ?̅? ⇒ 𝑌 
Relationship0 
Fact of combination1 
Constituent tendency T1  
Constituent tendency T2.1  
Constituent tendency T2.2 
Fact of combination2 
Counteracting tendency T3 
[11] 
Φ =  𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 ∧ ?̅? 
∴ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 ∧ ?̅? ⟺ 𝑌 
Definition of combination1 
Resolution 
 
 
where the starting relationship can be hypothetical, the double-edged 
arrow ⟺ indicates the connection is biconditional, and the single-edged 
arrow ⇒ indicates the connection is conditional at least. 
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b) Second mode: intermediation 
In the second mode, the explanation consists of detecting an inter-
mediate link “between what seemed the cause and what was supposed 
to be the effect … so that the cause at first assigned is but the remote 
cause, operating through the intermediate phenomenon”69. As a first il-
lustration, the Logic recalls the connection between touching an object 
and perceiving a sensation. The apparently direct experience was later 
discovered to occur by the mediation of nerves connecting  
 
our outward organs to the brain. Touching the object, therefore, is 
only the remote cause of our sensation; that is, not the cause, properly 
speaking, but the cause of the cause; – the real cause of the sensation 
is the change in the state of the nerve70. 
 
The Logic considers the two separate connections (of the outward 
organ to the nerve, and the nerve to the brain) are each more general 
than their conjunction, as the latter can fail under more circumstances 
than each component71. Moreover, the proximate connection has wider 
relevance in accounting for the occurrence of the effect because differ-
ent antecedents can activate it, and without it the signal cannot be trans-
mitted. The chain of relationships that resolves the connection, there-
fore, can be portrayed as in [12.a] below: 
 
𝜑1 ⇔ 𝑌 
 𝜑1 ⇒ 𝜑2 
𝜑2 ⇐ 𝑌  
Relationship0 
Remote relationship 
Proximate relationship 
[12.a] 
∴ (𝜑1 ∧ 𝜑2) ⟺ 𝑌 Resolution  
 
Chemical causation, too, envisages intermediate causation – alt-
hough as stages in the process that yields the effect: 
 
The more powerful acids corrode or blacken organic compounds. This 
is a case of causation, but of remote causation; and is said to be ex-
plained when it is shown that there is an intermediate link, namely, 
the separation of some of the chemical elements of the organic struc-
ture from the rest, and their entering into combination with the acid. 
The acid causes this separation of the elements, and the separation of 
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the elements causes the disorganization, and often the charring of the 
structure72.  
 
To preserve the parallelism, but somehow confusingly, Mill applies 
the term “remote” to denote the compound in which a factor is embed-
ded that is responsible for the effect of interest when interacting with 
key components from other compounds. In turn, the factor that enters 
the composition or constitution of the effect qualifies as “proximate.”  
Nevertheless, the second mode resolves chemical causation into re-
mote factors and proximate links by decomposition and reconstruction 
of compounds, as summarized in [12.b] below.  
 
𝛷 ⇔ 𝑌 
𝛷:   𝜑1 ∧ 𝜑2 ⟺ 𝑌 
𝜑1:       𝐴 ∧ 𝜀1 ⇒ 𝑌 
𝜑2:      𝑋 ∧ 𝜀2 ⇒ 𝑌 
Relationship 
Decomposition1 
Decomposition1a 
Decomposition1b 
[12.b] 
∴ 𝐴 ∧ 𝑋 ⟺ 𝑌 Reconstruction  
 
c) Third mode: subsumption 
The third mode of explanation proceeds in the opposite directions 
of the first two modes, and consists of the subsumption of partial or 
particular relationships under a more general one that recognizes the 
pattern across “diverse sets of instances.” The third mode resolves par-
ticular relationships into a more general one establishing the class 
equivalence of antecedents and consequents, as in reasoning [13]: 
 
𝜑1 ⇔ 𝜐1 
𝜑2 ⇔ 𝜐2 
𝜑3 ⇔ 𝜐3 
𝛷 = [𝜑1] ∧ [𝜑2] ∧ [𝜑3] 
𝛶 =  [𝜐1] ∧ [𝜐2] ∧ [𝜐3] 
Special relationship1 
Special relationship2 
Special relationship3 
Class equivalence 
Class equivalence 
[13] 
 ∴ 𝛷 ⇔ 𝛶 Subsumption  
 
Explaining, then, “is but substituting one mystery for another”73. 
However, the substitution extends the reach of our statements as it re-
solves the original relationship into more certain ones, or into relation-
ships with a broader scope. 
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3.3 Explanation between induction and deduction 
 
The further modern rendering of classical explanation – and, for a few 
decades, the “received view” in the philosophy of science74 – bears 
Hempel’s signature75.  
The model developed in the wake of the analytical revolution that, 
since Frege, engaged the philosophy of science76. The agenda origi-
nated in the works of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Along 
with the Stoic logic, it assumed the world has a knowable logical con-
stitution that language can render. In Wittgenstein’s words, language 
can align a specific “state of affairs,” that is, a constellation of objects 
that stand in actual relationships with each other in the world, with the 
picture that we make in our mind of it as a “situation” – which, in the 
scientific discourse, could be a “theory.” The language performs the 
alignment through sentences – molecular structures of atomic compo-
nents whose logical relationship mirrors the relationship among the cor-
responding formal objects on the one side, and empirical objects on the 
other. The promise was, again, that the proper logical syntax would 
have grasped the isomorphism of situations and states of affairs, and 
yielded a more profound knowledge of the world as verified theoretical 
statements.  
Such an agenda found its limits in the fact that logic opened to pos-
sibilities and alternative worlds, while the empirical domain offered 
portrayals of necessary actualizations, and language involved the attrib-
ution of meaning – so that the verifiable overlapping of the three could 
only be partial at best77. Hempel’s proposal, although far from offering 
the ultimate solution, proved able to attract the attention of as diverse 
disciplines as history and psychiatry on the relevance of the alignment 
of language, logic, and evidence to improve our grasp of causation – 
even in single occurrences.  
 
3.3.1 Deductive models of explanation  
Of Mill’s three modes of explanation, Hempel considers the third 
one as his model of reference. In his understanding, an explanation is 
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an operation that subsumes a single causal occurrence under one or 
more general statements. His explanatory strategy is better known as 
“of covering law” – a definition that Hempel himself embraced78. 
In a famous example, Hempel uses a car’s cracked radiator to illus-
trate how the covering law strategy works79. Once and again, the expla-
nation of a singular occurrence follows from two sets of information: 
“(i) particular facts and (ii) uniformities expressible by means of gen-
eral laws”80. 
The first set 𝐂𝒌 = {𝐶1, … , 𝐶𝑘} includes the 𝑘 circumstances 𝐶 under 
which the event occurred. To this set belong conditions such as that the 
car’s radiator was of cast iron; that cast iron belongs to the class of ma-
terials with low tensile strength; that the radiator was filled with water, 
its lid screwed on tightly; that the car was parked in the street where, 
during the night, the temperature fell below 25°F.  
The second set 𝐋𝑟 = {𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑟} includes the 𝑟 proven laws or “uni-
versal hypotheses” – statements with an unlimited scope that hold in the 
world of reference without exception. To this set belong notions such 
as that water freezes below 32°F at standard atmospheric pressure; that 
water increases in volume when freezing; that materials with low tensile 
strength crack when stressed.  
The general structure of an explanation, hence, unfolds as in [14] 
below: 
 
⋀𝐋𝑟  the conjunction of law statements  [14] 
⋀𝐂𝑘  the conjunction of condition statements   
 
 deductively entail  
𝐸 the statement about the event in case  
 
Hempel denotes the expression below the line as the explanandum 
and everything above the line as the explanans. Like in a classic syllo-
gism, the explanans includes a major premiss that sets the general rules 
and a minor premiss that make the case. Of the two, the conjunction of 
the 𝑘 circumstances, ⋀𝐂𝒌 is that which accounts for 𝐸: the radiator 
cracked because it was of cast iron and filled with water and was ex-
posed to low temperatures. However, Hempel emphasizes, the condi-
tions of the radiator and the weather together explain the occurrence as 
far as they provide the boundary conditions under which ⋀𝐋𝑟unfolds.  
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Otherwise said, Hempel emphasizes the general statements ⋀𝐋𝑟  are 
that which makes the boundary conditions relevant to understand and 
account for the occurrence of 𝐸. The low temperature contributes to 
explain 𝐸 in light of our knowledge of the rules 𝐿𝑊 that capture the 
general behavior of water. The rules of water behavior, in turns, gain 
relevance in virtue of the rules 𝐿𝑀 that capture the behavior of solid 
materials under pressure.  
The ultimate reason for 𝐸, in Hempel’s view, lies in the 𝑟 laws ⋀𝐋𝑟 
that jointly obtained under ⋀𝐂𝒌 and made 𝐸 unavoidable given the cir-
cumstances. The conjunction of local conditions becomes explanatory 
as it compels the local instantiation of the general laws. Counterfactu-
ally, “if the law were deleted, the argument would no longer be valid”81.  
General statements also ensure a further hallmark of Hempel’s ex-
planation: its grounding in expectability. The information that accounts 
for an occurrence is the same that makes it predictable. Knowing the 
general behavior of water and iron containers, we can foresee the crack-
ing as much as we can explain it. The difference between the two heu-
ristics reduces to a mere matter of research focus: 
 
While in the case of an explanation the final event is known to have 
happened and its determining conditions have to be sought, the situa-
tion is reversed in the case of a prediction: here, the initial conditions 
are given, and their “effect” – which, in the typical case, has not yet 
taken place – is to be determined82. 
 
Expectability makes explanation possible even in those “special” 
sciences – such as history, economics, medicine, or sociology – inter-
ested in stochastic phenomena. Hempel maintains select statistical ab-
stractions do support scientific knowledge, too, as far as they allow an-
ticipating the occurrence of some class of events with a reasonable de-
gree of confidence.  
All that matters to Hempel, therefore, is whether the general state-
ments cover the occurrence of interest – that is, whether they apply un-
der the circumstances. The default reasoning again unfolds deductively 
as in [15.a]. 
Deduction [15.a] reads as follows. Let 𝑇 be a treatment for hay fever 
symptoms, 𝐶 some initial health conditions, 𝑂 as the relief, and the in-
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dexed 𝐶 and 𝑂 as the values that health conditions and reliefs, respec-
tively, take in the 𝑖th actual instance. Thus, the major premiss in [15.a] 
reads that, under general conditions 𝐶, 𝑇 makes 𝑂 to be expected with 
a probability of 𝑟. When the probability is as high as 𝑟 ≅ 1, the remedy 
succeeds almost certainly in the cases that qualify as instances of the 
reference class 𝐶.  
 
p(𝑂, 𝑇𝐶 ) = 𝑟  probability of an outcome O given 𝑇𝐶 [15.a] 
𝑇𝐶𝑖   degree in which 𝑖 is an instance of  𝑇𝐶  
 
 
entails with probability 𝑟  
𝑂𝑖  the value of the outcome of case 𝑖  
 
Now, the minor premiss offers the observation of the further case 𝑖 
meeting 𝐶𝑖 – for instance, John Doe, showing clear signs of a hay fever 
attack after spending a few hours near a bouquet, with a family history 
of allergies but otherwise young and healthy – and taking 𝑇.  
All in all, the structure suggests we can expect 𝑂𝑖  with probability 𝑟 
– and in both directions. Prospectively, we can predict John Doe’s 𝑂 
after 𝑇 as he qualifies as a 𝐶-type instance. Retrospectively, we can 
conclude that John Doe’s 𝑂 was almost inevitable because the remedy 
𝑇 was adequate to John Doe’s disease and conditions. 
However, general statistical premisses arise a paradox when the pos-
sibility always exists that, together with [15.a], [15.b] holds, too: 
 
p(?̅?, 𝑇𝐾 ) = 𝑟   probability of an outcome ?̅? given 𝑇𝐾 [15.b] 
𝑇𝐾𝑖   degree in which 𝑖 is an instance of  𝑇𝐾  
 
 
 entails with probability 𝑟  
?̅?𝑖  the value of the outcome of case 𝑖  
 
The structure of [15.b] reads that the same treatment of type 𝑇 can 
be expected to yield the opposite outcome ?̅? with the same probability 
𝑟 as in [15.a], just because of the different conditions 𝐾. For instance, 
Jimmy Doe can find no relief in 𝑇 because the treatment works when 
the symptoms are caused by allergens, while his disease has a bacterial 
origin.  
On a more general vein, Hempel eventually recognizes that any out-
come becomes almost statistically certain given the “right” reference 
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class, hence under the right set of boundary conditions83. This point has 
long been raised to contend that statistical equations can support expla-
nation as true universals do84. The concern compelled Hempel to two 
clarifications: first, of the function of the general statements employed 
as explanatory premisses; second, of the ground on which probabilistic 
statements can license the inference to the next instance. 
 
3.3.2 Capturing potentials 
The scope of the general statement in an explanation does not war-
rant its explanatory capacity85. General statements confer explanatory 
power to the conditions in the explanandum when they capture a poten-
tial that the conditions actualize. Therefore, the general statements sup-
port the explanation if they capture the possibility of the effect. It is the 
potential or the possibility of an effect – not its probability – that allows 
us expecting it and interpreting some of its non-manifestations as a fail-
ure. 
Now the problem arises as possibilities are unobservable by defini-
tion, hence invite to debatable metaphysical tenets. Regardless of their 
ontological commitment, different strands in the modern philosophy of 
science86 conceive of potentials as objects’ theoretical properties. The 
empirical streams utilize these theoretical constructs as placeholders in 
an explanatory hypothesis whose standing is decided by the fit of evi-
dence. Hempel’s explanation sides with this tradition and with its com-
mitment to the empirical testability of the statements about properties. 
Testability, however, requires the theoretical property is “operational-
ized” as an appropriate extensional class. Hempel’s argument on this 
point runs as follows. 
Explanations are always relative to some explanandum 𝑄. The the-
oretical mindset commits to consider 𝑄 as the observable state that a 
particular object, or unit, or body 𝑥 takes after causation unfolded. The 
further assumption stipulates that 𝑥 becomes 𝑄 at time 𝑡 provided that, 
at time  𝑡 − 1, it already has the potential, the capacity, or the disposi-
tion to 𝑄. In short, 𝑥 “𝑄-ed” only because it was “𝑄-able” first. Assum-
ing that 𝑥 is 𝑄-able allows identifying the attributes of the reference 
class. The concept holds if its reference class allows predicting 𝑄, or if 
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it fits the theoretically “right” boundary conditions that can explain the 
manifestation of 𝑄 in suitable bodies 𝑥 or its failure. The open issue, 
hence, is how to translate disposition-concepts into testable reference 
classes. Hempel’s explanation develops a solution that takes the semi-
nal contribution of Rudolf Carnap87 as its point of departure.  
 
Carnap was “the first empiricist who, not content with asserting the 
reducibility of science to terms of immediate experience, took serious 
steps toward carrying out the reduction”88 He provided an operational 
and experimental understanding of a disposition. “𝑄-able” is the predi-
cate that we introduce to indicate the capacity of a body 𝑥 to react “in 
such and such ways and such conditions, e.g., ‘visible,’ ‘smellable,’ 
‘fragile,’ ‘tearable,’ ‘soluble,’ ‘indissoluble’ etc.”89. Hence, if we assign 
the meaning “soluble in water” to 𝑄, we can define it as in [D] 
 
[D] 𝑄 ≡ (𝐶1 ⊃ 𝑄1) 
 
where 𝑄 denotes the solubility of any body 𝑥, 𝐶1 reads that the body 𝑥 
is placed into water at time 𝑡, and 𝑄1 reads that the body dissolves at 
time 𝑡. The definition, hence, stipulates that “any body is soluble in wa-
ter if and only if, if it is placed into water, then it dissolves.”  
The problem with [D] is that it relies on the horseshoe, which makes 
the implication vacuously true when the antecedent is false. Otherwise 
said, the definition qualifies a body as soluble even if it is not, based on 
the fact that it has never been put into water and never will be – such 
as, with Carnap’s example, the match I burned yesterday.  
To address this paradox, Carnap suggests rephrasing [D] as the reduc-
tion sentence [RS] 
 
[RS] 𝐶1 ⊃ (𝑄 ≡ 𝑄1) 
 
The sentence switches the connectives and yields a conditional def-
inition: if the body 𝑥 is placed into water at time 𝑡, then it is soluble if 
and only if it dissolves at time 𝑡 – else, it is not. As such, [RS] implies 
a loss in scope and a gain in accuracy in contrast to [D], as it only de-
fines things that meet 𝐶1, hence, solubility in water. 
The meaning of [RS] can be generalized as in [RS1] below: 
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[RS1] 𝐶1 ⊃ (𝑄1 ⊃ 𝑄) 
 
[RS1] reads that if any space-time point 𝑥 meets the empirical con-
dition 𝐶1, then if we find the effect 𝑄1, then the point has the property 
𝑄. So rephrased, it means that observing 𝑄1 as expected of an instance 
from the reference class 𝐶1 suffices to maintain that the property applies 
to the instances of 𝐶1. 
[RS1] also serves to establish the absence of the theoretical prop-
erty. If 𝑥 satisfies the condition 𝐶2, then if we find the effect 𝑄2, then 
the point has not the property 𝑄: 
 
[RS2] 𝐶2 ⊃ (𝑄2 ⊃ ~𝑄) 
 
[RS2] means that observing 𝑄2 from the reference class 𝐶2 as ex-
pected suffices to maintain that the property does not apply to the in-
stances of 𝐶2. 
 
[RS1] assigns 𝑄 to the points of the class 𝐶1 ∧ 𝑄1 while [RS2] at-
tributes ~𝑄 to the points of the class 𝐶2 ∧ 𝑄2. Hence, [RS1] offers a 
valid reduction for 𝑄 except for those points that satisfy ~(𝐶1 ∧ 𝑄1). 
The negation of the conjunction ~(𝐶1 ∧ 𝑄1), then, states the impossi-
bility that defines the property 𝑄. 
On the same vein, [RS2] reduces for ~𝑄 except for those points that 
are ~(𝐶2 ∧ 𝑄2). The negation of the conjunction ~(𝐶2 ∧ 𝑄2) states the 
impossibility that defines the property ~𝑄. 
Together, [RS1] and [RS2] constitute a reduction pair for 𝑄 and 
hold for those cases that, logically or empirically, do not satisfy 
~[(𝐶1 ∧ 𝑄1 ) ∨ (𝐶2 ∧ 𝑄2)].  
 
A special case of empirical reduction arises when 𝐶2 = 𝐶1 and 𝑄2 =
~𝑄1. It refers to the case of two objects, 𝑥 and 𝑦, such that when placed 
in water 𝑥 dissolves, while 𝑦 does not. The two effects license the re-
placement of the reduction pair with a single “bilateral reduction sen-
tence” [BRS]: 
 
[BRS] 𝐶1 ⊃ (𝑄 ≡ 𝑄1) 
 
[BRS] reads that if an object meets the condition 𝐶1, then it has the 
property 𝑄 if and only if it yields 𝑄1 – and vice-versa, it yields the effect 
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if it has the property. The bilateral reduction sentence, Carnap notes, 
cannot apply to the objects for which ~𝐶1 holds, that is, outside the 
conditions that reveal the property through the reaction. When these 
conditions are a standard constituent of any state of affairs, like oxygen 
to regular fire, then we can dispense with specifying 𝐶1 and the reduc-
tion sentence “degenerates” into the definition: 𝑄 ≡ 𝑄1. The statement 
says that a body has the property if it manifests the effect and vice versa. 
As such, the statement is circular, void of factual content, and of little 
use outside the strict domain of logic.  
In contrast to bilateral reduction sentences, reduction pairs may pre-
serve empirical import. Reduction pairs assign points or entities to the 
general class 𝐶1 ∧ 𝑄1 ∧ 𝐶2 ∧ 𝑄2. As no object can be at the same time 
under two different conditions and yield opposite results, then it also 
must be that no object of a reduction pair satisfies ∼ (𝐶1 ∧ 𝑄1 ∧ 𝐶2 ∧
𝑄2), that is, by the laws of complementarity, ~𝐶1 ∨ ~𝑄1 ∨ ~𝐶2 ∨ ~𝑄2. 
The disjunction of negated terms does not degenerate into a defini-
tion if we further specify 𝐶, – for instance, by stating that if 𝑥 is made 
of a specific material and is put into water, then it will be soluble and 
dissolve. The addition of new predicates results in a reduction chain 
that improves the determination of the instances as it grows richer.  
 
3.3.3 The problem of confirmation in explanations 
Carnap’s proposal does not capture potentials or dispositions as 
such – and the question remains open of how to gauge these and other 
“unobservables” credibly90. Nevertheless, his reduction sentences clar-
ify that a disposition becomes visible as the response that special con-
ditions can elicit from certain entities, and that we can interpret causally 
in the light of a theory. Thus, reduction sentences set hypotheses about 
conditions that are counterfactually associated with the potential to ob-
tain. Conditions capture how the past, future, or anyhow unobservable 
entities would react to the “experimental” conditions if tested.  
In a reversal of the classical logic, late Hempel’s explanation takes 
Carnap’s reduction sentences as the elementary logical machinery that 
(i) allows connecting conditions to effects and (ii) licenses the applica-
bility of theoretical terms about potential to the entities in the same class 
as those for which the connection proved true. At the same time, 
Hempel considers that the reduction sentences inevitably establish the 
conditional implication as a bona fide general statement that may never 
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lose its state of hypothesis. This conclusion follows from the redefini-
tion of the original “covering laws” approach. 
 
In their first versions, Hempel’s “covering laws” are general state-
ments – such as ˹any raven is black˺ – and, logically, universal condi-
tionals – such as ˹if it is a raven, then it is black˺ – that stand as (dispo-
sitional) hypotheses – meaning that, for any 𝑥, if 𝑥 is a raven then 𝑥 is 
black. Hempel considers a common intuitive assumption that the con-
ditional is confirmed by any object 𝑎 that ˹is a raven˺ (𝐶) and ˹is black˺ 
(𝑄) and disconfirmed when we observe a raven and non-black object 
(𝐶 ∧ ?̅?). Such an assumption, to Hempel, defies essential requirements 
of consistency that the language of logic imposes. To make his point, 
he reformulates the issue as follows. 
He maintains the universal conditional statement 𝑆1 ˹if raven, then 
black˺ is formally equivalent to the contrapositive 𝑆2 ˹if not black, then 
not raven˺, so that S1 = S2. If the relationship is a material conditional, 
S1:   𝐶 ⊃ 𝑄 and S2:   ?̅? ⊃ 𝐶̅, and the hypothesis reads (𝐶 ⊃ 𝑄) ≡
 (?̅? ⊃ 𝐶̅). Assuming the antecedent and the consequent in S1 and S2 are 
binary – either true or false – the hypothesis affords four possible types 
of instances: (𝑎) ravens and black, (𝑏) ravens and non-black, (𝑐) non-
ravens and black, (𝑑) non-ravens and non-black– as displayed in Figure 
5. 
 
Figure 5.  Types of objects by the antecedent and  
the consequent of a conditional statement 
𝑸 
(𝒄) 
𝐶̅𝑄 
(𝒂) 
𝐶𝑄 
?̅? 
(𝒅) 
𝐶𝑄̅̅ ̅̅  
(𝒃) 
𝐶?̅? 
 ?̅? 𝑪 
 
Now, the intuitive understanding of empirical probation entails that 
objects (𝑎) confirm 𝑆1 yet are neutral to 𝑆2, and objects (𝑑) confirm 𝑆2 
yet are neutral to 𝑆1. Thus, the intuitive understanding assigns different 
import to the same instances depending on how the conditional is for-
mulated. Such an asymmetry, in Hempel’s view, violates a fundamental 
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logical requirement for the adequacy of any criterion of confirmation – 
that is, the Equivalence Condition. 
The Equivalence Condition commits to the principle that “whatever 
confirms (disconfirms) one of two equivalent sentences, also confirms 
(disconfirms) the other”91. Being 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 hypotheses about the same 
disposition, the Equivalence Condition stipulates they have to be sup-
ported by the same type of instances. Hence, objects (𝑑) – be them red 
herrings or white shoes – do bear confirmatory import. Moreover, they 
support 𝑆2 as 𝑆1 and any further equivalent statement – such as 𝑆3: 
 
𝑆3:    𝐶 ∨ 𝐶̅ ⊃ 𝑄 ∨ 𝐶̅  
 
The last equivalent statement originates from the insertion of 𝐶̅ as a 
disjunct in both the antecedent and the consequent of 𝑆1. The addition 
does not affect the formal relationship between the antecedent and the 
consequent. However, 𝑆3 states that if anything is either a raven or not 
a raven, then it is either black or not a raven. As the antecedent is now 
a tautology and the implication is material by assumption, the conse-
quent 𝑄 ∨ 𝐶̅ always follows. And, as paradoxical as it may seem, logic 
dictates that 𝑆1, 𝑆2 , 𝑆3 all find support in any black object, be it a raven 
or not, or in any non-raven object, be it black or not. Moreover, 𝑆3 com-
pels us to make room for further eerie assumptions. On pain of logical 
inconsistency, we should accept that, with red herrings and white shoes, 
green mermaids, too, stand as confirmatory instances of our hypothesis 
about black ravens.  
 
Hempel’s tenet spurred a lively debate on the paradoxes of implica-
tion that, nevertheless, did not cause any radical change in his under-
standing of the problem of inference and his commitment to formal 
logic as the framing language of reference92. However, he later con-
ceded that categorical and Aristotelean-like systems were typically able 
to avoid the green mermaids’ paradox by forbidding the negation of the 
subject – that is, its qualitative variation. Predicate logic lifted the con-
straint by reducing subjects to predicates that, as such, can be negated. 
He then reasoned that an Aristotelean restriction could be fruitfully in-
troduced through a rule requiring the “existential import” of the in-
stances under analysis. The rule, Hempel reasoned, was not to apply to 
logical hypotheses directly, as the validity of these statements only must 
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depend on their fit to the axioms of propositional logic. Instead, the re-
quirement of “existential import” had to apply to the operationalization 
of logical statements – that is, to the observational reports that allow us 
to adjudicate on their empirical standing. Late Hempel, so, posited op-
erationalization as the ground where validity serves soundness. 
 
3.3.4 Operational solutions 
The operational perspective assumes that hypotheses and evidence 
are rendered by sentences formulated in the same “language of sci-
ence.” The language allows shaping the connection between a property, 
such as ˹being black˺ or ˹being a raven˺, and, on the other, the observa-
ble attributes and relationships that qualify an entity as an instance of 
that property. An observational sentence, then, is “the sentence affirm-
ing or denying that a given object, or sequence of objects, possesses one 
of those observable attributes”93. The observation sentence, in short, de-
scribes the output of a measurement, or of any other pragmatic opera-
tions devised to decide on the nature of objects based on their observa-
ble features. The observation report 𝐑 consists of the finite class of ob-
servation sentences.  
So equipped, Hempel stipulates that conclusive confirmation or dis-
confirmation can be framed as a logical relationship of entailment be-
tween an observation report and a hypothesis, such that any hypothesis 
that is entailed by an observation report is also confirmed by it. The 
entailment condition, in Hempel, builds on a Chrysippean-like criterion 
of correctness – hence, it moves the issue outside the terrain of formal 
logic. It stipulates that a hypothesis-statement 𝐇 is confirmed as its con-
junction with a false observational report 𝐑 is unsatisfiable, as in [16] 
 
 ~(𝐇 ∧ ?̅?)   [16] 
 
The entailment condition allows for the conclusive confirmation of 
a hypothesis – its verification or falsification – which, however, is lim-
ited in scope: “from the information contained in 𝐑 we can infer that 
the hypothesis 𝐇 does hold within the finite class of those objects that 
are mentioned in 𝐑”94.  
To widen the scope, Hempel adds two further conditions:  
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- the Consequence Condition maintains that if an observation-report 
verifies a specific class of sentences, then it confirms any sentence 
that is a logical consequence of that class;  
- the Consistency Condition maintains that every logically con-
sistent observation report is logically compatible with the whole 
class of the hypotheses that it confirms.  
 
Consequence and consistency allow extending the scope of confir-
mation beyond observations through the development of the hypothesis. 
The development of a hypothesis 𝐇 for a condition 𝐶 “states what 𝐇 
would assert if there existed exclusively those objects which are ele-
ments of 𝐶”95. Hence, it consists of the chained assertions of the hy-
pothesis 𝐇 for all the objects in an observational report. The hypothesis 
𝐇 is verified when the sentences in the report 𝐑 entail the development 
of the hypothesis for the finite class of the objects in the report. 
To illustrate the point, let us assume that 
 
- 𝐇:𝐶 ⊃ 𝑄 renders the raven hypothesis,  
- we have a finite class of three objects {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}.  
 
The development of the raven hypothesis then reads 𝐇𝟏: (𝐶𝑖 ⊃ 𝑄𝑖) ∧
(𝐶𝑗 ⊃ 𝑄𝑗) ∧ (𝐶𝑘 ⊃ 𝑄𝑘).  
 
Let also assume that, in the three objects,  
 
- the property 𝐶 is rendered by the observable attribute 𝐶1, and 
the observations of 𝐶1 lead to the statements 𝐶1𝑖, 𝐶1̅𝑗 , 𝐶1̅𝑘, 
- the property 𝑄 is rendered by the observable attribute 𝑄1, and 
the observations of 𝑄1 in the three objects yield the statements 
𝑄1𝑖 , 𝑄1𝑗 , ?̅?1𝑘.  
 
The report then reads 𝐑: (𝐶1𝑖 ∧ 𝑄1𝑖) ∧ (𝐶1̅𝑗 ∧ 𝑄1𝑗) ∧ (𝐶1̅𝑘 ∧ ?̅?1𝑘).  
𝐑, then, entails 𝐇𝟏; therefore, we can infer that 𝐇 is satisfied within 
the finite class {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘} under the conditions of Consequence and Con-
sistency. 𝐑 then confirms 𝐇 for {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}.  
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In short, Hempel assumes the impossibility ~(𝐇𝟏 ∧ ?̅?), in which 
the truth value of 𝐇𝟏 is decided by 𝐑. Also, Hempel equates the discon-
firmation of a hypothesis 𝐇 with the confirmation of its denial, ?̅?, de-
cided by the observational report 𝐑′. A report is neutral to 𝐇 if it neither 
confirms nor disconfirms it. In his note 46, he also suggests that when 
a report contains a tautological observation about an object, then the 
object shall be dropped from the reference class. 
Then, verification and falsification are those types of confirmation 
that apply when observation reports are conclusive (Hempel, 1965:39). 
Whether observational sentences have such a heuristic power depends 
on the quantity of the hypothesis, as summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Quantity of a hypothesis and conclusive observations 
Scope Hypothesis Reports Conclusion 
Singular 𝐶(𝑥) ⊃ 𝑊(𝑥)  𝐶(𝑥) ∧𝑊(𝑥)  Verified 
  𝐶(𝑥) ∧ ?̅?(𝑥)  Falsified 
  ?̅?(𝑥)  –  
Existential ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 .  𝐶(𝑥) ⊃ 𝑊(𝑥)  𝐶(𝑥) ∧𝑊(𝑥)  Verified 
  𝐶(𝑥) ∧ ?̅?(𝑥)  – 
  ?̅?(𝑥)  – 
Universal ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 .  𝐶(𝑥) ⊃ 𝑊(𝑥)  𝐶(𝑥) ∧𝑊(𝑥)  – 
  𝐶(𝑥) ∧ ?̅?(𝑥)  Falsified 
  ?̅?(𝑥)  –  
 
Keys.  Lowercase indicates objects; uppercase indicates attributes. 
∃ is the existential quantifier and reads “there exists at least one”; ∀ is the 
universal quantifier and reads “for all”, “for any”. 
∈ indicates the relationship of belonging; 𝑋 indicates the reference class. 
 
Table 2 says that, in a universe 𝕌, a singular hypothesis about a 
unique object is both verifiable and falsifiable. The statement 𝐶(𝑥) ⊃
𝑊(𝑥) can read ˹if 𝑥 is a cygnet, it turns white˺. The observation report 
of 𝑥 changing into white verifies the statement; of it changing into any 
other color falsifies the statement, while a report of no change leaves 
the statement undecided.  
Existential hypotheses, instead, can be verified yet not falsified. The 
statement ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 .  𝐶(𝑥) ⊃ 𝑊(𝑥), reading that ˹ there exists at least one 
entity 𝑥 belonging to class 𝑋 (of chicks) such that, if 𝑥 is 𝐶 (a cygnet), 
it 𝑊 (turns white)˺, is conclusively proven by the observation sentence 
about those chicks that make the conditional true. However, observa-
tion reports cannot decide the truth of the statement when there is no 𝑥. 
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Pure universal hypotheses can be falsified when an observation re-
port contradicts them; however, they cannot be verified. The statement 
∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 .  𝐶(𝑥) ⊃ 𝑊(𝑥), reading that ˹for any object 𝑥 drawn from the 
class 𝑋, if 𝑥 is 𝐶, then 𝑥 is 𝑊˺, is conclusively proven false when we 
find ?̅?(𝑥) – in the cygnet example, if the chick turns into a black swan. 
A series of observational reports about white swans, however, only 
makes the statement provisionally true – confirmed, yet not verified. 
The parallel is striking of Hempel’s considerations about observa-
tional reports with the inferences allowed by the square of opposition 
in Figure 1. Existential hypotheses concern particulars, while the hy-
pothesis about singular causation mirrors the Aristotelean statements 
about a closed universe – in Hempel’s case, a universe of one item – 
whose testing consists of measurement. Hempel’s universal hypotheses 
do preserve the nature of the Aristotelean universals in that they can be 
contradicted although not conclusively proven – unless their scope is 
restricted to particular space-time boundaries. 
 
From the advantage point of observational reports, Hempel’s sug-
gestions indicate that the same observation does have a different prov-
ing power – depending on the scope of the hypothesis. Thus, given the 
unquantified hypothesis that 𝐶 ⊃ 𝑊, the conjunction 𝐶(𝑥) ∧ 𝑊(𝑥) ver-
ifies the singular and the existential understandings of it; the report 
𝐶(𝑥) ∧ ?̅?(𝑥) falsifies the singular and the universal understandings; 
and reports about red herrings, white shoes, and green mermaids 𝐶̅(𝑥) 
do not affect the provisional standing of any version of the hypothesis. 
The quantifier of the hypothesis, vice versa, determines the type of ob-
servation required to establish the truth of the hypothesis. 
  
  
 
 
4. Back to square one?  
 
 
 
 
 
The portrayals sketched in the previous chapters, although partial, sug-
gest a remarkable continuity in the understanding of scientific explana-
tion. Aristotle identified it in the middle term that qualifies some objects 
as instances of a universal relationship: planets do not twinkle because 
they are near things, and near things never twinkle. Hempel identified 
it in the circumstances that license expectations about the behavior of 
particular instances: the car’s radiator broke because it was made of cast 
iron and filled with water and exposed to low temperatures, and iron is 
fragile and water increases in volume when freezing.  
A robust strand agrees on identifying explanations with the set of 
conditions under which the effect occurs. More controversial is the 
ground on which we can accept that those conditions are relevant to the 
occurrence of the effect. Intuitively, conditions explain as they signal 
the presence in the field of some causal power, or tendency, or disposi-
tion to yield the effect that they activate – which licenses the inference. 
The difficulty consists of defining the ultimate criteria that allow us as-
suming such power inheres in some object and is manifested as some 
concomitant attribute. The problem is exquisitely Aristotelean, but the 
modern philosophy of science contends that it can be tackled with met-
aphysical objects. On pain of circularity, we cannot conclude that not 
twinkling inheres in near things as the manifestation of their “nearth-
ingness.” 
The problem has two sides – ontological, related to the potential of 
interest, and epistemic, related to the knowledge that we can have of it. 
Logical languages have been introduced to improve our grasp of both 
sides. As the previous chapters show, these languages have cast some 
convincing light on the epistemic side of the problem, showing under 
which empirical conditions we can maintain a hypothesis orders reality 
according to logical criteria. Confirmation and disconfirmation apply to 
105 
an image of reality that may have no stronger standing than an educated 
guess. As Hempel and Carnap established with the rules of entailment, 
the match of observation reports and reduction sentences allows us de-
ciding when a hypothesis is proven and on which ground. The open 
question asks which conditions we shall include in our hypothesis that 
captures the potential. This, however, leads us back to the ontological 
side of the picture. 
The contemporary answer to the ontological question comes from 
strands that associate causation with mechanisms. The strands originate 
in the broader domain of the so-called “special sciences” – an extensive 
range that encompasses as many different disciplines as biology and 
sociology – from scholars’ discontent with the Hempelian “received 
view”. The covering law model stipulated that laws are required to en-
dow explanatory conditions with the capacity to explain occurrences, 
establishing standards that many scholars saw as unreasonable or be-
yond the scope of their research practices.  
A variety of philosophical contributions has elaborated on this dis-
content and developed the idea of a “mechanism” as an alternative 
grounding to covering laws. Among them, the following three deserve 
a special mention, again for their broad influence beyond the domain of 
philosophy of science.  
 
 
4.1 Relevance, causality, and causation 
 
Salmon1 develops his proposal around Russell’s idea of a “causal line” 
as the persistence of something. His proposal, hence, understands cau-
sation in line with the Humean tradition, but with a twist. Persistence 
pertains to processes that we can observe as the state of the property of 
an object at different space-time points. Under this definition, a stone 
resting defines a process as much as a stone throwing. Causation occurs 
at the intersection of two processes at the space-time point 𝑡. The inter-
section is causal when the processes are different at 𝑡 + 1 and at 𝑡 − 1.  
Originally, the difference was understood as the transmission of a 
mark beyond the point of interaction. To ensure the mark is not spuri-
ous, Salmon was compelled to add the counterfactual condition that the 
change would not have occurred, had the intersection not happened – 
                                                          
1 Salmon, 1984, 1998. 
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which he held in some contempt. Counterfactuals, he considered, de-
moted the mark principle to an epistemic criterion and again left causa-
tion impinging on the actual occurrence of interactions and modifica-
tions. In short, counterfactuals make processes dispensable in defining 
causation2.  
In the effort to preserve the ontic priority of processes, Salmon then 
embraced the principle of constant or invariant quantities as the feature 
that qualifies a process as causal. Thus: 
 
A process transmits an invariant (or conserved) quantity from A to B 
(𝐴 ≠ 𝐵) if it possesses this quantity at A and at B and at every stage 
of the process between 𝐴 and 𝐵 without any interactions in the half-
open interval (𝐴, 𝐵] that involve an exchange of that particular invar-
iant (or conserved) quantity3. 
 
The half-open interval, he specifies, allows “for the possibility that 
there is an interaction at 𝐴 that determines the amount of the quantity 
involved in the transmission.” The new definition implies that “a causal 
process does not enter into any causal interactions”4. The causal process 
only denotes what happens as a consequence of interaction, and inde-
pendently on the effect that it sorts out. It captures the speeding bullet 
that transmits the energy-momentum from the gun to the target. It ren-
ders the notion of propagation as separate from that of production. 
From this viewpoint, therefore, mechanisms are causal interactions that 
produce a change in the structure of the causal processes, which later 
propagate across the space-time region until it delivers.  
Salmon’s proposal is relatively silent on how to establish the prop-
agation process, except for the requirement of tracing it in its actual 
shape. More attention is paid to the relationship between productive in-
teractions and propagating processes, which is empirically validated 
when the interactions provide a homogeneous partition of a reference 
class. 
Salmon5 understands a reference class 𝑆 as a collection of objects 
identified by some attribute of interest. Its partition yields cells or “sub-
classes that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive within 𝑆 – that is, 
                                                          
2 Kitcher, 1989. 
3 Salmon, 1998:257. 
4 Salmon, 1998: 258. 
5 Salmon, 1989:63 ff, 1998. 
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every member of 𝑆 belongs to one and only one subclass of the parti-
tion.” A partition is relevant to an attribute 𝑃 if the heterogeneity of 𝑃 
in each cell is different from the heterogeneity in any other cell. Then, 
the reference class 𝑆 is homogeneous to 𝑃 when no relevant partitions 
can be made of it.  
The language in Salmon’s proposal is probabilistic and Bayesian. 
The reference class provides the prior probability 𝑝(𝑃|𝑆), and the cells 
from its partition by attribute 𝐶 provide the posterior probabilities 
𝑝(𝑃|𝑆𝐶), 𝑝(𝑃|𝑆𝐶̅). The relevance of 𝐶 to 𝑃 in 𝑆 is decided by compar-
ing the posterior probabilities in each cell and to the prior and is proven 
when a cell displays a different conditional probability than any others. 
As a consequence, the symmetry that was typical of law-like generali-
zations is violated.  
That which does the explaining, hence, is the attribute 𝐶, or the in-
tersection of attributes 𝛷, that constitute the ultimate homogeneous cell 
to which no further partition can prove relevant. The proof of relevance 
consists in the fact that any new condition 𝐺 satisfies the equation in the 
left side of [17]: 
 
[𝑝(𝑃|𝑆𝛷𝐺) = 𝑝(𝑃|𝑆𝛷)] > 𝑝(𝑃|𝑆)  [17] 
 
The left side of [17] renders the Markov condition and indicates that 
𝛷 “absorbs” or “screens off” the relevance of any 𝐺 to 𝑃 in 𝑆. An ex-
planation, hence, is the conjunction of attributes that identify a group as 
the ultimate homogeneous partition in the reference class. In practice, 
with Salmon’s example, the answer to the question “why did those 
youngsters steal a car?” appeals to those relevant conditions 𝛷 that sort 
the group 𝑃 of car thieves out of the reference class 𝑆 of teenagers. The 
answer is complete when no further conditions can be added to 𝛷, as 
even the relevant ones would be screened off by the conditions in the 
explanation.  
Completeness and relevance equip us with the criteria to pinpoint 
credible explanatory conditions. These are the “proximate causes” that 
absorb the entire relevance of more remote causes to a phenomenon. 
The criteria can guide our search for relevant conditions, as well as our 
decision to end our search. With a reasoning that recalls Mill’s second 
mode of explanation, Salmon maintains that 
 
A complete set of factors statistically relevant to the occurrence of a 
given event can be found by examining the interior and boundary of 
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an appropriate neighboring section of its past light cone. Any factor 
outside of that portion of the cone that is, by itself, statistically rele-
vant to the occurrence of the event in question is screened off by 
events within that neighboring portion of the light cone6. 
 
Completeness also ensures that the explanation is only made of rel-
evant conditions. Thus, it provides a solution to the famous riddle of the 
barometer, that a frequentist confirmatory approach, like any simple 
enumeration, would mistake for the cause of the storm. The Markov 
condition in [17] would prove instead that the conditional probability 
of the storm given the reading of the barometer and the pressure is the 
same as the probability of the storm given the pressure alone: therefore, 
a barometer is not a relevant part of the causal explanation of the storm.  
Salmon does not recognize the set 𝛷 any metaphysical import. Rel-
evance is relative to our knowledge of the reference class, the process, 
and the candidate initiating conditions that we consider for testing. An 
explanation, therefore, is always bona fide, given the limits of our 
knowledge. He also acknowledges that his principle of relevance, un-
derstood as an invariant relation of quantities, brings the explanation 
back in the riverbed of law-like regularities – so, at a short distance from 
early Hempel’s and, before, Mill’s explanation. However, in Salmon’s 
perspective, the invariance of conditions is as local and relative as the 
actual processes that they explain. What truly matters, in Salmon’s ac-
count and to the broader debate on explanation, is the underlying ontol-
ogy of causation. The causal processes of propagation are the ontic 
spindles that, on the one side, confer relevance to initiating conditions 
and, on the other side, make the effect happen. This view suggests an 
essential distinction between causality and causation.  
Salmon’s proposal entails that firing a bullet, the speeding bullet, 
and the shot target are three distinct parts of the problem. Causation can 
be grasped as the change in the state of the target due to the firing and 
explained by the intersection. Causality, instead, is the invariance of the 
speeding bullet that propagates the force unlashed when firing. Salmon 
draws attention to the fact that the causality generated at the intersection 
of the starting conditions may or may not end with the effect of interest, 
hence “forks” alternatives. However, he never frames them as possibil-
ities, only as forks capable of experimental interpretation. These forks 
end in a different way to different individuals of a specific reference 
class. That which we understand as the effect only is the recognition 
                                                          
6 Salmon 1998: 121. 
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that these responses may be of the same kind, which again can be ac-
counted for by some combination of relevant conditions. These condi-
tions can be found by testing their relevance to the process – ideally, for 
each fork. 
In Salmon’s view, explanations require both statistically relevant 
conditions and a connecting causal process – else, the explanation 
would be wanting. Salmon recognized priority to causal processes over 
conditions as, like Hempel before him, he maintains the propagation 
confers conditions their explanatory standing. Moreover, the process of 
propagation remains the key for understanding “how the world works,” 
which, to Salmon, is necessary to scientific knowledge. Causality, then, 
is an intensional matter; interventions and counterfactuals, which are 
extensional instead, are far from required to characterize it – although 
they improve our grasp of causation.  
 
 
4.2 Mechanistic models of causation in philosophy 
 
The focus on causation, interventions, and counterfactuals is the hall-
mark of the “mechanistic model” perspective. This again takes its move 
from the discontent with Hempel’s requirement of universal generali-
zation as the grounding of explanation and predictions alike. However, 
the mechanistic model approach disagrees with Salmon on the ontic 
priority of some individual eventless “causal rope” pulled between the 
generative intersection and its end results. The disagreement is espe-
cially evident in the influential contribution of Woodward7.  
Woodward contends that Salmon’s focus on actual single processes 
can have any currency beyond the domain of classical physics and be-
yond simple systems. Faced with  
 
large numbers of interactions among many distinct fundamental 
causal processes […], it is often hopeless to try to understand the be-
havior of the whole system by tracing each individual process. Instead 
one needs to find a way of representing what the system does on the 
whole or on the average, which abstracts from such specific causal 
detail. […] In this treatment, such characteristically “epistemic” or 
“inferential” concerns as finding techniques for actually solving the 
relevant equation governing this aggregate behavior and for avoiding 
computational intractabilities are of quite central importance. Rather 
                                                          
7 Woodward, 1989, 2003. 
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than merely mirroring facts about causal interactions and processes 
the relevance of which for inclusion in the explanation is determined 
on other grounds, such epistemic considerations seem to have an in-
dependent role in determining why this sort of explanation takes the 
form it does8. 
 
Moreover, Woodward considers that giving priority to seamless 
processes posits inescapable questions about the amount and type of 
evidence required to support something more than a singular or an ex-
istential claim that 𝛷(𝑥) makes 𝑆(𝑥) be 𝑃(𝑥). The focus tapers the 
analysis and puts some desirable goals out of reach. For instance, based 
on single processes, we may not be able to answer why that particular 
process took place instead of others that were equally possible. Ad-
dressing such alternative “what-if” questions is nevertheless desirable 
in Woodward’s eyes, as these responses reduce the sense of contin-
gency while pointing out that similar processes can be expected under 
a variety of initial conditions. Besides, the focus on singular processes 
may prevent our attempts to consolidate dispersed knowledge under one 
consistent framework, as the concept of mechanism instead can and 
should do.  
Woodward conceives of a mechanism as a model, that is, an image 
that captures macroscopic patterns or regularities by abstracting away 
from the details of single occurrences. Thus, mechanistic explanations 
first come in the shape of a theory as a formal model. Construed as a 
reduction that mimics the aggregate behavior of the actual system, mod-
els are proven “true” when they reproduce the observed behavior – as 
is the case of those algorithms that, from biology to rational choice, find 
equilibria in the aggregate responses to selection and adaptation pres-
sures. The mechanistic model approach, then, agrees with the inten-
sional rendering that explanations cannot be reduced to content-free 
logical structures. At the same time, it departs from the intensional ren-
dering as it understands explanation to be the solution to an equation, 
valid in the strict domain of the driving question about the effect, but of 
general space-time applicability in that domain. 
The main issue that these mechanistic models have to address is the 
specification of a causal structure. Woodward establishes that 
 
a necessary condition for a representation to be an acceptable model 
of a mechanism is that the representation (i) describes an organized 
                                                          
8 Woodward 1989:362-363. 
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or structured set of parts or components, where (ii) the behavior of 
each component is described by a generalization that is invariant un-
der interventions, and where (iii) the generalizations governing each 
component are also independently changeable, and where (iv) the rep-
resentation allows us to see how, in virtue of (i), (ii) and (iii), the 
overall output of the mechanism will vary under manipulation of the 
input to each component and changes in the components themselves9. 
 
At the core of this image lies an arrangement of elements, each of 
which displays some observable pattern of behavior, and such that all 
contribute to the output.  
These patterns do not correspond to any law; instead, they are em-
pirical relationships. They bear counterfactuals in the classical, experi-
mental understanding, but apply the principle to Markovian structures. 
Thus, an acceptable mechanistic model is that in which an intervention 
on the value of the 𝑘th elements 𝑋𝑘 results in the change of the value of 
the output 𝑌, and the change only passes through 𝑋𝑘 and the further 
elements that are “causally between” 𝑋𝑘 and 𝑌. According to this defi-
nition, a change in the value of the barometer effected by a change in 
atmospheric pressure does not count as an intervention that proves the 
barometer has a “causal betweenness” to the storm. An intervention on 
the barometer, instead, is the attempt at making the storm more or less 
likely by intervening on it in insulation. The fact that the manipulation 
of the barometer in a vacuum chamber does not affect the weather is 
observed as the vanishing correlation between the reading of the barom-
eter and the occurrence of the storm as the observations cumulate.  
The causal process, in short, manifests as the correlation that we can 
make vanishing to disprove something is not causal, or relevant, to the 
effect of interest under repeated manipulations. Woodward acknowl-
edges that even a real causal relationship may be affected by some dis-
ruptive interference; however, it is expected to hold on average under a 
variety of interventions. For instance, a block sliding along an inclined 
plane would keep sliding according to the empirical regularities of grav-
ity and friction regardless of average changes in the width of the sur-
face, the weight of the block, or greasing.  
The disproving strategy of betweenness proves more useful than a 
confirmatory tracing strategy, Woodward maintains, because it can un-
ravel complex situations. Counterfactually, we can discover that a kind 
of protein intervenes on the operations of an enzyme by inhibiting its 
                                                          
9 Woodward 2002:S375. 
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blocking agent when the double prevention proves robust under a vari-
ety of changes.  
The counterfactual tests of betweenness, hence, are desirable as they 
yield information that we can employ to intervene on the causal process 
beneath an undesired effect.  
 
Invariance [under intervention] thus has the virtue of capturing the 
idea that what really matters to whether a generalization describes a 
causal relationship is whether it describes a relationship that is poten-
tially exploitable for purposes of manipulation10.  
 
Manipulability compels Woodward to introduce the assumption that 
the mechanism is made of independent elements and modular connec-
tions, which allow “one to trace out the consequences of possible 
changes in any of them for the overall behavior of the system.” The 
module can be conveniently assigned a residual effect on the output, 
support intervention, and be controlled. The major problem that a mod-
eler has to solve consists in identifying the right decomposition of the 
process to the effect. Modularity calls for criteria for establishing the 
boundaries of any independent element of the mechanism inductively.  
Woodward’s model provides an essential map of a mechanism as a 
consistent system, geared toward explaining its behavior by decompos-
ing – hence, again, reducing – it into recognizable functioning parts that 
together contribute to yield the effect. The explanation by mechanistic 
modeling, then, recalls Mill’s first and, possibly, second method of ex-
planation, as in [11] and [12.a], [12.b]. In no sense, however, Wood-
ward’s models can be equated to a “true” image of a complex system – 
and purposefully so. Instead, his reductions are designed to offer suffi-
cient information to act upon phenomena and change them. 
 
 
4.3 Explanatory mechanisms and their requirements 
 
Salmon’s and Woodward’s approaches to mechanisms may be por-
trayed as rivals. The one is confirmatory, intensional, and oriented to 
singular causation; the other is disconfirmatory, extensional, and geared 
to simulate whole systems. The two provide different responses to the 
same dissatisfaction for the covering-law model of explanation: 
Salmon’s account aims to portray the propagation process as close as 
                                                          
10 Woodward, 2002: S371. 
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possible to the real one, while Woodward develops a map that statistical 
equations can render and make interpretable. However, both depart 
from the classical syllogistic construction to emphasize the probative 
value of observational reports as such – in Woodward’s proposal, as 
detached as possible from contextual conditions. Nevertheless, both at-
tempt to capture the potential in the observable unfolding of activities.  
Unsurprisingly, the contemporary philosophy of science has tried to 
reconcile the two views11. Again for its influence on methods and re-
search, a special mention deserves a late mechanistic strand in the phi-
losophy of science – the eclectic synthesis developed as a reflection on 
biological and neurobiological explanations.  
Within this strand, Craver (2006, 2007) portrays explanatory mech-
anisms as the structure developed to systematize separate pieces of 
knowledge and develop a picture for both understanding and manipula-
tion. His mechanisms are “constitutive explanations,” in which “a prop-
erty or behavior of a system is explained by the properties and activities 
of its parts.” The underlying assumptions maintain that the interactions 
of the constitutive entities at the lower-level at time 𝑡1 arise higher-level 
effects that, in turn, constrain the interactions of the same constituent 
entities at time 𝑡1+𝑛. In this view, mechanisms offer a comprehensive 
model of causation as a local order, roughly captured as an input-
throughput-output system process that organizes the world. The epis-
temic question, following the debate between Woodward and Salmon, 
asks which desiderata – which criteria – a model should meet. Craver 
equates modeling with finding a function or an algorithm that mirrors 
the worldly order to be ascribed to the mechanism so that the input-
output patterns are close enough to what is observed – at least in their 
relevant aspects, although in all the relevant ones. The problem that 
modeling poses to the researcher is that of information loss:  
 
Few models are isomorphic with the phenomenon, given that models 
typically abstract away from the precise details of the system being 
modeled, that they typically are only approximate, and that they make 
simplifying assumptions in order to apply a particular formalism12. 
 
Then, different models can be developed of the same phenomenon 
to render it at different levels of detail. A coarser one accommodates a 
                                                          
11 e.g., Friedman, 1974; Kitcher, 1989. 
12 Craver 2006: 357. 
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broader range of diverse manifestations, although it dismisses more in-
formation about their actual diversity under the assumption of irrele-
vancy. More fine-grained characterizations, instead, provide richer in-
formation yet only apply to few or single phenomena. However, Craver 
maintains that phenomenal accuracy and explanatory power are inde-
pendent of one another. As such, the two criteria set two different de-
siderata – namely, robustness and plausibility. 
 
a) Desiderata 
To Craver, the explanatory power of a model depends on whether it 
can render the unfolding of a phenomenon under normal as well as ex-
treme conditions – that is, on whether it can map actual outputs even 
from degraded inputs or damaged units. A model that only maps the 
functioning of “the system” under normal conditions is not robust; 
hence it is not explanatory – although it can serve the purpose of pre-
diction. To him, “this is the take-home lesson of the several decades of 
attack on covering-law models of explanation at the hands of advocates 
of causal-mechanical models of explanation”13. 
Explanatory robustness and predictive robustness, therefore, are as-
sessed on different grounds – possibly, on opposite ones. The purpose 
that explanatory models serve, however, is no less significant than that 
of predictive generalizations. Both allow establishing how a system be-
haves under a variety of contingencies so that this information can sup-
port mindful decisions about intervention. Robust maps of phenomena 
include the “causal organization of the system” and its possible changes 
under different scenarios14. The causal organization, Craver maintains, 
is rendered as soon as the model includes “all the entities, properties, 
activities, and organizational features that are relevant” to preserve the 
functioning of the system across circumstances15. Relevance, therefore, 
depends on the driving question and the scope of the model; explanatory 
robustness, instead, guards against idiosyncratic bias in mapping. 
Explanatory robustness is not the sole criterion that a model shall 
meet. To be mechanistic, the model should refer to components and ac-
tivities that mirror the purported components and activities of actual 
phenomena. In short, the model should provide a plausible portrait of 
the particular region of the world that it maps. Plausibility, however, is 
a goal that can be reached by successive approximations from starting 
                                                          
13 Craver 2006: 357. 
14 Craver 2006, 359. 
15 Craver 2006, 359. 
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idealized conjectures – as it has been the case of the atom model, the 
solar system model, or the neural network model among many others. 
In the case of mechanisms, the approximation strategy yields different 
types of accounts in response to different versions of a how-question. 
 
b) Model specification and how-answers 
The strategy takes a definition of the explanandum as its starting 
point. The definition comes as an idealized “how-possibly” model 
shaped as a hypothetical sketch that specifies the primary connections 
and inserts the “black-boxes” that justify their emergence and direction. 
The accurate point of arrival, instead, is a “how-actually” model that 
provides “ideally complete descriptions of a mechanism” and includes 
“all of the entities, properties, activities, and organizational features that 
are relevant to every aspect of the phenomenon to be explained”16. In 
between, several “how-plausibly” models provide schemas that satisfy 
pragmatic needs. Schemas are mechanistic explanations in which 
known details have been intentionally abstracted away, and that, there-
fore, are similar to a testable theory in shape and function17. 
The passage from lower to higher accuracy “often proceeds by func-
tional analysis, reverse engineering, homuncular explanation, and de-
composition”18. The passage unfolds along intertwined, although ana-
lytically separate lines. 
On the one side, the focus is on the conditions that shape the phe-
nomenon. The knowledge of a mechanism improves with the under-
standing of the standard circumstances under which the event of interest 
can be detected. A better picture of the working of the system also in-
cludes the impeding conditions under which the mechanism fails. Fur-
ther details are added when the model accounts for the modulating con-
ditions – which, in other contexts, are understood as the moderators, 
corresponding to those background conditions that affect the intensity 
of the output. The picture becomes almost complete when these condi-
tions are identified to render non-standard circumstances – those that 
would never occur in an everyday observational setting. Eventually, the 
full picture emerges when the byproducts and the side-effects are clari-
fied. 
On another side, the focus is on the entities that are responsible for 
the activities resulting in the phenomenon of interest. Here, the passage 
                                                          
16 Craver, 2006:360, emphasis added. 
17 Kaplan, 2011: 348; Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000: 15 ff. 
18 Craver, 2006: 362. 
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from idealized possibilities to actual representations occurs when the 
“real components” are identified. Components are “stock-in entities 
[…] when they exhibit a stable cluster of properties” that indicate their 
subtypes and the associated causal powers of interest19.  
The issue is strictly related to the further analytical dimension, 
which narrows on the space-time organization of the entities in causal 
structures and dependencies. These objects are construed within the 
scope and the limit of technical choices, in which respect Craver rec-
ommends an eclectic approach, to generate as many possible maps as 
techniques are available for the sake of triangulation and validation. 
In the end, Craver portrays a mechanistic model as an ongoing en-
deavor that ideally ends when a detailed stable picture is produced of 
the phenomenon. His understanding of explanation is maximalist, as the 
ideal model includes all the classic aitia as established by a multiplicity 
of testing techniques, plus their descriptions and connective processes, 
so to provide answers to any question about a phenomenon – the what, 
the how, the where and when, as well as the why.  
 
c) Salmon-complete constitutive mechanisms 
As a last note, in his more recent contributions with David Kaplan, 
Craver operates a correction of some earlier position while addressing 
the question of which details really matter to constitutive mechanistic 
models20. These last works specify the requirements of a “successful” 
explanatory model as follows:  
 
(a) the variables in the model correspond to components, activities, 
properties, and organizational features of the target mechanism that 
produces, maintains, or underlies the phenomenon, and (b) the (per-
haps mathematical) dependencies posited among these variables in 
the model correspond to the (perhaps quantifiable) causal relations 
among the components of the target mechanism21. 
 
However, they also emphasize that  
 
the idea of an ideally complete how-actually model, one that includes 
all of the relevant causes and components in a given mechanism, no 
                                                          
19 Craver, 2006: 370. 
20 Kaplan and Craver, 2011; Craver and Kaplan, 2018. 
21 Kaplan and Craver, 2011: 611. 
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matter how remote, negligible, or tiny, without abstraction or ideali-
zation, is a philosopher’s fiction. Science would be strikingly ineffi-
cient and useless both for human understanding and for practical ap-
plication if it dealt in such painstaking minutiae22. 
 
So they posit abstraction and, implicitly, mechanistic schemas as the 
unavoidable feature of some usable scientific knowledge of phenom-
ena. They insist that these models cannot prioritize epistemic factors 
such as description, prediction, or confirmation at the cost of the struc-
tural constraints, as the dismissal of the latter yields a faulty knowledge 
about barometers accounting for the storm. They emphasize that con-
stitutive mechanistic models do not provide the “aetiological” explana-
tion of chained causation. Instead, they render the arrangement that 
links the phenomena and its basic elements23. In short, mechanistic 
models are those that capture the structure beneath chemical causation. 
They contend that chemical causation can be “scientifically” rendered 
as a seamless flow of details, as the seamless flow would obfuscate the 
structural constraint that makes the model suitable for scientific pur-
poses. Neither models of the flow of activities nor model describing 
entities would answer the question of why the system produces the out-
put that we observe. The model that counts as an explanation is that 
which selects particular facets and connects them into the structure en-
suring the different activities will yield the output. Purposeful omis-
sions are the epistemic feature that confers models their explanatory 
value. The point solicits criteria to establish which details have to be 
included in the model.  
Craver and Kaplan identify a criterion in the definition of complete-
ness that Salmon applied to elucidate his concept of relevance, decou-
pled from Bayesian formulations. A model, along this line, is “Salmon-
complete” when it includes all and only those relevant proximate con-
ditions that somehow absorb the relevance of any other. The Salmon-
complete model is that which partitions the reference base into cells 
displaying an “unimprovable” degree of homogeneity at best of current 
knowledge.  
Although, again, Craver and Kaplan maintain the criterion of 
Salmon-completeness can establish an ideal that real schemata may not 
satisfy, they add a further consideration about the nature of the elements 
of a mechanistic model that can push our modeling attempts closer to 
                                                          
22 Kaplan and Craver, 2011: 609–10. 
23 Kaiser and Krickel, 2016. 
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that ideal24. They consider that, within a knowledge horizon, a better 
mechanistic model is not that which provides more answers to counter-
factual “what if” questions, as Woodward suggested. Neither it is that 
which answers to a higher number of actualist “how” questions. The 
priority of structural arrangements gives center stage to questions of a 
third kind, that they label “r-questions,” asking what role a particular 
item plays in the mechanism – its fit in the puzzle.  
 
A scientist who knows many facts about action potentials but does not 
know that action potentials play a role in neural signalling is missing 
an important filter on which details are relevant. The components of 
the action potential only hang together as such because we appreciate 
that the action potential is a significant feature of neuronal behaviour. 
No description of the molecular details could be organized into a 
causally productive unit without taking this higher-level perspective 
on the bewildering causal mayhem of the neuron and its compo-
nents25. 
 
The r-answers learn from how-answers and prove their standing by 
responding to what-if questions. However, they are shaped to retain 
those relevant details that, alone, make an element fit into the functional 
schema of a mechanism producing an effect – that is, into our hypothet-
ical generative structure. 
 
This is where QCA enters the picture as a technique capable of mod-
eling Salmon-complete generative structures without appealing to 
(Bayesian) probabilities.  
 
 
                                                          
24 Craver and Kaplan, 2018:24 ff. 
25 Craver and Kaplan, 2018:26. 
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5. Configurations and inus causation 
 
 
 
 
 
The recent literature has compelled a change in the logical structure of 
explanations. The traditional place of the major premiss, which the 
modern philosophy of science occupied with regularities with a univer-
sal scope, is now taken by mechanisms. The change, on the one side, 
revives the original understanding of explanation as reasoning about the 
actualization of potentials. On the other, as Mill already noted, it blurs 
the boundaries between induction and deduction.  
Successful explanations of outcome regularities literally entail a hy-
pothesis about the structure that arranges entities and activities so that 
they “bring about” the effect. Observation reports are employed as the 
minor premiss to confirm, or disconfirm, the hypothesis, following 
long-established logical rules that, however, are differently invoked de-
pending on the language. The hypothesis, in turn, is a schema that no 
longer makes the case of a difference between causes and conditions: 
all are understood as parts of the local intersection that arises the right 
process of propagation to the effect and all contribute to making the 
effect sure or impossible. Still, the hypothesis needs to be specified in-
line with some criterion of relevance. Salmon-completeness provides a 
useful principle, which interestingly chimes in with the concept of inus 
causation recognized by the broader configurational scholarship1.  
 
 
5.1 inus causation 
 
Recall from Part I that Mill proposed a redefinition of causation as a 
compound of irreplaceable and replaceable constituents under which, 
                                                          
1 Ragin, 2000:11, 2008; Goertz 2002; Baumgartner, 2009; Grofman and Schneider, 
2009; Schneider and Wagemann, 2010, 2012; Rohlfing, 2012; Hackett, 2015; Schneider 
and Rohlfing, 2016; Duşa, 2019; Haesebrouck, 2019. 
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and only under which, the effect inevitably occurs in the absence of 
hindrances.  
The redefinition encompasses the whole fact of causation, without 
distinctions between causes and conditions. Analytically, the com-
pound captures all the tendencies as empirical laws connecting each 
component to the effect and turns the causal power into a local occur-
rence. Be it true and complete, the compound shall yield evidence from 
the reference class about two types of observation sentences, the one 
about the conjunction of the full compound and the effect, and the one 
about the conjunction of a partial or null compound and the absence of 
effect, without exceptions. The shape of the relationship, then, corre-
sponds to that of a logical iff connective, establishing the identity of two 
terms that licenses barbara-type of inferences. The relationship, in 
short, is philosophically “necessary” – something that has to occur and 
cannot occur in a different shape.  
 
5.1.1 Necessity, sufficiency, and vending machines 
Mackie considers that the concept of philosophical necessity has 
been loaded with a variety of meanings over the centuries, but that two 
are of particular interest for a better grasp of logical causation2. He fa-
mously illustrates the two concepts with the example of the three imag-
inary vending machines named K, L, and M. In his fiction, all the ma-
chines sell chocolate bars for one shilling each. Machine K always and 
only drops one bar after the shilling. Machine L, too, requires a shilling 
to drop a bar, although sometimes it fails. Machine M, again, drops the 
bar after the shilling, although it may also eject bars with no apparent 
reason.  
Any of the three machines, then, affords the four possible types of 
observations portrayed in Figure 5, and that in this context read:  
 
(a) coin and bar,  
(b) coin and no bar;  
(c) no coin and bar,  
(d) no coin and no bar.  
 
and the different functioning of each machine is captured by the special 
observation reports 𝐑 that it allows.  
                                                          
2 Mackie, 1974. 
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The observation report from Machine K is 𝐑𝑲: {(𝑎) ∧ (𝑑)} – when-
ever the coin, the bar follows; without the coin, the bar certainly does 
not drop. The functioning of Machine K, hence, supports the inference 
that 𝐇𝑲:  𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑛 ≡ 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝐾  – that is, a relation of necessity and sufficiency. 
Following Mill, however, it should be noted that the defining part from 
the observation report 𝐑𝑲 consists less of what is observed than of what 
is missing. Machine K never yields the two possible types (𝑐), (𝑑); to 
claim that 𝐇𝒌 holds unconditionally true, we should rule out that the 
two observation sentences are possible. In short, we should establish 
Machine K is failsafe and meets Mill’s requirements R3 and R4. This 
becomes possible in two different ways. First, we can prove the claim 
for the reference class and the time of observation – which already can 
be a remarkable result. Else, we can identify some feature of Machine 
M that makes the bar dropping unavoidable once the coin is dropped. 
In Machine L, not putting the coin makes the dropping impossible; 
putting the coin makes the dropping possible, although not certain, as 
some coin can fail. The observation report from Machine L, then, is 
𝐑𝑳: {(𝑎) ∧ (𝑏) ∧ (𝑑)}. The report supports the inference that the rela-
tionship is of logical necessity, and 𝐇𝑳:  𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑛 ⊂ 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝐿 in the slice of the 
world under analysis. The claim, however, is better supported when (𝑐) 
is ruled out as impossible, and Mill’s requirement R3 is satisfied. 
In Machine M, the coin will certainly yield the bar, although there 
may be free droppings. The observation report, therefore, is 
𝐑𝑴: {(𝑎) ∧ (𝑑) ∧ (𝑐)}, supporting the hypothesis that the shelling is the 
sufficient condition for dropping the bar, and 𝐇𝑴:  𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑛 ⊃ 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑀  holds. 
This, again, can be proven within the limited space-time region of our 
observations; however, it would better be credible had we information 
that Machine M makes (𝑏) impossible so that Mill’s requirement R4 is 
satisfied. 
Mackie maintains with Mill that Machine K is ideal as it is fully 
intelligible. Even if it eventually needs maintenance and degenerates 
into an L-type, Machine K can be fixed as the source of failure can be 
located in some defective component. However, a K machine as an ir-
replaceable, surefire, single mechanism to the effect is seldom given 
due to the possible alternative channels to the effect. The common oc-
currence in the real world, then, is of a K-machine into an M-machine 
– a system with many channels of which we only know the one with the 
coin. This knowledge, however, may prove enough when we can be 
reasonably sure that we have identified a trigger and ways to fix its fail-
ures. Without such minimal knowledge, L-effects overlap M-effects, 
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and we cannot recognize any causation. The issue with mechanisms, 
once and again, is that they are out there, but our grasp is based on our 
intuition of their functioning based on patterns in behavior. As such, the 
knowledge we have of them is tentative and limited – but it can improve 
by cumulation. 
 
5.1.2 Full explanations 
Now, Mackie maintains that, despite our limits, we can aim at a full 
explanatory schema of some phenomena3. He illustrates his point with 
the well-known example of the burned building4.  
He notices how easily we can buy any standard conversational ex-
planation of the sort ˹the warehouse burned out because of a short-cir-
cuit˺. However, he emphasizes, the explanation is far from compelling. 
A bit of formalization can better expose its weaknesses. 
Let 𝐶 indicate the short-circuit and 𝐵 the burning. The underlying 
hypothesis about the burning, 𝐇𝐵, then reads 𝐇𝑩: 𝐶 ⊃ 𝐵. The reasoning 
that supports the explanation runs as follows: if 𝐶 then 𝐵, my observa-
tional report includes (𝑎): 𝐶 ∧ 𝐵, which confirms the hypothesis – 
therefore 𝐵 because of 𝐶. So displayed, we realize why the explanation 
is wanting: the observational report is too poor to support the claim that 
the hypothesis about the burning accounts for the case of the warehouse.  
 
a) Checking for plurality 
The claim is about singular causation, and we can both falsify and 
verify it. The observational report 𝐑𝐻: {(𝑎)} can contribute to the vali-
dation of 𝐇𝐵: but the convincing report for verification also requires 
that we consider (𝑑)-type of observations. In short, as our hypothesis is 
about singular causation and aims to ascription, we cannot hold it true 
unless we are sure that 𝐶 is irreplaceable.  
The claim of irreplaceability, however, stands against the backdrop 
of a theory about the role that the factor can play in bringing about the 
outcome, plus some reasons to believe that no relevant alternative factor 
was available at the same time in the same place that could have played 
the same role. To keep on with the example: we may maintain that 
short-circuits are relevant to fire as a source of heat. Then, we have to 
                                                          
3 Mackie, 1965. 
4 The reasoning closely recalls the strategy of adjudication in case studies developed 
by Van Evera, 1997, the contributors to Bennett and Checkel, 2015; Fairfield and Chap-
man, 2018. 
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consider that alternative sources do exist, in the form of unattended pans 
on a stove, careless smokers, bolts, and the like. Hence, a better hypoth-
esis about the fire should read that the short-circuit 𝐶 or some alterna-
tive source of heat 𝛷 caused the fire 𝐇𝑩𝟏: 𝐶 ∨ 𝛷 ⊃ 𝐵. We then can look 
for something fitting the observational sentence (𝑎′): 𝛷 ∧ 𝐵 in the con-
text of the warehouse. If we can rule out 𝐇𝑩𝟏, we are allowed to main-
tain that, counter-to-the-facts, without the short-circuit, the fire would 
not have been. The counterfactual consideration adds the unobserved 
yet plausible type (𝑑∗) to the report 𝐑𝐻1: {(𝑎) ∧ (𝑑
∗)}. The new and 
more convincing version of the explanation reads that ˹the warehouse 
burned down because of the short-circuit – and this is true because noth-
ing else happened that could have done it˺.  
This story, however, is not complete yet. All that the report 𝐑𝐻1 says 
is that the short-circuit could have produced the fire under the circum-
stances. As such, eventually, 𝐇𝟏 is a statement about a potential that 
may or may not actualize. On this ground, we can only maintain that 
the burning was more likely in our warehouse than in a twin building 
where the electrical system was safe.  
 
b) Checking for Constitution and Composition 
To connect the potential to its effect, we have to clarify whether (𝑏)-
type observations were impossible under the circumstances. Here, Mill 
and Mackie suggest, two different orders of considerations enter the 
picture.  
The first concerns constitutive issues, and calls for attention to the 
complements to 𝐶 in making 𝐵 unavoidable. Again, the story improves 
if we can invoke a theory about what is needed to make the effect hap-
pen for sure. The theory would suggest that the short-circuit fails unless 
it meets fuel, 𝐹, and oxygen, 𝑂. Both, then, had to be present in the 
warehouse, or the fire would not have been. The second consideration 
draws attention to the hindering factors – the ones that, Mill said, have 
to be absent for the compound to obtain. Thus, Mackie warns, the ex-
planation is again incomplete unless we bring a broken sprinkler 𝑆̅ into 
the picture.  
Eventually, our improved hypothesis reads 𝐇𝑩𝟐: (𝐶 ∨ 𝛷) ∧ (𝐹 ∧
𝑂 ∧ 𝑆̅) ⊃ 𝐵. In compiling the observation report, 𝐇𝑩𝟐 compels us to 
verify that 𝐹 ∧ 𝑂 ∧ 𝑆̅ were all jointly present in the expected state. Hav-
ing observed the fuel, the oxygen, and the broken sprinkler, our obser-
vational report again reads 𝐑𝐻2: {(𝑎) ∧ (𝑑
∗)}, but now we are sure that 
the missing instances (𝑏), (𝑐) do not appear in the report as they were 
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not part of the state of the world – hence, their observation was impos-
sible under the circumstances. As a side note, Hempel did not register 
the difference between a wanting observation report and one that has 
dismissed the logically impossible types of observations as actually ab-
sent in the situation, which conveys ambiguous information about the 
empirical standing of the hypothesis. As we will see, the technical pro-
tocol of QCA avoids such an ambiguity through its “truth table”, which 
compels the researcher considering every logically possible observation 
sentence from a reduction sentence. 
The complete convincing explanation, then, specifies that ˹ the ware-
house burned down because it was crammed with waste tires and leak-
ing barrels of exhausted oil, and the sprinklers were broken when the 
short-circuit happened – but, were it not been for the short circuit, the 
burning would not have happened˺. 
 
5.1.3 Principles of inus composition  
Together with Mill, Mackie5 maintains that a “cause” is a structural 
arrangement and consists of the configuration of several elements in the 
world. Every disjunct in the disjunction 𝐶 ∨ 𝛷 constitutes an alternative 
element that identifies a machine of causation. Each machine is a min-
imally sufficient compound: as far as we can rule out its failure – which 
can be done by discounting obstructions to the “propagation” of the 
causal process – the compound will certainly yield its effect. The cause, 
therefore, is the conjunction of replaceable and irreplaceable compo-
nents 𝐶 ∧ 𝑂 ∧ 𝐹 that, jointly given and unimpeded, makes the occur-
rence of the effect unavoidable. The certainty of the effect allows the 
understanding that the components entertain a constant relationship 
with each other and with their effect. The relationship, however, defies 
the standard arithmetic rendering that would reduce their interactions to 
a sum of quantity. Necessity and sufficiency, Mackie advances, provide 
a better grasp of the compound. This casts new light on the fire example.  
First, the single factors in the explanation are “partial causes.” They 
cannot obtain without the compound, hence they are individually insuf-
ficient to the effect. However, the compound cannot obtain when even 
one of their components is in the wrong state. Therefore, each compo-
nent is necessary – that is, required, nonredundant – to at least one com-
pound on pain of failure. 
                                                          
5 Mackie, 1965, 1974, 1977. 
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Second, that which qualifies as a “full cause” is the compound. 
When the conjunction is complete – in the sense that every component 
is given in the right state, in the right place, at the right time – then the 
compound is a K-mechanism of the effect and sufficient to obtain it. 
However, the compound includes replaceable components, which 
means the same effect can also be reached through alternative K-ma-
chines. In this respect, the compound is unnecessary to the effect: alter-
native “equifinal” arrangements may be possible – and we have to rule 
out the alternatives if we want to be sure that the ascription is unambig-
uous. 
In the light of these considerations, Mackie dubs single factors in 
complex causation as “inus conditions” – the acronym standing for In-
sufficient yet Non-redundant parts of Unnecessary yet Sufficient com-
pounds. The acronym summarizes the composition rule of a “nomolog-
ical” complex as the individual necessity and joint sufficiency of the 
components to the effect.  
 
Inus causation calls for two different types of questions. The first 
asks which mindset supports conjectures that fit the shape of inus cau-
sation. This will be the topic of the next chapter. The second question 
asks which language equips us for the analysis and the refinements of 
these conjectures. This will engage us in the remainder of this part.  
  
  
 
 
6. Imagining machines 
 
 
 
 
 
The lesson from contemporary mechanistic literature is that even an el-
liptic explanation about a single factor makes sense to us as long as we 
have a theory about the generation of the phenomena. Even if we ignore 
whether the single factor was the only “anomaly,” or whether the con-
text was “structurally disposed” to make the effect happen, the infor-
mation is credible as the factor has some property, or capacity, that can-
didates it to play a role in the mechanism. These abstract schemes offer 
the starting point of an explanatory configurational analysis. 
 
 
6.1 The relevance of stage setting 
 
At the ontological level, explanatory configurations agree with the 
mechanistic assumption of an abstract world where entities are en-
dowed with some capacity to make something, which we can observe 
through special manifestations and can indicate as an entity’s attribute. 
The capacity unfolds into a causal power when effects accompany or 
follow its manifestation. The further and crucial ontological tenet main-
tains that any property remains in the state of latency until it meets the 
“right” conditions. This point can mark a departure from the standard 
approach to mechanistic causation.  
Mechanistic accounts in Woodward’s tradition tend to prize an ex-
tensive understanding of robustness, and aim to model underlying 
mechanisms as interactions independent on background conditions1. 
However, as Nancy Cartwright has long argued, abstractions under the 
assumption of context independence may put explanations on shaky 
ground. If, with Mackie, Hempel, and Mill before them, we consider 
                                                          
1 Woodward, 1989, 2003; Pearl 2009, 2015; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010; Morgan 
and Winship, 2015. 
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that potential is a theoretical construct with convenient epistemic prop-
erties that, by definition, defies direct observation, then the adequate 
rendering of mechanisms includes the “right” conditions under which 
causation occurs.  
 
Some causal powers need to be triggered if they are to be exercised; 
some may need facilitating even once triggered; some can be inhib-
ited so the contribution they produce is diminished or distorted; and 
even […] an interference may stop them from being exercised alt-
hough all the other conditions are right2. 
 
Cartwright’s definition renders the concept of inus causation from 
the perspective of the functions and the roles that have to be fulfilled 
for the unfolding of the power, as Kaplan and Craver advocate. The 
model that captures a power is the interplay of triggers, facilitators, and 
shields that, jointly given, arise a “nomological machine” – an arrange-
ment that warrants and compels the local production of the effect as if 
the effect obeyed some laboratory law of nature. By definition, there-
fore, a nomological arrangement includes anything it takes to yield the 
effect with certainty. A complete nomological arrangement, rather than 
a single capacity or potential, justifies the expectation about the occur-
rence or the nonoccurrence of the effect. When complete, it explains 
similar effects in dissimilar settings; when incomplete, it accounts for 
the failure of the effect in a setting despite the single capacity was there. 
 
6.1.1 Salmon-completeness of nomological machines 
A nomological machine is a compound of inus conditions as both 
provide an antecedent in a Carnapian reduction sentence about the ef-
fect. The inus machine, however, also implies that we can develop a 
Salmon-complete image of it. In the case of the fire, for instance, we 
can understand the process to the fire as “combustion.” A chemist 
would better specify it as an exothermic chemical reaction of reduction 
between a substance that plays as a reductant and an oxidant, which 
occurs at high temperatures. This definition, however, does not capture 
the kernel of the decomposition. Instead, it renders the starting condi-
tions – the compresence of a reductant, an oxidant, and high tempera-
ture – and tells us that, given heat is one of the products of the process, 
the reaction tends to reproduce itself unless one of its components goes 
exhausted. 
                                                          
2 Cartwright 2017:12. 
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Interestingly, the inus components of combustion – the “reductant,” 
the “oxidant” – are rendered with terms that refer to the role they can 
play into the process. Since long, we can ascribe the meaning of an in-
teraction to the conjunction connective, so that the result of the con-
junction is more than the algebraic sum of the conjuncts. Similarly, the 
conditional can be given the meaning of a nomological M machine. 
Then, we can capture the general process with the schema 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 ∧
𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡 ∧ 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ⊃ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒. In short, although we cannot pin 
down the reaction as a tangible object, we can identify the inus causes 
of its effect – which provide a reduction sentence of the elusive real 
thing. Of course, the schema can be made more specific. Alternative K 
machines can be built from catalogs of reductants and of oxidants as 
possible inus conditions that we can meet in the field. 
Moreover, the special reductant and oxidant couple will react at a 
particular temperature so that the related term in the conditional can be 
replaced with some source of heat capable of reaching the critical tem-
perature. We can then modulate the level of detail to gain a better grasp 
of the various versions of the nomological machine. However, we can 
establish that the representation is Salmon-complete independently on 
the level of detail. 
A Salmon-complete nomological schema yields (𝑎)-type and (𝑑)-
tye of instances – else, it is not effective – but also prevents the insur-
gence of (𝑏)-type and (𝑐)-type of instances. Those of the (𝑏)-type in-
dicate that our schema is replaceable with some alternative mechanisms 
– or that our definitions of the components are not abstract enough to 
keep the actual alternatives within the same catalog. This, however, 
does not invalidate the specification of the schema. More challenging 
are instead (𝑏)-observations. They signal our schema is Salmon-incom-
plete, and our knowledge of the generation of the effect is unreliable. In 
short, we have omitted something relevant – such as, the obstructions, 
like the sprinklers, or the shields that inhibit the obstructions, like the 
failure of the fire system. It may also be the case that we have ill-de-
signed catalogs, following ill-designed roles, or compound. In short, 
(𝑏)-observations are useful indications that our schema is flawed. 
 
 
6.2 Cultivating mechanistic imagination 
 
The formal criteria suggest a nomological machine is that which may 
stay dormant yet does not fail when activated, and that we can capture 
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it as the complete set of relevant conditions required to initiate, support, 
and shield some elusive process to the effect. How to get this schema 
as the starting point of a QCA is, as usual, a matter of cultivated imag-
ination in drawing a configurational hypothesis3. The methodological 
literature of any flavor agrees that a hypothesis is a claim about a rela-
tionship between specific factors and an effect that builds on previous 
knowledge. The strands that commit to dis/confirmation also add that 
the hypothesis should be amenable to empirical probation4.  
The issue concerns how we can learn from the previous literature so 
that existing models and findings can fit the configurational mindset 
and contribute to shaping a nomological machine. 
 
 
6.2.1 Learning from correlational literature 
The correlational literature is usually engaged in ascertaining capac-
ities, that is, in responding to the question of whether a relationship ex-
ists between the single factor 𝑋 and a purported effect 𝑌. The choice of 
𝑋 and 𝑌 may depend on the discipline and the researcher’s interest, or 
the pragmatic consideration that, were the relationship true, 𝑋 could be 
easily manipulated to improve 𝑌5.  
The protocol, however, requires that the relationship between 𝑋 and 
𝑌 is treated as a hypothesis that “elaborations” with further factors can 
refute, corroborate, or refine. A robust stream in the correlational tradi-
tion identifies three possible elaborations of the original relationship – 
respectively aimed to explain it away, to interpret it, and to specify it6. 
Of the three, correlational studies have usually narrowed on explanation 
as a threat to the standing of the relationship, and on interpretation as a 
guarantee7. 
A relationship is explained away as spurious when a confounding 
factor 𝐶 exists, on which both 𝑋 and 𝑌 depend. The confounding factor 
dismisses the original relationship 𝑋 → 𝑌 for a truer one 𝑋 ← 𝐶 → 𝑌. 
However, the substitution may neither happen – when no credible con-
founders are identified – nor be usable – i.e., when 𝐶 is unobserved – 
nor be complete – i.e., when 𝑋 alone still accounts for part of 𝑌. In all 
                                                          
3 George and Bennett, 2005. 
4 King et al., 1994. 
5 Woodward, 2003. 
6 Kendall and Lazarsfeld, 1950; Lazarsfeld, 1955. 
7 Morgan and Winship, 2015:330 ff.; Little, 1996. 
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these cases, the relationship stands, although less credibly so. An inter-
pretation can then be added that corroborates the original relationship 
by probing how 𝑋 led to 𝑌 in selected cases. 
An interpretation finds the intervening or mediating or channeling 
factors 𝑀 that chain 𝑋 to 𝑌 so that the original relationship is preserved 
and detailed as 𝑋 → 𝑀 → 𝑌. When the mediating factors capture all of 
the effect of 𝑋 on 𝑌, and their chain is independent on alternative paths 
to the effect, they provide an identifying mechanism for the effect of 𝑋 
on 𝑌8. The identifying mechanism renders the chain of events as the 
stages of the process through which the effect unfolds. In so doing, it 
supports and illuminates the original relationship, making it credible9. 
The models from the correlational literature provide predictors, de-
terminants, confounders, and mediators from an array of theoretical ap-
proaches to the effect. The suggestions can be overly rich, requiring a 
selection among factors. A survey of scholars’ practices10 pinpointed 
four basic strategies. The “comprehensive approach” builds hypotheses 
that include all the factors from all the relevant theories. The “perspec-
tive approach” selects single variables to represent major theories. The 
“significance approach” narrows on statistically proven variables only. 
The “second look” approach mixes statistically significant variables 
with theoretically meaningful factors that did not survive those same 
tests.  
None of these strategies, it has been argued, yields proper configu-
rational hypotheses. Inus factors and statistically significant determi-
nants may not overlap. Collections of proven determinants do not sup-
port expectations about any particular nomological machine. Mediators 
leave the conditions unspoken under which their mechanism certainly 
holds in actual cases11. Identifying mechanisms-as-processes provide 
configurational analysis with at least a valuable criterion to select per-
tinent factors, however. Knowing the stages of combustion does not tell 
what made a nomological machine in the warehouse but allows us as-
suming that certain functions had to be performed for the fire to occur. 
So, it reduces the range of the local factors we should consider for ex-
plaining a particular occurrence of the effect. 
                                                          
8 Pearl, 2009; Gerring, 2011. 
9 Little, 1996. 
10 Amenta and Poulsen, 1994; Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009. 
11 Falleti and Lynch, 2009. 
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This literature provides vital suggestions about the dynamic under-
lying the scheme. A not-so-good idea, however, may be that of “curry-
ing” chains of mediators into a conjunction, as the dependencies to an 
effect do not amount to a nomological machine12. A complete nomo-
logical arrangement, instead, is that which provides the homogeneous 
partition as the “scope condition” under which the correlation holds13.  
A factor from the correlational literature hence qualifies as a possi-
ble component in a mechanism if it can develop directional expectations 
about its contribution as a triggering, supporting, or shielding factor that 
jointly makes the identifying mechanism obtain. 
 
 
6.2.2 Learning from case-oriented literature 
QCA is closer to case-oriented approaches due to the similar en-
gagement with complexity. The question often drives the case-oriented 
research asking whether the cases at hand are instances of a theory of 
interest, and learn from the gap between the set of features that cases 
display and the set of features that the theory envisages14.  
The usual starting point of a case-oriented analysis is a concept, i.e., 
a label endowed with meaning. Any concept has an intension decided 
by the properties that together define the meaning and an extension as 
the range of entities that share those properties. Intension and extension 
are related, as the properties under a label change the width of its ap-
plicability – the less and more abstract the properties, the more exten-
sive their coverage. Fruitful concepts in comparative empirical analysis 
are associated with a stable set of unambiguous attributes, which pre-
serves the identity of the concept across time and contexts and allows 
deciding on the nature of actual cases properties15. When a theory exists 
that attaches particular expectations to a concept, the evidence from the 
case establishes whether the case is an instance of the concept. The 
marks that causation leaves in the case, or its changes over time, provide 
evidence of the empirical standing of the theoretical expectations16.  
                                                          
12 Baumgartner, 2013; Rihoux and De Meur, 2009; Damonte, 2018. 
13 Walker and Cohen, 1985. 
14 Ragin, 2000; Ragin and Becker, 1992; George and Bennett, 2005. 
15 Sartori, 1984; Collier and Mahon, 1993; Goertz, 2006. 
16 Elman, 2005, Fairfield and Charman, 2017, Bennett and Elman, 2006; Rohlfing, 
2012; Beach and Pedersen, 2016. 
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The strategy of ascription may be different, however, depending on 
how the set of core properties is defined. The methodological scholar-
ship discriminates at least between cores as ideal types and as classifi-
cation types17. The ideal-type follows from a purposeful selection of 
properties that may have been abstracted from exemplary instances yet 
may seldom, if ever, be observed jointly, or with the intensity entailed 
by the concept. Adjudication against an ideal type consists in establish-
ing the relative distance, or deviance, of a case from such an ideal pole.  
In the Weberian tradition, ideal types may also portray a fictional 
twin world in which a property of the concept is given in the wrong 
state, to serve as a counterfactual mind experiment that emphasizes the 
relevance of that property to the meaning of the concept. Thus, we may 
prove irrationality is constitutive of the concept of financial panic by 
imagining what would have happened in 1929 had people reacted ra-
tionally.  
The counterfactual application of ideal-types leads us to classifica-
tion types. Classification types follow from the sociological tradition of 
the “theories of the middle range” – images developed for thinking 
about some behavior of particular classes of entities, and about the 
mechanisms it entails18. The theory specifies the attributes that identify 
the class of entities where the mechanism is expected to obtain. The 
attributes define a “property space,” originally visualized as multi-story 
contingency tables; the type arises by their reduction – i.e., the dismissal 
of some attribute based on pragmatic, statistical, or logical considera-
tion19. In contrast to ideal types, cases “belong to” the types that result 
from such a reduction. 
The typological literature pinpoints attributes and properties that 
naturally suit the configurational mindset. The issue rather arises when 
instances are attributed ad hoc features, as it may happen in the excep-
tionalism literature, or with any thick descriptions of processes and sit-
uations in single cases. In this regard, Verba20 suggests three operations 
to learn systematically from these portrayals, which also apply to the 
construction of configurational hypotheses – as follows. 
 
1. When a single factor is invoked as a relevant condition to an effect 
in a particular case, the factor should be included in the hypothesis. 
                                                          
17 Collier and Mahon, 1993; Elman, 2005; McKinney, 1969; Capecchi, 1968. 
18 Merton, 1968: 43. 
19 Barton, 1955, Capecchi, 1968, Elman, 2005, Lazarfeld and Barton, 1951. 
20 Verba, 1967. 
135 
That is, if the eruption of Mount Vesuvius is reported to account 
for the disruption of the Pompeiian administration, the configura-
tional hypothesis that learns from the case may systematically con-
sider the presence or the absence of a similar event across cases. In 
so doing, the hypothesis allows adjudicating on the inus status of 
absent factors, too. 
2. When the limited scope of some local factor prevents its portabil-
ity, the factor can be redefined as the particular manifestation of a 
more abstract attribute that preserves its meaning beyond the in-
stance that motivated it. In learning from the Pompeiian case, a 
configurational hypothesis may more fruitfully model a property 
about “natural calamities” instead of one about “volcanic erup-
tions,” as the latter builds a property that is meaningful within vol-
canic regions only. 
3. When the purported explanation includes an exogenous factor, bet-
ter hypotheses follow if the exogenous factor is endogenized as 
some particular attribute that the unit of analyses reveals when ex-
posed to the factor, and that is relevant to support or obstruct the 
mechanism of interest. That is, we may develop a better hypothesis 
if, to explain administrative breakdown, the exogenous condition 
“natural calamity” is referred to the attributes that theories would 
suggest a successful administrative system displays when faced 
with it – such as ‹resourceful›, or ‹anticipatory› – and which possi-
bly makes the difference with failing systems. 
 
So shaped, the case-oriented literature provides a useful comple-
ment to what we learn from correlational research as far as it embodies 
the third kind of elaboration of a purported causal relationship – the 
specification of the attributes as local scope conditions under which an 
interpretable mechanism inevitably unfolds21. 
 
 
6.3 Summing up 
 
A Salmon-complete explanatory configurational hypothesis is that 
which specifies the relevant conditions endogenizing the mechanistic 
process to an effect – or which identifies the attributes of the explana-
tory type from a mid-range theory about a mechanism – so that the 
                                                          
21 Walker and Cohen, 1985, George and Bennett, 2005. 
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mechanism would surely obtain, were our understanding of it true in 
the cases at hand. 
The correlational literature contributes to configurational hypothe-
ses as it can test the relationship between single components of the 
mechanistic process and the outcome out of several instances, net of 
idiosyncrasies, although abstracted from contexts. The case-oriented 
literature contributes to configurational hypotheses by providing de-
tailed, although possibly idiosyncratic portrayals of actual generative 
processes, and by pointing at the attributes that qualify real cases as 
instances of types of mechanistic processes. 
Mechanisms, therefore, emerge as the common ground around 
which a configurational hypothesis can take its shape about the circum-
stances, or the set of attributes, that make an effect “unavoidable” in the 
field22.  
The contribution of the typological literature to explanatory QCA, 
however, goes further than that. Lazarsfeld and Barton23 indicate the 
reduction of the property space as a suitable analytical strategy to assess 
the import of the configurational hypotheses while identifying the ex-
planatory core. Their proposal, however, left the researchers free to 
choose among alternative strategies of reduction – hence, remained ag-
nostic about the proper algebra of composition and the algorithm of 
elimination. 
Ragin’s Standard QCA reinvents the tradition of classification ty-
pologies by rendering and treating the property space with Boolean al-
gebra. Thanks to its unique nature, this language ensures the property 
space is faithful to the assumptions of configurational causation, while 
its operations ensure that solutions find the inus compound accounting 
for the cases at hand. Moreover, the language has the convenient char-
acteristic of connecting QCA to the longstanding logical tradition of 
explanation – especially, with the rationale of reduction sentences and 
observation reports. 
 
  
                                                          
22 Little 1996. 
23 Lazarsfeld and Barton, 1951. See also Barton, 1955. 
  
 
 
7. A language to render inus causation 
 
 
 
 
 
An algebra is a language of meaningful symbols and rules. An algebra 
that suits inus causation and the typological mindset should allow prop-
erties:  
 
1. have basic observable states as presence or absence of attributes;  
2. form compounds; 
3. have substitutes; 
4. establish relations of dependency. 
 
To render them all, QCA resorts to Boolean operators. Introduced 
as primary devices to analyze human reasoning about the world1, these 
operators have the convenient feature of supporting a twofold reading 
– a logical one and a set-theoretical one2.  
 
 
7.1 Presence and absence of a property 
 
Boolean algebras use “literal symbols” to indicate factors. QCA bor-
rows the convention and indicates: 
 
- the presence of an attribute, with an uppercase letter, such as 𝐴, 
𝐵, 𝐶,...  
- the absence of the attribute, with the same letter introduced by 
a curl ~ reading ˹not˺.  
 
Thus, 𝐴 reads ˹the presence of attribute 𝐴˺ or ˹𝐴 present˺ or ˹𝐴 pos-
itive˺ or simply ˹𝐴˺; while ~𝐴 reads ˹the absence of attribute 𝐴˺ or ˹𝐴 
                                                          
1 De Morgan, 1847; Boole, 1853. 
2 Stone, 1936. 
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absent˺ or ˹𝐴 negative˺ or ˹not 𝐴˺. Absence can also be indicated with 
the lowercase, or with an overbar to omit the curl: ~𝐴, 𝑎, 𝐴 ̅ all have the 
same meaning. Often in empirical QCA, the convention in force is left 
unspoken, although the reader can infer it from context. 
In the following sections, as in the original Boolean notation, the 
negated set is denoted with the overbar. When a literal indicates more 
than one attribute, each attribute is denoted by a subscript ranging from 
1 to 𝑘. Thus, the set of positive attributes can be {𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑘} or 
{𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, … }; the corresponding set of their negations will be 
{ ?̅?1, ?̅?2, … , ?̅?𝑘} or { ?̅?, ?̅?, 𝐶̅, … }. 
Literals are freely chosen to stand for a name or an adjective denot-
ing “either a thing, or some quality or circumstance belonging to it”3. 
Hence, 𝐴 may mean “inflammable” of a material, “defined” of a juris-
diction, “affluent” of a society, “Independent” of a voter, “adult” of a 
citizen – or whatsoever attributes we consider as the purported inus con-
dition for the effect to occur. 
From the logical perspective, letters represent propositions about the 
entities in the world – they establish that the entities of interest ˹are 𝐴˺. 
As propositions, they require a universe of discourse to back and define 
their meaning4. Plainly, the universe consists of the entities about which 
we talk, and to which our propositions refer. Within a universe, each 
proposition also becomes a set, that is, the extension of the attribute, or 
the collection of entities to which it applies. Hence, any set 𝐴𝑘 is the 
collection of the 𝑖 entities 𝑢𝑖 that belong to the universe 𝕌 such that 
each entity shares the 𝑘th attribute 𝐴𝑘.  
In short, a set arises from an operation of classification. In the Bool-
ean logical world, a set partitions automatically the universe in two clas-
ses: that of the entities that manifest the property as the select attribute, 
and that of the entities that do not. Logic clarifies the relationship that 
the two partitions maintain with themselves and to each other and that 
operations cannot violate.  
The primary relationship is of identity, stating that a set is equal to 
itself. In Boole’s original proposal and all the basic operations of QCA, 
the set also is idempotent, meaning it satisfies the classical dictum de 
omni et nullo. Recall the principle is met when what can be affirmed or 
denied of the whole class also holds for each of its members. Therefore, 
                                                          
3 Boole, 1853:27. 
4 De Morgan, 1847. 
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the principle defines homogeneous classes of individuals to the attribute 
grouping them together. Boole renders idempotent identity as in [18] 
 
𝐴2 ≝ 𝐴 [18] 
 
The only two numerical values that satisfy it are 1 and 0. Therefore, 
Boole’s literals can only take these two values – and the basic opera-
tions in QCA share the bivalent assumption, too. In its original version, 
bivalence entails another classical principle, that of the excluded mid-
dle. Recall the principle states that an entity can only be 𝐴 or  ?̅? – dis-
allowing borderline cases. The commitment to this principle has signif-
icant consequences on the images of the world that we can construe 
with this algebra. 
Set-theoretically, 1 is the conventional membership-value for the in-
clusion of an entity into a property-set and can be read as ˹belongs to˺, 
while 0 is the membership value for the exclusion from the same set 
and can be read as ˹does not belong to˺. The values allow synthesizing 
the set-theoretical consequence of the excluded middle as equation [19]: 
 
?̅?𝑖 ≝ 1 − 𝐴𝑖 [19] 
 
indicating the negation of the attribute is its complement. 
Set-theoretically, 0 can also stand for the empty set, that is, the par-
tition containing no elements, and 1 for the tautological set, that is, the 
partition containing all the entities in a universe. In this sense, however, 
sets are fractions of the universe, and their value refers to the cardinality 
of the partition. The cardinality, indicated by a vertical bar on each side 
of a literal, is the number of the entities that in a universe qualify as 
instances of the partition, calculated as in [20]: 
 
|𝐴| = |{𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑖}| = 𝛴𝑖=1
𝑛  𝐴𝑖 [20] 
 
When the cardinality is rendered as the fraction of the 𝑛 entities in 
the partition to the 𝑁 entities in the universe, the empty set yields 𝑛 ⁄
𝑁 = 0; the tautological set instead yields 𝑛 ⁄ 𝑁 = 1.  
To avoid ambiguities, in the following we will indicate the empty 
set as ∅, and the tautological set as 𝕌. If we denote the difference be-
tween sets with a backslash \, reading ˹minus˺, equation [19] applied to 
the relationship of 𝐴 and 𝕌 reads as equation [21]: 
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|?̅?| = |𝕌 \ 𝐴| [21] 
 
meaning the negative set,  ?̅?, collects those instances in 𝕌 that are ex-
cluded from the positive set 𝐴.  
Logically, the values convey the truth of the underlying proposi-
tions. 1 means true, 0 means false, and together provide the only al-
lowed answers to the second-order question ˹is it true that this entity is 
A?˺. Idempotency and the principle of the excluded middle together 
warrant that: 
 
(𝐴𝑖 = 1)  ≡  (?̅?𝑖 = 0) [22.a] 
(𝐴𝑖 = 0)  ≡  (?̅?𝑖 = 1) [22.b] 
 
Identity [22.a] means that when it is true that the instance is 𝐴, then 
it is false that the instance is not 𝐴; identity [22.b] states that when it is 
false that the instance is 𝐴, then it is true that the instance is not 𝐴. These 
identities turn the principle of the excluded middle into the principle of 
non-contradiction, establishing the truth of an attribute and its negation 
are mutually exclusive. 
The truth-value of a contrary statement follows from the application 
of the connective ˹not˺ to the truth-values of the original statement. The 
operation can be represented as a truth table5. 
 
a) The truth table 
A truth table is the universe specified, plus a connective.  
The specification of the universe follows from the logical expansion 
of the 𝑘 elementary propositions – crudely, the exhaustive list of the 
combinations of their truth-values, which also specifies all the possible 
alternative states of an instance in the universe independent on their ob-
servability. As the expansion is the fundamental ordering operation of 
a universe6, the combinations in a truth table are “primitive”. As each 
Boolean proposition can only have two values, the total number of 
primitives in a truth table is 2𝑘. Conventionally, the first primitive in 
the truth table reports the combination of all true affirmative proposi-
tions, while the last primitive displays the combination of all false-pos-
itive propositions.  
                                                          
5 Wittgenstein, 1922. 
6 Quine, 1982. 
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Each column of a truth table displays a truth function, i.e., the se-
quence of the truth-values of each elementary proposition, and the con-
nective. The length and structure of the truth function of an elementary 
proposition are constant and independent on the connective; instead, 
they depend on the number of elementary propositions considered.  
Thus, the expansion of {𝐴} corresponds to the truth function of the 
single proposition 𝐴, that is, (1 0). In the expansion of two propositions 
{𝐴, 𝐵}, the truth function of 𝐴 conventionally is (11 00), while the truth 
function of 𝐵 is (10 10). In the expansion of {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶}, the truth func-
tion of 𝐴 is (11 11 00 00), that of 𝐵 is (11 00 11 00), and the truth 
function of 𝐶 is (10 10 10 10) – and so on.  
The last column of the truth table associates each primitive from the 
expansion to the truth-value of the connective under consideration. 
 
As portrayed in Table 3, that of the negation connective is the most 
straightforward truth table, as it can apply to a single proposition. The 
truth function of the connective ˹not˺ is (0 1) when applied to the truth 
function of a single factor, and summarizes the identities in [22.a] and 
[22.b]. 
 
Table 3. The truth table for the connective  ̅  . 
ID 𝑨 ̅  
(1) 1 0 
(2) 0 1 
 
Keys: the column “id” attaches an identification number to each of the primi-
tives from the expansion of the elementary proposition. 
Column A lists the truth function of the elementary proposition in the expansion. 
Column   ̅ reports the truth function resulting from the application of the negation 
connective to each primitive in the expansion. 
 
The truth functions are of use to explore the formal equivalence of 
complex statements. On this basis, for instance, it is possible to derive 
De Morgan’s laws on the negation of complex statements. However, as 
the pointed philosophical literature on paradoxes has long clarified7, the 
formal equivalence of the truth function of statements about phenomena 
may not warrant the substantial equivalence of actual phenomena – es-
pecially when inference is involved. 
 
                                                          
7 Good, 1967; Salmon, 1989. 
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7.2 Compounds 
 
Compounds arise from trains of letters connected by the ˹and˺ operator. 
In QCA, the operator is indicated by a dot ⦁ or by a star ∗, although the 
connecting symbol may be omitted. Hence, 𝐴𝐵𝐶̅, 𝐴 ∗ 𝐵 ∗ 𝐶̅, 𝐴 · 𝐵 · 𝐶̅ 
all read ˹𝐴 and 𝐵 and not-𝐶˺.  
Two facts are worth noting about the ˹and˺ operator. Permutation 
and grouping are irrelevant to a compound: 𝐴𝐵𝐶̅ means the same as 
𝐵𝐴𝐶̅ and as 𝐴(𝐵𝐶̅) – the resulting class groups in the same instances. 
In short, the Boolean ˹and˺ supports the commutative rule and the asso-
ciative rule, respectively. This entails that compounds are insensitive to 
the time dimension and sequences. Instead, they emphasize space – the 
joint occurrence of attributes in an entity, which also defines the class 
of the entities sharing the same compound. 
The ˹and˺ operator again supports the twofold interpretation – logi-
cal, and set-theoretical.  
 
Table 4. The truth table for the conjunction 𝑨 ∧ 𝑩 ∧ ?̅?. 
ID 𝑨 𝑩 𝑪 ?̅? 𝑨 ∧ 𝑩 ∧ ?̅? 
(1) 1 1 1 0 0 
(2) 1 1 0 1 1 
(3) 1 0 1 0 0 
(4) 1 0 0 1 0 
(5) 0 1 1 0 0 
(6) 0 1 0 1 0 
(7) 0 0 1 0 0 
(8) 0 0 0 1 0 
 
Keys: the column “id” attaches an identification number to each of the primi-
tives from the expansion of the elementary propositions. 
Columns 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 list the truth function of the elementary proposition in the ex-
pansion. 
Column  𝐶̅ reports the truth function of the negation of 𝐶. 
Column 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 ∧ 𝐶̅ reports the truth function of the corresponding compound, and 
draws attention to its only true point – i.e., primitive (2). 
 
Set theoretically, ˹and˺ corresponds to the intersection among prop-
erty-sets, written ∩. 𝐴𝐵𝐶̅  has the same meaning as 𝐴 ∩ 𝐵 ∩ 𝐶̅, and in-
dicates the subset of the entities that display all the attributes in the right 
state, hence lay in the intersection of the corresponding sets.  
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An intersection is one of the partitions in which a universe can be 
carved up, given several property-sets. As each set generates 2 parti-
tions, any further property-set doubles the number of partitions of the 
universe, and the number of partitions from 𝑘 sets is 2𝑘. A partition 
becomes observed or empirically true when at least one entity from the 
universe qualifies as its instance. 
The one in an intersection is the most demanding set-membership. 
To qualify as an instance of 𝐴𝐵𝐶̅, it has to be true at once that an entity 
is A while being B and not being C. This leads us on the logical ground, 
where the ˹and˺ operator is a connective, usually indicated with the 
wedge ⋀. The train of literals forms a conjunction of elementary prop-
ositions. 
A conjunction is logically true when each conjunct is true. Hence, 
in the truth table of the ˹and˺ connective, there is a single point where 
the truth function takes the value of 1 – corresponding to its identical 
primitive, as portrayed in Table 4. 
As truth-values and membership-values coincide, the shape of the 
truth function of the conjunction suggests that the rule for establishing 
whether an entity is an instance of an intersection of 𝑘 attributes 𝐴 can 
be based on the minimum of the entity’s values in each attribute, as 
summarized by equation [23]: 
 
⋂𝐴𝑘 = ⋀𝐴𝑘 = min(𝐴𝑘)  [23] 
 
When equation [23] yields the value of 1, it is true that the entity is 
an instance of the compound; else, it is not. If no entity qualifies, the 
intersection is logically possible yet unobserved, hence remains an 
empty set. 
The application of the ˹and˺ operator to single properties further 
clarifies the meaning of the principle of the excluded middle as the con-
sequence of the principle of idempotency. Following equations [18] and 
equation [20], the intersection of the positive and the negative set must 
be empty, as in equation [24]: 
 
𝐴2 − 𝐴 = 𝐴(1 − 𝐴) = 𝐴 ∙ ?̅? = ∅  [24] 
 
Any violation of equation [24] arises a logical contradiction, which 
can be symbolized by an uptack ⊥ or by a Ↄ, reading contradictory, or, 
again, false. 
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7.3 Substitutes 
 
Substitutes arise when terms – either single or compound – are con-
nected by the operator ˹or˺. In QCA, the operator is indicated by a plus 
symbol + and is never omitted. Hence, 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶̅ reads ˹𝐴 or 𝐵 or not-
𝐶˺.  
Idempotency makes permutation and grouping irrelevant to substi-
tutes, too: 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶̅ means the same as 𝐵 + 𝐴 + 𝐶̅, and as 𝐴 + (𝐵 +
𝐶̅); thus, the Boolean ˹or˺, too, supports the commutative rule and the 
associative rule.  
Set-theoretically, this ˹or˺ corresponds to the union of property-sets, 
usually indicated by ∪. 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶̅ has the same meaning as 𝐴 ∪ 𝐵 ∪ 𝐶̅ 
and indicates the superset of the entities that belong at least to one of 
the property sets in the right state. Logically, this set union is a nonex-
clusive disjunction of elementary propositions, usually denoted by a vee 
∨. The disjunction is true for any primitive that includes at least one of 
the elementary propositions with the right truth-value. The truth func-
tion of any disjunction, therefore, is always true except for the primitive 
where all the propositions jointly take the opposite truth-values. Thus, 
the disjunction 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ∨ 𝐶̅ is only false at the primitive ?̅? ∧  ?̅?  ∧ 𝐶 – as 
shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. The truth table for the disjunction 𝑨 ∨ 𝑩 ∨ ?̅?. 
ID 𝑨 𝑩 𝑪 ?̅? 𝑨 ∨ 𝑩 ∨ ?̅? 
(1) 1 1 1 0 1 
(2) 1 1 0 1 1 
(3) 1 0 1 0 1 
(4) 1 0 0 1 1 
(5) 0 1 1 0 1 
(6) 0 1 0 1 1 
(7) 0 0 1 0 0 
(8) 0 0 0 1 1 
 
Keys: columns are the same as in Table 4, except for the last one. 
Column 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ∨ 𝐶̅ reports the truth function of the corresponding disjunction 
and draws attention to the only false point – i.e., primitive (7). 
 
The disjunction is false only when its complement is true – in Table 
5, primitive (7). Its truth function suggests the rule for establishing 
whether an entity is an instance of the union of 𝑘 attributes 𝐴 can be 
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based on the maximal value that the entity gets in each of the attributes, 
as summarized by equation [25]: 
 
⋃𝐴𝑘 = ⋁𝐴𝑘 = max(𝐴𝑘)  [25] 
 
Lastly: from equation [19], it follows the disjunction of a proposi-
tion, and its complement yields the universe or all the instances, as in 
equation [26]. 
 
𝐴𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖 =  𝕌 [26] 
 
Logically, such a disjunction generates a tautology, and its result is 
also denoted by a downtack ⊤. 
 
 
7.4 Necessity and sufficiency 
 
In QCA, necessity is indicated with an arrow running from the effect to 
the causes, and sufficiency with an arrow running from the causes to 
the effect. Conventionally, expressions are written from left to right, 
and the effect of interest appears at the end of the expression; under 
such a convention, sufficiency is a right-headed arrow, and necessity is 
left-headed. For instance, 𝐴 → 𝑌 reads ˹A is sufficient to Y˺;  ?̅? ← 𝑌 
reads ˹not-𝐴 is necessary to 𝑌˺. 
These two relationships have long been given a set-theoretical and 
a logical rendering. 
 
7.4.1 Necessity 
Set-theoretically, the necessity of 𝐴 to 𝑌 corresponds to 𝐴 being a 
superset of 𝑌. The relationship is satisfied when all the 𝑌 also are 𝐴, 
although the reverse may not be true, and, in the universe, there may be 
instances of A that do not display Y. The hallmark of necessity is the 
impossibility of the effect in the absence of the factor, as in [27]: 
 
?̅? ∩ 𝑌 = ∅ [27] 
 
The requisite makes better sense in the logical reading of the rela-
tionship. 
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In logic, the superset distribution corresponds to the truth table for 
the implication connective ←, reading ˹implies˺, as portrayed in Table 
6. 
Requisite [27] corresponds to Primitive (3) and embodies the em-
pirical proof of the counterfactual argument that factor A is required by 
the effect, although it does not compel it. Regardless of their complex-
ity, hence, necessary attributes cannot sort instances of the effect from 
instances of its failure – hence, they cannot account for local differences 
in the effect. Sufficiency can do instead. 
 
Table 6. The truth table for the implication 𝑨⟵ 𝒀. 
ID 𝑨 𝒀 ⟵ 
(1) 1 1 1 
(2) 1 0 1 
(3) 0 1 0 
(4) 0 0 1 
 
Keys: Column ID assigns a progressive number to the possible conjuncts of 
truth-values of the factor 𝐴 and the effect 𝑌; 
Column 𝐴 reports the truth function of the allegedly causal factor 𝐴; 
Column 𝑌 reports the truth function of the effect 𝑌; 
Column ← reports the truth function of the implication 𝐴 ← 𝑌 and draws attention 
to the only false point – i.e., primitive (3). 
 
 
7.4.2 Sufficiency 
Set-theoretically, the sufficiency of a factor or a compound 𝑊 to 𝑌 
corresponds to 𝑊 being a subset of 𝑌. The relationship is satisfied when 
all the 𝑊 are also 𝑌 although the reverse may not be true, and instances 
of 𝑌 may exist in 𝕌 that do not display 𝑊. In short, a sufficient factor 
compels the effect, although the effect can occur otherwise. 
The hallmark of sufficiency is the impossibility that the effect fails 
when the factor is present, summarized by requisite [28]: 
 
𝑊 ∩ ?̅? = ∅ [28] 
 
Again, the requisite makes better sense from a logical perspective. 
In logic, the subset distribution corresponds to the truth table for the 
conditional connective → , reading ˹if – then˺, as portrayed in Table 7. 
The ˹ if… then˺ connective suits a discursive situation in which the com-
pound proposition on the left is a premiss compelling the proposition 
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on the right as its logical conclusion. The unobserved primitive (2) en-
sures the factual statement is not contradictory. Were it true of the enti-
ties in 𝕌 that ˹if they are 𝑊; then they are 𝑌˺, and ˹if they are 𝑊; then, 
they are not 𝑌˺, we should get to the conclusion that, in 𝕌, being 𝑊 can 
lead to both 𝑌 ∙  ?̅? – that is, to a contradiction. Observing primitive (2), 
hence, logically refutes the claim that 𝑊 compels 𝑌. 
The claim of sufficiency instead logically holds despite primitive 
(3) is observed, due to the classical principle ex falso quodlibet sequitur, 
establishing that anything can follow from a false premiss. Indeed, we 
would incur in a fallacy, were we accepting a false premiss invalidates 
a true conclusion. Instances of primitive (3) are logically valid although 
not empirically sound – they are vacuously true. 
 
Table 7. The truth table for the conditional 𝑾→ 𝒀. 
ID 𝑨 𝒀 ⟶ 
(1) 1 1 1 
(2) 1 0 1 
(3) 0 1 0 
(4) 0 0 1 
 
Keys: Column 𝑖𝑑 assigns a progressive number to the possible conjuncts of 
truth-values of the compound 𝑊 and the effect 𝑌; 
Column 𝑊 reports the truth function of the allegedly nomological compound 𝑊; 
Column Y reports the truth function of the effect 𝑌; 
Column → reports the truth function of the logical conditional 𝑊 → 𝑌 and draws 
attention to the only false point – primitive (2) – and the vacuously true point – 
primitive (3). 
 
From Mackie’s perspective of incomplete explanations, like cell (3) 
of Figure 5, primitive (3) accommodates the instances where the effect 
arises due to different compounds than originally hypothesized. 
 
 
7.5 Putting it all together for the analysis 
 
The QCA scholarship agrees8 Boolean algebra allows expecting that a 
complete explanation of the occurrence of an effect reads as in expres-
sion [29.a]: 
 
𝐼1 +⋯+ 𝐼𝑚 → 𝑌 [29.a] 
                                                          
8 Duşa 2018, Mahoney et al. 2013. 
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where 𝐼𝑚 are prime implicants and indicate one of the 𝑚 alternative 
complete conjunctions of the 𝑙 ≤ 𝑘 inus attributes implying one or more 
primitives from our starting hypothesis, as in [29.b]: 
 
𝐴1 ∙ … ∙ 𝐴𝑙 ← 𝐼𝑚 [29.b] 
 
In short, the general QCA solution is a disjunction of sufficient con-
junctions 𝐼𝑚 of proven inus attributes 𝐴𝑘 – or, the disjunction of 𝑚 K-
machines. 
The scholarship is less univocal about the shape of the starting hy-
pothesis. Those who maintain QCA is for retrieving articulated theoret-
ical models9 consider that [29.a] should provide both the starting and 
the endpoint of the analysis, as QCA is for retrieving the true structure 
of causal dependencies. Schneider and Wagemann10 allow for results 
differing from ex-ante theoretical expression instead, and maintain the 
empirical holding of specific set-theoretical propositions requires a dif-
ferent protocol without minimizations.  
As a reduction technique that “starts by assuming maximum causal 
complexity and then mounts an assault on that complexity”11, however, 
the starting point may rather resemble a theoretically meaningful yet 
unwarranted claim about a redundant compound of 𝑘 possibly-inus at-
tributes to the effect. The claim may assume that were it true that the 𝑘 
selected attributes together make one or more “nomological” arrange-
ments, then the effect should inevitably occur in a theoretical instance 
displaying them all. The starting hypothesis that warrants this reading 
is an overdetermined claim of sufficiency about a theoretical instance, 
as in expression [29]. 
 
𝐴1 ∙ … ∙ 𝐴𝑘  → 𝑌 [29] 
 
Boolean operations turn the hypothesis [29] into solution [29.a] in 
three steps. They: 
 
1. expand the hypothesis into a truth table;  
                                                          
9 Baumgartner and Thiem 2017. 
10 Schneider and Wagemann, 2012; see also Oana and Schneider, 2018. 
11 Ragin, 1987: x. 
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2. assess the consistency of each primitive with the claim of suf-
ficiency in the hypothesis based on the distribution of the in-
stances from the universe across the primitives;  
3. reduce the consistent primitives to identify the implicants 𝐼𝑚 – 
originally, with the Quine-McCluskey algorithm.  
 
As a preliminary operation, however, the protocol prescribes that 
we assess the empirical standing and direction of the expectations we 
associate with each attribute in the hypothesis. 
 
7.5.1 Checking directional expectations 
We include an attribute in the starting hypothesis under the direc-
tional expectation that, according to the existing literature, in the right 
state, it contributes to a nomological compound. The expectation holds 
when the attribute in the wrong state always impedes the effect and 
|𝐴 ̅ ∩ 𝑌| = ∅. The consistency of necessity (N.cons for short) controls 
for the threats to this claim that can arise from “miracle” instances of 
an M-machine. The index is calculated as in [30]: 
 
N.cons =
|𝐴∩𝑌| 
|𝑌|
=
∑ min(𝐴𝑖,𝑌𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 [30] 
 
When 𝑌 only occurs with 𝐴, the numerator equals the denominator, 
and the index takes its higher value of 1.00, supporting the claim that 
the attribute is necessary to the effect in the whole universe. Since the 
compound is that which mediates the necessity of an attribute to the 
effect, a full N.cons value means the attribute is like oxygen to combus-
tion – a necessary component to any alternative compound, without 
substitutes in the field. Lower N.cons values weaken the claim instead. 
A second index captures the information about the empirical rele-
vance of the necessary attribute: the coverage of necessity (N.cov for 
short), calculated as in [31]: 
 
N.cov =
|𝐴∩𝑌| 
|𝐴|
=
∑ min (𝐴𝑖,𝑌𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐴𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 [31] 
 
The N.cov renders the share of the instances with the necessary fac-
tor in which the factor also enters a known effective compound. Usu-
ally, the index is only reported for those factors with a high N.cons 
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score. When all the instances of the effect occur under the necessary 
factor, the numerator equals the denominator, and the index takes its 
higher value of 1.00. The lower the N.cov index, the lower the extension 
of the claim that the necessary factors always come with an effective 
compound.  
A further index assesses the truth of the statement that the absence 
of the necessary factor and the failing of the effect coincide. The Rele-
vance of Necessity (RoN12) establishes to which extent the instances 
where the effect does not occur also are the instances where the factor 
is in the wrong state, as in [32]. 
 
RoN =
|?̅?| 
|?̅?∪?̅?|
=
∑ (1−𝐴𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ (1−min(𝐴𝑖,𝑌𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖=1
 [32] 
 
The index takes its higher value of 1.00 when the failing effect al-
ways occurs under the wrong state of the factor; the lower the RoN, the 
more trivial the condition – to the point of becoming a meaningless con-
stant across the universe. 
Calculated on each state of an attribute against both the effect and 
its failure, and supported by the information from the N-cov and the 
RoN, the N.cons allows assessing whether our theoretical expectations 
about the single factors hold in the universe of reference for the analy-
sis. Especially in the Enhanced versions of the Standard Analysis 
(ESA13), the analysis of the necessity of individual attributes provides 
significant indications for refining the directional expectations to be 
later used in minimizations. 
 
7.5.2 Building the truth table 
A crucial step of the procedure consists in construing the truth table 
as the full specification of the universe by the factors in the starting 
hypothesis. 
After expanding the attributes, each of the instances under analysis 
is classified as a member of the corresponding primitive. The classifi-
cation is exclusive and follows from the calculation of the membership 
score of each instance in each primitive as in equation [23]. The in-
stance is then assigned to the single primitive in which it scores higher 
than 0.5. 
                                                          
12 Schneider and Wagemann 2012, Duşa 2018. 
13 Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, Oana and Schneider, 2018. 
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At the end of the operation, the truth table displays two kinds of 
primitives – observed and unobserved. The latter is also known as log-
ical remainders and constitutes a common occurrence. Although the ra-
tio of cases to attributes plays a role in generating the remainders14, the 
phenomenon is relatively independent of the richness of the hypothesis. 
The logical remainders mainly mirror the limited diversity of the actual 
nomological arrangements, indicating some combination of attributes 
remains unrealized in the cases at hand15. In the Weberian tradition of 
typological analysis, these unrealized combinations can nevertheless 
serve minimizations as counterfactual mind experiments.  
So settled, the truth table allows for testing whether the claim of the 
sufficiency of the starting hypothesis holds in 𝕌. 
 
7.5.3 Assessing the sufficiency of the hypothesis  
The truth table provides the first proof of the claim of inus causation. 
If the attributes in the starting hypothesis capture at least a nomological 
compound, then each observed primitive from the expansion of the hy-
pothesis distributes the entities in the shape of sufficiency. 
Standard QCA16 considers that two indexes can assess the fit of the 
distribution to the shape of sufficiency. 
The coverage of sufficiency (S.cov for short) controls for the threats 
that arise from vacuous miracle instances, and is calculated as in [33]: 
 
S.cov  =
|𝑊∩𝑌|
|𝑌|
=
∑ min (𝑊𝑖,𝑌𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 [33] 
 
When all the instances of a primitive 𝑊𝑖 display the effect, the nu-
merator equals the denominator, and the index takes its higher value of 
1.00, supporting the claim that the compound is sufficient to the effect 
in the whole universe. The more the exceptions, the lower the S.cons 
and the credibility of the extension of the claim.  
The consistency of sufficiency (S.cons for short) instead controls for 
the threats that arise from contradictions to the claim of sufficiency, that 
is, from instances of the same primitive displaying opposite effects. The 
S.cons index is calculated as in [34]: 
 
                                                          
14 Marx and Duşa, 2011. 
15 Ragin, 2008. 
16 Ragin, 2008; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012; Duşa, 2018. 
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S.cons =
|𝑊∩𝑌|
|𝑊|
=
∑ min (𝑊𝑖,𝑌𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 [34] 
 
When all the instances of 𝑊𝑖 agree on the effect, the numerator 
equals the denominator, and the index takes its higher value of 1.00, 
supporting the claim that the compound is sufficient to the effect in the 
universe. The higher the disagreement, the lower the S.cons index and 
the weaker the standing of the claim.  
To assess the claim of the sufficiency of the starting hypothesis, the 
S.cons again bears higher relevance than the S.cov. Calculated on each 
of the primitives in the truth table to the positive and to the negative 
outcome, the S.cons suggests the hypothesis is well specified when all 
the observed primitives display high S.cons to the effect and low S.cons 
to its negation, or vice versa.  
In any case, the S.cons values identify which primitives can be min-
imized to find the compound of inus factors explaining the effect and 
its negation. 
 
7.5.4 Minimizing the truth table 
The minimization applies to consistent primitives, compared pair-
wise, according to the “single difference rule” as implemented by the 
Quine-McCluskey algorithm. The rule allows dismissing a conjunct as 
redundant when two primitives associated with the same outcome have 
the same number of literals and all in the same status except one.  
For instance, we can minimize the primitive 𝐴𝐵𝐶𝐷 and the primi-
tive 𝐴𝐵𝐶?̅? if both display high S.cons values to the same effect. The 
formal reason is, the two allow the factorization 𝐴𝐵𝐶(𝐷 + ?̅?). Recall 
from equation [26] and [24] that the disjunction of an attribute and its 
negation is a tautology, as the union of a partition and its complement 
corresponds to the universe: 𝐷 + ?̅? =  𝑈 = ⊥. Therefore, the compari-
son highlights 𝐴𝐵𝐶 yields 𝑌 regardless of the state of 𝐷, which does not 
qualify as an inus component of that compound to 𝑌.  
The decision on the inus nature of single components, however, may 
change depending on how minimizations consider the unobserved 
primitives. The Standard Analysis contemplates three alternative as-
sumptions about them:  
i. that none could have been sufficient to the effect, if observed;  
ii. that any could have been sufficient, if observed and useful to 
drop a further literal from a compound;  
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iii. that only those qualifying as easy counterfactuals could have 
been sufficient if observed. 
 
a) Hard and easy counterfactuals 
The difference between hard and easy counterfactuals is easier to 
grasp with formalization. Then, let us imagine the following.  
We include the attribute 𝐴 to the starting hypothesis under the the-
oretical expectation that it is an inus factor, and that it contributes to the 
machine of the effect 𝑌 when present. This means that 𝐴 should be pre-
sent with other conjuncts 𝛷 for the outcome to occur; vice-versa, the 
absence of 𝐴 should make 𝛷 fail. Thus, our directional expectations are 
(i) 𝐴𝛷 → 𝑌 and (ii)  ?̅?𝛷 →  ?̅?. 
After we build and populate the truth table, we find that the primi-
tive 𝑊1 = 𝐴𝐵𝐶𝐷 is observed with an S.cons of 1.00 to Y, while we do 
not observe (hence we star) the primitive 𝑊9
∗ = ?̅?𝐵𝐶𝐷.  
According to the single difference rule, 𝑊1 and 𝑊9
∗ can be mini-
mized. The minimization dismisses 𝐴 as irrelevant, ascribing suffi-
ciency to the compound 𝐵𝐶𝐷. However, the minimization entails 𝑊9
∗ 
is consistent with 𝑌, hence  ?̅?𝐵𝐶𝐷 potentially is a nomological arrange-
ment to the effect. This, however, goes against our directional expecta-
tion (ii) and makes a hard counterfactual of 𝑊5
∗. 
 
Let us now imagine the opposite.  
We find the primitive 𝑊13 = 𝐴𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐶𝐷 is observed with an S.cons of 
0.98 to Y while we do not observe (hence we star) the primitive 𝑊5
∗ =
𝐴?̅?𝐶𝐷. Again, according to the single difference rule, 𝑊13 and 𝑊5
∗ can 
be minimized, and the minimization dismisses 𝐴 as irrelevant, ascribing 
sufficiency to the compound ?̅?𝐶𝐷. Again, the minimization entails 𝑊5
∗ 
potentially is a consistent compound with 𝑌. In this case, however, the 
assumption is 𝐴?̅?𝐶𝐷 would portray a nomological compound – i.e., the 
presence of 𝐴 would contribute to make ?̅?𝐶𝐷 obtain the effect. As this 
is consistent with our directional expectation (i), 𝑊5
∗ is an easy coun-
terfactual. 
 
Minimizations first operate under the prudential assumption that 
none of the unobserved primitives would have been sufficient. This 
drops redundant factors from observed primitives and yields the con-
servative or complex solution. 
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The second round employs any matching counterfactual. The result 
is a superset of the conservative, known as the parsimonious solution. 
The surviving factors are the real inus components in the hypothesis, as 
no solution can prove consistent without them. However, minimizations 
can use hard counterfactuals that defy directional expectations. Other-
wise said, inus solutions – made of essential components – are not nec-
essarily Salmon-complete. 
In the third round, the hard counterfactuals are barred from minimi-
zations. Their implicants are richer than in the parsimonious, as the min-
imizations restore those further attributes from the starting hypothesis 
that “co-unvary” with the prime of the parsimonious17. Therefore, these 
results are the intermediate or plausible ones. The additional attributes 
may not be essential to tell the positive from the negative instances of 
the outcome. Nevertheless, they deserve to be discussed as they im-
prove the consistency of the overall solution with the outcome18. In a 
nutshell, higher parameters of fit may prove plausible solutions are 
Salmon-superior to parsimonious solutions. 
 
 
7.6 Wrapping up 
 
Boolean algebra provides an especially suitable language to render and 
test individual necessity and joint sufficiency of inus factors to an out-
come. Attributes are elementary propositions and sets, and their rela-
tionship is defined by logical connectives, each corresponding to a par-
ticular set relationship.  
In this language, the starting hypothesis can be conceived of as the 
ideal conjunction of all the attributes that jointly bear a claim of suffi-
ciency. 
The hypothesis holds to the cases in a universe when the expansion 
of the attributes orders the universe in homogeneous partitions, each 
bearing the same claim – i.e., when all the observed primitives in the 
truth table have high S.cons values to one effect and low S.cons values 
to its opposite, not both or none. 
The Quine-McCluskey algorithm then applies to observed primi-
tives with only high or only low consistency to an outcome. It identifies 
prime implicants under three assumptions about the unobserved primi-
tives – that they would never obtain; that could obtain if close enough 
                                                          
17 Damonte, 2018. 
18 Duşa, 2019. 
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to an observed configuration; that would obtain if close enough and pre-
serving the directional expectations. 
The prime implicants from the latter minimizations are the reduced 
types providing the plausible explanation of why an effect occurred in 
some cases and why it failed in some others. The types are both inter-
pretable and logically valid when they render a configurational hypoth-
esis about a constitutive mechanism. Nevertheless, they still could be 
unsound, were they based on unreliable measures. 
  
  
 
 
8. Modeling membership scores 
 
 
 
 
 
The actual link between sets, propositions, and the real world is decided 
by how membership scores are assigned – that is, by measurement. 
The standard assumption in measurement theory maintains real-
world properties depend on some entities’ deep structure that we can 
know indirectly only, as meaningful variations in their empirical mani-
festation as attributes1. Measurement theory assumes we can represent 
these attributes as numerical images, and capture their variation as a 
relationship among numbers through proper scales. Scales are valid 
when they warrant that, for any manifestation 𝐴𝑖 of the property 𝑃, there 
is a measure 𝑞𝑖 of the image 𝑄 such that the functional relationship be-
tween measures preserves the fundamental relationship between mani-
festations. 
The seminal work of Stevens2 narrowed on four of such fundamen-
tal relationships: sameness, rank, distance, and proportion. Thus, same-
ness is preserved, and the nominal scale is valid, when 𝑞1 = 𝑞2 if 𝐴1 =
𝐴2; rank is preserved, and the ordinal scale is valid, when 𝑞1 < 𝑞2 if 
𝐴1 ≺ 𝐴2 equality of differences is preserved, and the interval scale is 
valid, when (𝑞1 − 𝑞2) (𝑞3 − 𝑞4)⁄  mirrors (𝐴1 − 𝐴2 ) ⁄ (𝐴3 − 𝐴4)); 
equality of proportions is preserved, and the ratio scale is valid when 
𝑞1 𝑞2⁄  renders 𝐴1 𝐴2⁄ . Classical methodology textbooks have long 
taught that a hierarchy of scope exists among measurements with the 
ratio scale at the top, as the latter is the more robust – i.e., abstracted 
from actual contexts – and allows for the broadest array of transfor-
mations.  
Meant as a prudential guideline for preventing nonsensical claims 
from naïve statisticians3, “permissible transformations” have become a 
                                                          
1 Campbell, 1928. 
2 Stevens, 1946. 
3 Luce, 1959. 
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canon of statistical procedures. As such, it has been disputed since its 
introduction. Skeptics argue that data are not prior to scales and that 
Stevens’ four types are far from exhaustive or mutually exclusive. 
Moreover, any operation – including that of gauging properties – entails 
a loss function, and is admissible to the extent that it minimizes the loss 
of information of interest to the researcher4. Along this line, compara-
tists recognize entities can manifest properties with different intensity 
yet contend that any variation in intensity should be recorded as equally 
meaningful as the ratio scales assume. Classes and nominal scales arise 
when some select point of variation is emphasized that corresponds to 
a meaningful change in the state of the entities bearing the property, 
while any other differences are dismissed as irrelevant5. 
In short, scales entail a trade-off between precision and meaning. 
The two perspectives become compatible, though, when metric varia-
bles are remapped onto properties as fuzzy sets. 
 
 
8.1 Giving variation a meaning 
 
Lofti Zadeh introduced fuzzy sets in the 1960s, motivated from dissat-
isfaction with metric gauges germane yet slightly different from that of 
comparatists. He noted how the problem-solving embodied by machine 
algorithms was more accurate although of a narrower scope than the 
human, as “the class of nontrivial problems for which one can find pre-
cise algorithmic solutions is quite limited”6. He then identified the 
unique decision-making capacity of the human brain in its reliance on 
approximate characterizations of a collection of data as conveyed by 
language structures. To the question whether a given unit is 𝐴, only 
simple properties admit a crisp ˹yes˺ or ˹no˺ answer that Boolean alge-
bra can render without loss. Complex properties, instead, allow for nu-
anced answers, signaled by hedges such as ˹very˺, ˹somewhat˺, ˹al-
most˺. They still can be rendered as classes and sets, but indicate fuzzy 
transitions instead of crisp boundaries between membership and non-
membership.  
Fuzzy scores translate hedges into weights 𝜇 from 0.00 to 1.00, con-
veying the degrees of fit or misfit of any 𝑖th unit 𝑢𝑖 to the concept en-
tailed by the attribute 𝐴𝑘.  
                                                          
4 Lord, 1946; Guttman, 1977; Mosteller and Tukey, 1977. 
5 Collier et al. 2012, Collier and Mahon, 1993; Sartori, 1970, 1984. 
6 Zadeh, 1968:99, 1978. 
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Set theoretically, 𝜇𝐴 = 1.00 indicates the full membership in the set 
of attribute 𝐴, and 𝜇𝐴 = 0.00 indicates the full non-membership in the 
same attribute. With fuzzy scores, the opposite of a set is still its com-
plement: 𝜇?̅? = 1.00 − 𝜇𝐴. Therefore, an entity’s memberships in a set 
and its complement still add up to 1.00: 𝜇?̅? + 𝜇𝐴 = 1.00.  
The relation between opposites is warranted by a third relevant 
value, namely, the crossover. Conventionally weighing 0.50, this is the 
point of neutrality and signals a membership neither in the attribute set 
nor in its complement. Due to it, fuzzy scores defy a strictly bivalent 
logic7. Logically, fuzzy scores capture the possibility that the statement 
˹𝑢 is 𝐴˺ is true for the actual entity 𝑢𝑖. 1.00 indicates the statement is 
undoubtedly true; 0.00 indicates the statement is certainly not true; 0.50 
indicates the information about 𝑢 is so uncertain that the adjudication 
on its nature is impossible. 
In the original proposal8, the three points provide a strategy to align 
linguistic hedges, sets, and metric variables, under the assumption that 
the shape of the function that filters the metric values 𝜈𝐴 – for instance, 
age in years – into fuzzy membership scores 𝜇𝐴 – for instance, in the 
fuzzy set ‹teenager› – is triangular, trapezoidal, or bell-shaped. Given a 
shape, the researcher can establish:  
 
1. the value of inclusion on the metric measure of the attribute, or 
𝛼𝐴. The inclusion threshold censors any variation above 𝛼 as ir-
relevant, as for any higher values entity 𝑢𝑖 does qualify as an in-
stance of the attribute, and its corresponding fuzzy score is 1.00. 
2. the value of exclusion on the metric measure of the attribute, or 
𝛽𝐴. The exclusion threshold censors any variation below 𝛽 as ir-
relevant, as for any lower values 𝑢𝑖 does not qualify as an instance 
of the attribute, and its fuzzy score is 0.00;  
3. the metric value of the crossover 𝛾𝐴, at which the classification of 
𝑢𝑖 is uncertain so that its fuzzy score is 0.50. By Zadeh’s defini-
tion, the value of the crossover on the metric variable coincides 
with their arithmetic mean of 𝛼𝐴 and 𝛽𝐴.  
 
The shape of the relationship between metric values and fuzzy val-
ues define the correspondence of some linguistic hedges with set-mem-
bership and metric values: ˹ almost˺ falls between 𝛼𝐴 and 𝛾𝐴, ˹ quite˺ falls 
                                                          
7 Lee and Zadeh, 1969. 
8 Zadeh, 1978:404. 
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between 𝛾𝐴 and 𝛽𝐴. Other hedges instead operate transformations on 
fuzzy scores: ˹very˺ is understood as the stricter scores from the quad-
ratic concentration of the original scores, while ˹slightly˺ yields the 
more generous square root dilation of the original scores. 
 
 
8.2 Ragin’s improvements to fuzzy scores, and some concerns 
 
Zadeh’s proposal is affected by a twofold ambiguity problem. First, lin-
guistic hedges are seldom clearly ordered, so that a straightforward cor-
respondence with particular fuzzy scores can prove arbitrary. Second, 
triangular, trapezoid or bell-shaped relations can make each fuzzy score 
𝜇𝐴 correspond to more than one raw score on 𝜈𝐴. For instance, ˹almost˺ 
and ˹no longer˺ can both weigh 𝜇𝐴 = 0.67 and, when applied to the 
attribute ‹teenager›, indicate either someone of about ten or in their 20s. 
Thus, his map is not isomorphic: if we only know the thresholds and 
the fuzzy score, we can retrieve neither the associated hedge nor the raw 
value. 
 
Table 8.  Positions that any 𝒊th entity 𝒖𝒊 can take to any set 𝑨  
and the corresponding membership values 𝝁𝑨. 
 𝝁𝑨 
Position (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
fully in 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
mostly in    
 
4
5⁄  
5
6⁄  
 
½ < 𝜇𝐴 < 1 more in than out  
2
3⁄  
3
4⁄   4
6⁄  
more or less in   3 5⁄  
neither in nor out  1 2⁄   
1
2⁄   
1
2⁄  0.5 
more or less out 
0 
 
1
3⁄  
 2 5⁄  2
6⁄  
0 < 𝜇𝐴 < ½ 
more out than in  1 4⁄   
mostly out    
1
5⁄  
 
 
1
6⁄  
fully out 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Source: Ragin (2000:156, 2008: 31). 
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Ragin’s fuzzy sets9 avoid these issues as they serve a different pur-
pose than Zadeh’s. Instead of quantifying a natural language, they aim 
to provide a gauge that includes both types of information of interest to 
comparatists – of difference in degree and in kind among units to an 
attribute. Here, membership values are monotonic non-decreasing func-
tions, which re-establishes the isomorphism between raw values, fuzzy 
membership scores, and selected hedges – as in Table 8.  
The mapping of continuous raw variables 𝜈𝐴 into fuzzy scores 𝜇𝐴 is 
especially illuminating of Ragin’s rationale of conversion. He under-
stands it as an operation of calibration – that is, like the fine-tuning of 
an instrument to improve the validity of measurement. The instrument 
is the filter function, shaped and applied following two different meth-
ods10. 
The less common choice is the indirect method of calibration and 
proceeds in two steps. In the first step, the filter function is established 
as the “qualitative score” from a scale – such as (c) or (f) from Table 8 
– that the researcher assigns to groups of similar cases on the same raw 
variable. In the second step, the cases’ raw values are turned into pre-
dicted fuzzy scores through the qualitative scores by a fractional poly-
nomial regression.  
The method of reference, instead, is the direct method of calibration, 
stipulating the filter function is a growth curve of odds. The different 
smoothness of the slopes is decided every time by the actual raw values 
the researcher establishes as 𝛼𝐴, 𝛽𝐴 , 𝛾𝐴, whose corresponding member-
ship scores are conventional and fixed. As in Zadeh, Ragin maintains 
the membership score of any crossover is 𝜇𝛾 = 0.5, and fixes the two 
membership values of inclusion 𝜇𝛼 and of exclusion 𝜇𝛽 as in [35.a] and 
[35.b], respectively: 
 
𝜇α ≝ 0.953 [35.a] 
𝜇β ≝ 0.047 [35.b] 
 
The log-odds associated with 𝜇𝛼 equals to ln (0.953/(1 −
0.953)) = 3, while the log-odds associated with 𝜇𝛽 equals to 
ln (0.047/(1 − 0.047)) = −3.  
                                                          
9 Ragin, 2000, 2008. 
10 Ragin 2008:96, 2000; Duşa, 2018. 
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The scalar that filters the raw inclusion value 𝛼 into 𝜇𝛼 is 𝜅𝛼 as in 
[36.a], whereas the scalar that filters the raw exclusion value 𝛽 into 𝜇𝛽 
is 𝜅𝛽 as in [36.b]: 
 
𝜅α = 3 𝛼⁄  [36.a] 
𝜅β = −3 𝛽⁄  [36.b] 
 
To retrieve the fuzzy membership of the 𝑖th entity with the raw value 
𝜈𝑖 , 𝜅𝛼 or 𝜅𝛽 is applied to the distance of 𝜈𝑖  from the crossover 𝛾 de-
pending on whether the entity is above or below 𝛾; then the transfor-
mation is inverted as in [37]: 
 
𝜇𝑖 =
{
 
 
 
 
  
ℯ𝜅α(ν𝑖−𝛾)
1 + ℯ𝜅α(ν𝑖−γ)
,   𝜈𝑖 > 𝛾
0.5,   𝜈𝑖 = 𝛾
ℯκβ(ν𝑖−γ)
1 + ℯκβ(ν𝑖−γ)
,   𝜈𝑖 < 𝛾
 [37] 
 
Ragin’s calibration thus embeds the idea that the membership scores 
are the odds that an entity is a member of the set given its raw value. It 
then provides a correction to the crisp classification of instances as 
merely in or out. The same rationale applies to the fractional values of 
the scales (b) to (f) in Table 8, which can be directly assigned to ranked 
instances or clusters of instances when the uncertainty in membership 
depends on evidence without a continuous numeric nature. 
 
a) Measurement error  
A common source of concern about calibration stems from the fact 
that it yields values without measurement error11.  
The concern entails the assumption that a measurand entity has a 
correct score in the property set, and that a biased instrument can mis-
take it. Under such an assumption, the log-odds transformation makes 
the measurement errors on 𝜈𝐴 interact with the researcher’s classifica-
tion error as embodied by choice of the raw values of 𝛼𝐴,  𝛽𝐴, 𝛾𝐴, and in 
ways that may or may not be systematic.  
                                                          
11 Hug, 2013. 
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The concern is more severe in large-N QCA, where the entities 
hardly maintain their qualitative identity of cases. Here, it has promoted 
frontier literature on false negatives and false positives in solutions12, 
as well as on the opportunity of changing the shape of the filtering func-
tion13.  
Especially when the number of cases is limited, the standard strat-
egy may anticipate and discount such consequences by running parallel 
analyses with different membership scores from purposeful changes in 
the three calibration thresholds14.  
A corresponding, straightforward strategy narrows on the re-
searcher’s bias and treats them as a more conventional coder bias15. The 
reliability of fuzzy scores can improve by multiplying the coders and 
their heterogeneity, then solving discrepancies in assigned values or 
thresholds by a collective agreement on weights.  
As an alternative, the systematic tendency to strictness, generosity, 
certainty, or uncertainty that may affect a single coder’s calibration can 
be simulated by calculating the concentration [38], dilation [39], inten-
sification [40] or moderation [41] of the original 𝜇𝑖𝑘.  
 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝜇𝑖𝐴 = (𝜇𝑖𝐴)
2.0 [38] 
𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝜇𝑖𝐴 = (𝜇𝑖𝐴)
0.5 [39] 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝜇𝑖𝐴 = { 
(𝜇𝑖𝐴)
0.5 ,   𝜇𝑖𝐴 > 0.5
(𝜇𝑖𝐴)
2.0 ,   𝜇𝑖𝐴 < 0.5
 [40] 
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝜇𝑖𝐴 = { 
(𝜇𝑖𝐴)
2.0 ,   𝜇𝑖𝐴 > 0.5
(𝜇𝑖𝐴)
0.5 ,   𝜇𝑖𝐴 < 0.5
 [41] 
 
As these transformations render the perturbation of all the calibra-
tion decisions in known directions, parallel analyses on the resulting 
datasets provide an assessment of the robustness of the solutions. From 
                                                          
12 Bramoeller, 2015; Rohlfing, 2018. 
13 Thiem, 2010. 
14 Maggetti and Levi-Faur, 2013; Skaanig, 2011. 
15 Smithson and Verkuilen, 2006. 
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a different perspective, the comparison among solutions provides a val-
idation of the main threshold-setting decisions when they ensure higher 
parameters of fit. 
 
8.2.1 The relationship between fuzzy and crisp scores 
The capacity of fuzzy scores to render classification uncertainty 
does not mean they lose grasp of the qualitative difference among in-
stances. The crisp classification still holds with fuzzy scores, following 
the rule of conversion in [42]: 
 
𝐴𝑖 = { 
1 , 𝜇𝑖𝐴 > 0.50
0 , 𝜇𝑖𝐴 < 0.50
 [42] 
 
where 𝐴𝑖 is the crisp membership of the 𝑖th entity in the set of the at-
tribute 𝐴, while 𝜇𝑖𝐴 is the fuzzy membership of the same 𝑖th entity in 
the same set. Ragin’s fuzzy sets can be better conceived of as crisp sets 
with internal variation – or crisp sets for which the uncertainty in mem-
bership is reported for each unit.  
The conceptual correspondence of fuzzy and crisp sets is empha-
sized by the absence of conversion rules for the fuzzy value of 0.5 in 
[42]. The absence follows from the later convention that the crossover 
shall not be assigned to any actual unit of analysis, or that the instances 
on the crossover shall be dropped as they carry useless information to 
assess set relationships16.  
When designed to satisfy [26], fuzzy sets allow truth tables where 
the distinction between observed and unobserved primitives still holds 
in the universe based on information about the entities’ differences in 
kind. The consistency of sufficiency, instead, is based on the degrees of 
membership that any unit maintains into any primitive and any solution 
– which requires some additional caution. 
Fuzzy sets preserve full idempotency for certainty instances only. 
Those with partial membership instead strain the principle of the ex-
cluded middle, although not the principle of non-contradiction. For ex-
ample any 𝑢𝑖 with 𝜇𝑖𝐴 = 0.4 has a 𝜇𝑖 ?̅? = 0.6, so that 𝜇𝑖𝐴 ∩ 𝜇𝑖 ?̅? =
min(0.4,0.6) = 0.4. It is easy to generalize that, for any 𝑢𝑖, its mem-
bership in the intersection 𝜇𝑖𝐴 ∩ 𝜇𝑖 ?̅? is always lower than 0.5 so that the 
entity never belongs to it. The statement ˹𝑢 is A˺ and its opposite, then, 
                                                          
16 Ragin, 2008; Duşa, 2018. 
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again are not true at the same time of the same instance as in classical 
logic and in the original Boolean algebra; nevertheless, numerically the 
intersection of a fuzzy set and its complement is not empty, which af-
fects the parameters of fit. 
 
8.2.2 Necessity and sufficiency with fuzzy scores 
With fuzzy scores, sufficiency as a subset relationship is established 
as the containment17 of the membership function of factor 𝑊 by the 
membership function of effect 𝑌, as in [43]: 
 
𝜇𝑖𝑊 < 𝜇𝑖𝑌 [43] 
 
where 𝜇𝑖𝑊 is the fuzzy membership of 𝑢𝑖 in set 𝑊; 𝜇𝑖𝑌 is the fuzzy 
membership of the same instances in set 𝑌, and < is the relation of con-
tainment, reading ˹lower than˺.  
Thus, fuzzy sufficiency is proved when the memberships in 𝑊 are 
systematically lower than the memberships in 𝑌. Similarly, necessity is 
defined as the containment of the membership function of 𝑌 by that of 
𝐴, so that the fuzzy set 𝐴 is necessary to the fuzzy set 𝑌 when the in-
stances’ memberships in 𝐴 are systematically higher than the member-
ships in 𝑌, as in [44] below: 
 
𝜇𝑖𝐴 > 𝜇𝑖𝑌 [44] 
 
It follows that the relationship of necessity and sufficiency eventu-
ally arises when the memberships in a factor equal those in the effect 
and 𝜇𝑖𝐴 = 𝜇𝑖𝑌. 
In short, with fuzzy sets, a necessary factor is that which distributes 
the instances of the universe below the bisector in a lower-triangular 
shape, while a sufficient factor is that which distributes the instances of 
the effect above the bisector in an upper-triangular shape, and a neces-
sary and sufficient one would lay instances on the bisector. 
These shapes do not undermine the capacity of the parameters of 
consistency [30] and [31], and of coverage [33] and [34], to assess the 
fit of actual distributions. However, simultaneous residual member-
ships in 𝑌 and  ?̅? inflates the calculation of consistency and may affect 
the identification of solutions.  
                                                          
17 Ragin, 2000, cfr. Zadeh, 1978. 
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A further parameter, the Proportional Reduction of Inconsistency 
(PRI18), has hence been devised to complement the information from 
the S.cons and to discount the possible inflation of the score due to re-
sidual memberships. 
 
𝑃𝑅𝐼 =
|𝑊∩𝑌| \ |𝑊∩𝑌 ∩?̅?|
|𝑊| \ |𝑊∩𝑌 ∩?̅?|
= 
∑ min(𝑊𝑖,𝑌𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1  − ∑ min(𝑊𝑖,𝑌𝑖,?̅?𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  − ∑ (𝑊𝑖,𝑌𝑖,?̅?𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1  
  [45] 
 
Calculated as in [45], the PRI index again spans between 0.00 and 
1.00, and its higher values indicate that the claim 𝑊 → 𝑌 is fuzzy con-
sistent. Its values are less generous than those of the S.cons. They are 
commonly used to refine the decisions on which configurations shall 
enter the minimization as sufficient to the effect under analysis. 
 
 
8.3 Designing membership scores 
 
Whether fine-grained membership better renders the observed variation 
of the manifestations of a concept, hence, only depends on how we con-
strue them – that is, on how we establish our thresholds. Setting thresh-
olds is the most delicate of the operations. It elicits a solution to the 
thorny problem of establishing the extension it has in the universe of 
analysis so that it faithfully mirrors its intension.  
The deductive strategy of clarifying the intension first prevents the 
risk of stretching attributes beyond their meaning, which would embark 
far more hidden heterogeneity than desirable for the analysis19. At the 
same time, thresholds are meant to shape fuzzy scores that capture the 
relevant variation in the attribute across the universe of reference. As 
such, they may preclude or flaw the analysis when they enforce an ideal 
yardstick that none of the entities in a universe displays. In short, thresh-
olds can become useless when decisions are not fine-tuned to the uni-
verse of discourse.  
The scholarship has circulated several recommendations to prevent 
these risks, which together compose a research design to ensure the 
claim of the sufficiency of the starting model is empirically sound, ame-
nable to interpretation, and treatable with Boolean algebra. The recom-
mendations help the researcher to tackle three intertwined problems – 
                                                          
18 Ragin, 2006; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012. 
19 Sartori, 1970. 
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namely, to (a) establish the empirical domain of reference; (b) define 
the operationalization of the attributes; (c) identify thresholds that align 
attributes and evidence. In actual research, the point of attack may 
change; however, the resulting membership scores shall provide a sin-
gle solution to these three issues at once – likely, after some iteration. 
 
8.3.1 Establish the universe of reference 
As in any technique, cases provide an empirical ground to the anal-
ysis as solid as the criterion for their selection. The selection of cases 
for QCA, then, must ensure as unbiased minimizations as possible. 
Standard minimizations compare alike configurations with the same 
outcome and drop their unique changing condition under the further 
logical constraint that the solutions to the effect and those to the absence 
of the effect do not overlap. In so doing, as in most dissimilar systems 
with similar outcome designs20, they illuminate meaningful constant as-
sociations against a background of theoretically and logically irrelevant 
variations. Cases’ heterogeneity to the background factors is the first 
criterion that case selection shall meet.  
Cases allow for meaningful set relationships and the possibility that 
the hypothesis is logically wanting when they are selected to ensure 
enough variation on both the outcome and each explanatory factor21. 
Were the cases only selected on the presence of some explanatory factor 
of interest, the attribute would turn into a constant and easily disappear 
from the parsimonious solutions simply due to distributional reasons. 
Were the cases only selected on the presence of the effect of interest, 
evidence would artificially prevent inconsistencies – thus making the 
assessment impossible of the logical validity of results. Hence, the sec-
ond criterion that cases selection shall meet is to ensure the variability 
of all the factors. 
The negative existential claim embodied by [27] and [28] only 
stands if we do not cherry-pick our cases but also if we refer the analysis 
to a closed universe of reference. The conclusion that the starting model 
generates a non-contradictory truth table, hence that its implicants do 
explain the effect, would prove hasty unless we consider all the actual 
diversity, which in turn is humanly impossible within an open universe. 
Besides, these boundaries provide a geographical, historical, cultural 
limit to the heterogeneity of the instances – thus supporting meaningful 
                                                          
20 Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Little, 1996; Rihoux and Grimm, 2006. 
21 Collier and Mahoney, 1996. 
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decisions about the inclusion and exclusion of each entity from the set 
of an attribute. Indeed, whether a country qualifies as ‹rich›, ‹demo-
cratic›, or ‹equal› may require different α, β, γ depending on the world 
region and the timeframe of the analysis. The last criterion for case se-
lection, hence, consists of finding the ultimate scope condition that en-
ables meaningful calibration while setting the limits of the validity of 
results. 
 
8.3.2 Operationalize attributes’ intension 
The operationalization of an attribute consists of finding the pieces 
of evidence that count as its local manifestation across contexts – i.e., 
the evidence related to an observation sentence. Attributes so become 
the features that we recognize to an entity in force of some property, 
and that makes it indiscernible from others manifesting the same or 
equivalent features. The scholarship emphasizes that evidence can 
come in any shape – from official statistics to interview responses and 
expert scorings or portrayals22. The operation of aligning evidence to 
observation sentences in a meaningful way is seldom straightforward, 
however. 
A first problem is the one Verba23 pinpointed – of treating pieces of 
evidence as they were attributes, leading to narrow observation sen-
tences. Following Verba’s volcanic suggestions, the problem can be 
solved by scaling up the ladder of abstraction, and by establishing func-
tional equivalences in a catalog of items equally suitable to fill a role in 
the explanatory schema. If required, moreover, the broader class can be 
turned into the attribute that the theory expects successful units would 
display, and failing units would lack.  
The second and opposite problem arises when types are far too en-
compassing to be meaningful. This mainly affects ambiguous or con-
tested attributes for which no precise opposite exists. Such openness 
can serve the purpose of defining attributes whose intension does not 
follow the hierarchic structure entailed by the ladder of abstraction24. 
Nevertheless, without clear opposites, we risk “theoretically, a ‘nullifi-
cation of the problem’ and, empirically, what may be called an ‘empir-
ical vaporization’”25.  
                                                          
22 Basurto and Speer, 2012. 
23 Verba, 1967. 
24 Goertz, 2017; Collier and Mahon, 1993. 
25 Sartori, 1970:68. 
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The solution follows from the consideration that, usually, concepts 
are left open when their intension is multidimensional, and the rule of 
composition is unclear. We can address such an uncertainty within a 
given research question, by selecting those dimensions of the concept 
that better fill the role in our nomological arrangements. We can use 
them as separate factors, and let their contribution and relationships be 
decided empirically, by minimizations: when the factors in the model 
are too many to the cases at hand, however, the findings multiply, and 
their interpretation can prove daunting. Alternatively, we may establish 
suitable composition rules under some theoretical assumption, and 
“compress” them into “superconditions”26. The compression reduces 
the primitives in the truth table and, as a consequence, the number of 
solutions from minimizations. Besides, configurational findings from 
compressed factors do preserve their interpretability.  
This, in the happy case that raw measures render each dimension of 
the attribute faithfully for all the cases. Often, however, some measures 
will prove unsuited to a QCA due to missing values. The technique can-
not handle them, as the units for which the value is missing would have 
an open membership in the attribute – that is, should be given the score 
of highest uncertainty. Missing values require some credible raw esti-
mation to resolve the dilemma of adjudication – else, the measure can 
be substituted with a complete gauge of the same intension, or the un-
informative unit can be dropped from the analysis27. 
 
8.3.3 Identify the thresholds for calibration 
Thresholds explicate the rule the researchers follow to establish a 
unit is an instance of the attribute. 
The default recommendation is to base these decisions on external 
anchors28. The advice is especially compelling about the crossover, as 
it determines which configurations will be observed and prove con-
sistent with which effect. At the same time, the advice can result in mis-
leading measures when applied automatically.  
In policy studies, particularly for indexes of extensive usage of na-
tional systems performance, recognized tipping points exist that can be 
employed as external anchors. Among the many possible examples are 
                                                          
26 Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009; Elman, 2005; Damonte et al., 2014; Damonte 
and Negri, 2019. 
27 Ragin, 2008; Basurto and Speer, 2012; Duşa, 2018. 
28 Ragin, 2000, 2008. 
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interest rates around 4%, taken as a neutral signal about the overall per-
formance of the economy; a Gini index equal or above 30, sorting high 
from low economic inequality; a rate of 60% of citizens in the right age 
cohort enrolled in higher education programs, marking a watershed in 
the expected quality of societies. These are all critical points as they 
flag a shift in the state of the underlying system. Strategies and interac-
tions of the key actors in the field change depending on which side of 
the gauge the system lays at a particular time. Nevertheless, they may 
also prove misleading or useless – especially when no natural zero is 
involved. Periods of very low-interest rates may lower the tipping point; 
outside postwar Europe, the Gini index may never yield low scores; the 
enrollment rates of teenagers from low earning families, or some mi-
nority, may systematically remain below the chosen threshold. In short, 
under special contingencies or within particular regions, a strict reliance 
on common knowledge may generate skewed distributions – which, in 
QCA terms, will curtail the empirical diversity by calibration design, 
and create quasi-constants that, for this reason, may disappear from par-
simonious solutions. Moreover, a conventional tipping point may hap-
pen to coincide with some cases, making them uninformative in spite 
that all their raw information is available. 
To avoid the side issues from blind reliance on common knowledge, 
a researcher can correct conventions with distributional considerations. 
The practical suggestions mainly concern distributions generated by 
continuous raw measures of single attributes29. Although standard de-
scriptive statistics are usually deplored as a significant guide for thresh-
old setting because of their lack of qualitative meaning, considerations 
about quintiles seem unavoidable in large-N designs30. A complemen-
tary strategy, and more sensitive to the qualitative arguments of homo-
geneity, prescribes the reliance on cluster analysis to identify possible 
positions for thresholds, following the assumption that cases closer to 
each other along the single dimension should belong to the same side 
of the property – hence, that threshold should fall in the “natural gaps” 
between two clusters. The cluster analysis to find thresholds has long 
been offered as a standard function by many software packages31, alt-
hough it can also be performed more intuitively. This support, however, 
only partially relieves the researcher from the responsibility of choosing 
                                                          
29 Ragin, 2000, 2008. 
30 Ragin and Fiss, 2017. 
31 Duşa, 2018; Cromqvist, 2011. 
170 
the threshold, giving that the natural gaps identified with cluster analy-
sis change depending on the number of clusters the researcher asks the 
algorithm to retrieve. In such cases, multiple thresholds can be calcu-
lated, to opt for the two robust ones that censor the tails without over-
emphasizing certainty, and for the mid one closer to statistical as well 
as conventional knowledge.  
A qualitative check can be performed on the cases that would lay 
above and below the crossover, to dispel the last doubts and verify 
whether the decision chimes with the available qualitative knowledge32. 
As instances with partial membership between 0.51 and 0.70 will shift 
below the crossover under concentration, while those with partial mem-
bership between 0.26 and 0.49 will shift above the crossover under di-
lation, the test of robustness with fuzzy transformations will neverthe-
less provide the opportunity to consider the effect that residual biases 
in calibration may have on contradictions in primitives. Robustness 
tests are even more justified when fuzzy scores are directly assigned 
based on qualitative evidence33.  
 
  
                                                          
32 Ragin, 2000, 2008. 
33 de Block and Vis, 2018. 
  
 
 
9. The protocol 
 
 
 
 
 
To run an explanatory QCA, a researcher may want to: 
 
 
a) specify an interpretable statement of sufficiency – 
 
1. Define the effect of interest, and learn about its generation.  
Review the related theoretical and empirical literature to find test-
able definitions of the effect of interest, and identify a convincing 
underlying process to it. Learn how the process and its conditions 
have been understood and measured. When the literature reports 
predictors without clear causal channels, you may still ask your-
self what the predictor captures of the process. 
 
2. Formalize a nomological machine.  
Identify a plausible nomological arrangement. Recall QCA is 
committed to the assumption that causation is ontologically com-
plex, and that mechanisms only obtain under the conjunction of 
special attributes related to each other and the effect by inus com-
position rules. The starting model can be conceived of as an over-
determined nomological arrangement under which the process to 
the effect would not fail, was it observed. Hence, it has the shape 
of the sufficiency statement ⋂ 𝐴𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1 → 𝑌.  
Elucidate the directional expectation from theory and previous lit-
erature that the model embarks about each of the 𝑘 attributes. 
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b) operationalize it –  
 
3. Select the proper population and gauge.  
Identify the universe of reference in which to assess the statement 
and the raw variables that render its components in that universe. 
Please note that data availability may affect the specification and 
the operationalization of the attributes in the statement, as well as 
the width of the population. Within these constraints, choose the 
raw measures that render each attribute as faithfully as possible 
across the universe without missing values and at the proper level 
of abstraction.  
 
4. Turn the measures of each inus component and the effect into set 
membership scores. 
Discount uncertainty in classification by identifying the degree of 
variation in membership that the raw measures allow; identify the 
required thresholds; assign membership scores to instances with 
proper operations.  
As different scales may affect the assessment of set-relationships, 
apply the same scale to all the attributes. 
Consider whether the specification of the model may benefit from 
the compression of some components; in case, add the compressed 
attributes to the dataset.  
 
 
c) analyze it –  
 
5. Assess the claim of the individual necessity of the components to 
the occurrence of the effect.  
Conventionally, the claim is supported when the attribute in any 
state gets values of N.consistency higher than 0.95 to either the 
effect or its negation – although an attribute that is necessary to a 
single compound can have lower scores, down to 0.80. Consider 
the N.coverage and the Relevance of Necessity to exclude the at-
tributes are trivial, as trivial necessary conditions – i.e., constants 
– can be dropped.  
Consider whether compressed conditions obtain better or worse 
scores on N.consistency and N.coverage than the original ones; in 
case of better scores, consider substituting the initial attributes 
with their compression.  
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Consider N.consistency and N.coverage to appraise the empirical 
standing of the directional expectations established in stage a), 
step 2. 
 
6. Assess the claim of sufficiency.  
Build a truth table from the expansion of the statement, assign in-
stances to primitives, and calculate the S.consistency and the PRI 
of the observed primitives to both the effect and its negation.  
As the claim of sufficiency is weakened when observed configu-
rations cluster instances with opposite effects, check for contra-
dictory configurations. If found, check whether the contradiction 
arises because of: 
- the misclassification of a case to the crossover in the calibra-
tion of the attributes or the effect. In such a case, change the 
threshold; 
- the improper operationalization of one or more attributes. In 
such a case, change the gauge;  
- the misspecification of the statement. In such a case, add a 
further attribute consistent with the starting hypothesis to the 
statement and capable of telling the positive from the nega-
tive instances in the contradictory configurations.  
Then, re-run the analysis. 
 
7. Minimize.  
Establish the cutoff in the values of S.consistency below which the 
observed primitives will not be deemed consistent with the claim 
of sufficiency to both the positive and the negative outcome. The 
original software for the Standard Analysis implements a default 
cutoff of the S.consistency to the effect of 0.85, although lower 
values can be justified if the PRI scores preserve high values. 
Please note the R package instead performs this operation while 
building the truth table.  
Find the conservative, the parsimonious, and the plausible solu-
tions.  
Consider the difference in the composition of each prime impli-
cant from the parsimonious and the plausible solution. If new con-
ditions appear in the latter, check whether the S.consistency is 
higher in the plausible than in the parsimonious – whether the 
plausible solution is Salmon-superior to the parsimonious. If so, 
the addition is detectably meaningful, and the plausible solution is 
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that which deserves full discussion. If not, consider re-running the 
analysis from step 6 on a hypothesis without these additional con-
ditions. 
 
8. Plot the solutions to the effect and its negation.  
Draw the XY-plots to check the fitting of the instances to the upper 
triangular shape, assuming the fit is good when the solution lays 
all the cases above the 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 0.1 line.  
Discuss which implicants explain which instances of the effect.  
Consider unexplained instances, if any. 
 
 
d) check robustness, and go back to the theory 
 
9. Check the robustness of results.  
Calculate different datasets with perturbations – diluted, concen-
trated, moderated, and intensified scores. Delete some cases to 
make some observed configuration unobserved. Run parallel anal-
yses on these datasets.  
Compare the insurgence of contradictory configurations, the 
change in consistency and coverage of individual attributes, the 
configurations that survive, and those that do not, the differences 
in solutions.  
Draw conclusions about the standing of your results, and the as-
sumptions that support it.  
Please note these results usually go into the limitation section and 
in the appendix1. 
 
10. Return to theory.  
Consider what the findings of the nomological compound add to 
the previous empirical and theoretical knowledge about explana-
tory types and whether they refine the expectations about the ca-
pacity of single attributes to yield the effect.  
Consider what the cases in failing configurations can learn from 
those in close successful configurations to improve their effective-
ness. Please do not overload the results with meaning about the 
nature of the cases. Keep in mind that the findings are valid within 
                                                          
1 For further details on the current standards of transparency, please refer to Schnei-
der et al. (2019). 
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the space-time region where the gauges and setting of the opera-
tional reports make sense and that cases can change their member-
ship into configurations over time. 
Consider limitations and further extensions.  
 
 
The last part illustrates the protocol with the support of an actual 
example. Please note that the example is not to be taken as the blueprint 
of an ideal “research product” – be it an article, a policy report, or a 
book. Instead, it has to be taken as an example of how to develop ex-
planations with a configurational mindset and get results in line with 
fundamental criteria and assumptions about configurational causation. 
The presentation of the findings and the causal story that supports them 
have to be fine-tuned to the need of the addressees – a topic beyond the 
scope of this work. 
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10. What causes corruption,  
and what can hinder it 
 
 
 
 
 
Even a cursory look at the literature reveals that, first, not everywhere, 
and not always, corruption has been understood as a problem. For dec-
ades, it instead had been justified for its capacity of greasing the wheels 
of oppressive bureaucracies, easing transactions, and improving alloca-
tion. It had been seen as the strategy available to the most entrepreneur-
ial players to bypass “red tape” and speed up procedures and as a tool 
for keeping wages low and thus contributing to national competitive-
ness. Corruption had even been ascribed the capacity of cementing frag-
mented countries together, as it would open informal access to the pol-
icymaking process to groups and interests that would otherwise be ex-
cluded.  
Corruption was thus acknowledged and justified in the light of a 
particular belief. It was a byproduct of “second-best worlds,” such as 
weak states, authoritarian systems, or democracies in their early stages 
of development, and the “modernization” of the political system would 
have made it disappear1. A rich empirical literature came to challenge 
such a “romantic” view2. Evidence heaped up that corruption spoils na-
tional economies instead of contributing to their innovation3. Corrup-
tion may strengthen large enterprises in the short run, allowing them to 
build monopoly rents and scale economies, but, in the long run, it takes 
a toll on their competitiveness. To small and medium enterprises, cor-
ruption is of little benefit as it always reduces their rate of return to 
                                                          
1 Huntington, 1968; Nye, 1967; Leff, 1964. 
2 Tanzi and Daavodi, 2001. 
3 Gardiner, 1993; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Klitgaard, 1988; Scott, 1972; Tanzi, 
1998; della Porta and Vannucci, 2013. 
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investment4. An inverse relation has also been detected between cor-
ruption and direct foreign investment, with a marginal effect equal to 
an increase of more than three times in the tax rate5. Furthermore, cor-
ruption affects the productivity and composition of public investments 
and the national allocation of talent in ways that undermine growth. It 
widens the share of the informal sector, undermines the progressivity 
of taxation systems, decreases the rate of revenues, and fuels national 
fiscal deficits6.  
Although such empirical results may be far from conclusive, gains 
from corruption can no longer be assumed. More importantly, the ge-
ography of scandals proven mature democracies are not immune to mal-
practices. Instead of vanishing, corruption has been often observed to 
adapt, survive reforms, and spread around7. The typical bottom line to 
these research streams is, everywhere the “quality of government” can 
decline – corruption being a significant indicator, catalyst, or cause of 
such deterioration8. However, corruption metrics display significant 
variations across political systems with similar degrees of maturity. 
Thus, our guiding question asks: what can explain these differences 
across cases? 
 
 
10.1 Define: how do we recognize corruption? 
 
A usual starting point in corruption studies is the remark that the phe-
nomenon lacks a precise and shared definition. For instance, corruption 
is commonly understood as office-holders’ “misuse” of their power at 
their advantage9. The problem here is, which criteria should identify 
“misuse.” The literature resorts to three renowned criteria to draw this 
line10 – none of which has escaped criticisms.  
The first criterion has a legal nature and refers either to some meta-
historical principles or to the rules in force in the given context. How-
ever, the former could prove culturally biased; the latter, too relativistic 
and lax as, in some context, certain practices may not be perceived as 
                                                          
4 Isham et al., 1995. 
5 Wei, 1997. 
6 Mauro, 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2001. 
7 della Porta and Vannucci, 2016; Rothstein, 2011; Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Piattoni, 
2001; Elliott, 1997. 
8 Rothstein, 2011. 
9 Rose-Ackerman, 1999. 
10 Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2007. 
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corruption. Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Corrup-
tion has attempted to circumvent the issue and defined the phenomenon 
by antithesis. Thus, corruption is discussed as the opposite of “integrity, 
accountability, and proper management of public affairs and public 
properties.” Since 2003, further standards have been specified by the 
United Nations’ Convention against Corruption, based on inventories 
of offenses. Its article 1 posits integrity, accountability, and proper man-
agement of public affairs and public property as the purpose of anti-
corruption. In Chapter III, it associates corruption with bribery, embez-
zlement, and diversion, trading in influence, abuse of functions, illicit 
enrichment, laundering of proceeds of crime, concealment, obstruction 
to justice. The Convention, however, leaves the state parties the free-
dom to detail the meaning of “undue advantage” or of “lawful income,” 
and the right to consider themselves unbound by special provisions. In-
terestingly enough, state parties’ reservations mostly concern Article 
66.2, establishing the International Court of Justice as the default alter-
native to arbitration in settlement of international disputes on the appli-
cation of the Convention. Scattered national resistances to the definition 
of a joint international jurisdiction signal that important differences re-
main among legal systems in their approach to corruption and leveling 
differences constitutes a sensitive political issue. 
The second criterion understands corruption as the influence that 
bends public decisions in directions contrary to the public interest. 
However, different understandings of the public interest may coexist in 
the same society. The problem does not disappear if we rely on some 
consolidated economic yardstick to define it. The definition of winners, 
losers, and possible compensations may draw the issue back to the mat-
ter of standards. If “public” means “general” or “universal” policies, the 
criterion again may prove demanding, as policies often benefit particu-
lar constituencies that “deserve” it11.  
The third criterion recognizes corruption in the improper application 
of market and patrimonial rationales in the domain of legality. Along 
this line, it occurs when the power-holders maximize the benefits from 
their positions by giving higher bidders a disproportionate influence on 
the policymaking process. This would make corruption overlap policy 
capture by lobbyists: but while the latter can ideally be reversed by a 
policy change12, the hallmark of corruption is its capacity to survive 
                                                          
11 Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007. 
12 Hall, 1993. 
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regulatory changes – even of institutional regimes13. Moreover, an in-
verse relationship has been detected between contexts where legitimate 
pressures are allowed and those where illicit channels provide the only 
access to the policymaking. Besides, from the perspective of the private 
agent in search of a favorable policy decision, lobbying has been proven 
a more effective strategy than bribing to gain and retain an effective 
influence on the content of policy decisions14.  
Further analyses agree that, beyond their differences, all these defi-
nitions revolve around a core meaning, that of corruption as unfair-
ness15. Fairness consists of the enduring commitment to the unbiased 
treatment of any party16. Thus, office-holders qualify as corrupt when 
they trade their discretion on the public resources that should serve 
whatsoever policy purpose and instead deliver individualized benefits 
beyond or against that purpose. This definition has the advantage of 
applying to the petty corruption of “grease money” as much as to the 
grand corruption of grafts and understands both in the light of a basic 
principle of the rule of law. Besides, fairness suggests a useful ground 
to grasp the mechanism that makes corruption toxic and hard to eradi-
cate. 
 
 
10.2 Learn: how does corruption come about? 
 
The literature suggests that corruption hinges on a self-standing social 
mechanism and that the effort of curbing it consists of locating the lev-
ers and pulleys to block it17. Moreover, the literature emphasizes that 
perceptions as beliefs and personal experience play an active role in 
maintaining and institutionalize the social mechanism of corruption, as 
they affect people’s expectations about the actual working of the system 
and the individual strategies of access to the policymaking system. In 
short, perceptions do change the functioning of the policy system. The 
causation stems from the connection that fairness and generalized trust 
maintain in democracies through the mediation of institutions, and the 
perceived corruption tarns the relationship between fairness and trust 
                                                          
13 della Porta and Vannucci, 2006, 2012. 
14 Campos and Giovannoni, 2007. 
15 Rothstein and Teorell, 2008. 
16 Lind and Tyler, 1992. 
17 della Porta and Vannucci, 2006, 2012. 
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against the backdrop of the assumption of actors with bounded ration-
ality.  
 
10.2.1 Cogs and wheels 
Experimental evidence has long suggested that, before knowing the 
gainers and the losers, fairness is people’s preferred ruling principle. 
Individuals can agree on restraining themselves to the benefit of others 
if the restrictions would have applied to anybody in their same position 
and situation. Moreover, they can stick to the principle in their decisions 
over time until they can assume that everybody does the same or, at 
least, that opportunists are sanctioned. When people understand that 
abuses are seldom prosecuted, opportunism becomes a dangerous temp-
tation. It paves the way to a tragedy of the commons in which even basic 
provisions are primarily delivered after unfair access.  
The standard solution to a tragedy of the commons is regulatory and 
includes a capable pool monitor, and certainty of sanctions on trans-
gressors as deterrents18. However, monitors can be corrupted, or viola-
tions meet forbearance, or whistleblowers be harassed. These possibil-
ities trigger a “second-order trap.” In such a situation, people can find 
it rational to not report violations and let the controls fail, too19. The 
second-order trap has especially harmful effects as it institutionalizes 
corruption as the way to access a provision regardless of whether one is 
entitled to it. As a consequence, even the best-designed policies – in-
cluded those against corruption – turn into distribution machines and 
means of political competition20, while the principle of fairness associ-
ated with formal subjective positions weakens. 
Unsurprisingly, then, perceived fairness has been found to affect 
people’s support for authorities and their decisions, even regardless of 
the policy delivered21. This effect has been robustly detected in local 
contexts such as workplaces, classrooms, police stations, and courts22.  
Extended to the wider political context, the perception of fairness 
has been found to moderate the relationship between voters’ percep-
tions of economic performance and their approval of the government, 
then the relationship between economic outcomes and electoral support 
                                                          
18 Ostrom, 2004; Frey and Bohnet, 1995. 
19 Rothstein and Teorell, 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013; Ostrom, 1998. 
20 Zhu and Zhang, 2017. 
21 Lind and Tyler, 1988; Brockner, 2011. 
22 Colquitt et al., 2001, 2013. 
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for the incumbent parties, regardless of voters’ political sophistica-
tion23. The generalization yields less convincing results when tested 
within a country24 than in cross country comparisons25 – which points 
to the contribution of the national institutional framework on these per-
ceptions. Thus, we can say that inequality is accepted when it follows 
fair policies. 
The effect of fairness on the acceptance of corruption has been em-
phasized by further experiments proving that the time spent in a less 
corrupt context makes the country of origin lose its power to predict 
individual propensity to enter bribes26. Evidence corroborates the theo-
retical tenet that free-riding mainly is a local and conditional result – 
some myopic rational response to institutional incentives, which makes 
them insensitive to the prospect of harmful collective consequences in 
the long run27.  
Although elicited by local experience, the belief of system unfair-
ness has lasting systemic effects as it undermines individuals’ predis-
position to trust.  
Trust arises when “the probability” we entertain that someone “will 
perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is 
high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation 
with him”28. As such, trust has been associated with lively economies 
and robust democratic compacts, although the literature contends that 
the relationship is straightforward.  
Ariely and Uslaner29 establish a difference between the trust that one 
places in particular groups, and the trust that one reveals as a positive 
general disposition toward cooperation. They consider the two forms 
are at odds with each other and see both as the byproduct of economic 
inequality. From this perspective, inequality triggers the first order trap 
as it sprawls the belief that the institutional system is stacked in favor 
of the few. Therefore, people come to distrust other people outside the 
strict boundaries of kinship, which becomes the reason for demands for 
less redistributive policies as well as a cooperative basis to gain corrupt 
access to provisions in a self-reinforcing dynamics, as the diffusion of 
                                                          
23 Magalhães and Aguiar-Conraria, 2019. 
24 Bøggild, 2016; Kumlin, 2004. 
25 Dahlberg and Linde, 2016. 
26 Barr and Serra, 2010. 
27 Ostrom, 2004. 
28 Gambetta, 1988: 2. 
29 Ariely and Uslaner, 2016. 
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opportunism makes control ineffective. The other way round, when in-
equality is low, people are better disposed to trust, easily agree on re-
distributive policies, and stick to fairness in relationships, which makes 
opportunism a rare occurrence and easily uncovered and punished30.  
In short, on this account, the causal chain goes from (in)equality to 
corruption via perceived (un)fairness, generalized (dis)trust, and (non-
)acceptance of opportunism as a rule, which reinforces (in)equality. So 
shaped, the hypothesis is that there is no endogenous solution to the 
problem. The only route over the inequality trap passes through effec-
tive redistributive policies, which in corrupt contexts are easily captured 
and doomed to fail. Such a discouraging portrayal, however, disregards 
the experimental evidence that restoring fairness can change percep-
tions and the inclination to trust. Generalized trust here becomes closer 
to an imprinted personal trait than to an adaptive response. Rose-Hack-
erman31 contends that trusting others can be an imprinted property that 
pits kinship against universal fairness through the experience of ine-
quality. Instead, she maintains the crucial trade-off arises between two 
kinds of trust – “one-sided,” and “two-sided” – because of their differ-
ent rationale.  
One-sided trust characterizes the ordinary principal-agent relations 
that political science posits as constitutive of modern representative 
governments. It supports the mandate from voters to elected office-
holders, as well as from elected to unelected office-holders. It arises 
when the principal decides that the agent can be trusted to act on their 
behalf, regardless of whether the agent reciprocates. The principal’s de-
cision to trust depends on their consideration that the agent will use their 
discretion to make choices beneficial to the principal – or, at least, that 
the agent’s decisions will not harm the principal. The source of one-
sided trust, hence, rests on the alignment of the trustee’s and the princi-
pal’s interest.  
The broad neo-institutional wisdom32 considers that the principal 
can expect such an alignment when the trustee’s intentions and behavior 
are assessed against a standard, and the assessment provides the agent 
with incentives. It can provide a social reputational incentive when it 
produces information to be circulated for praise or blame. A different 
reputational incentive comes from professional membership, as failing 
the professional standards of conduct may tarnish the agent’s standing 
                                                          
30 Uslaner, 2004. 
31 Rose-Ackermann, 2001:532 ff. 
32 e.g., Majone, 2001; Bovens, 2007. 
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among peers. Third, procedural standards can justify one-sided trust by 
making the behavior of an agent more predictable.  
Instead, two-sided trust grows between two parties from their inter-
actions and over time. It can stem from mutual dependence: the princi-
pal comes to trust the agent as the agent lets the principal hold some-
thing that they value as “security” for the agent’s future behavior. Al-
ternatively, it can depend on kinship, and rest on some ascriptive traits 
when it stems from the agent and the principal belonging to the same 
group, or on chosen traits when the principal and the agent share beliefs 
and values that tell them apart from the near context.  
This theory, too, recognizes a trade-off between two-sided trust and 
one-side trust. When activated in fair contexts, dependence and kinship 
can be exploited to open illegitimate channels to access public resources 
and bend the functioning of the system. When activated in unfair con-
texts, however, two-sided trust can be employed to defuse the traps and 
initiate a paradigmatic change toward fairer institutions. The expected 
contribution of two-sided trust to the functioning of institutions, there-
fore, is mixed, as it largely depends on the context. The direction of the 
contribution, within this perspective, can be decided by pool-monitor-
ing bodies that adjudicate on the contribution of different kinds of kin-
ship on fairness in critical circumstances. 
On a more general note, Rose-Ackermann expresses reservations 
about imprinting as a significant explanation of people’s actual predis-
position to trust. In her view, trust is the default predisposition, and dis-
trust remains “a function of the particular situation”33. In the light of 
experimental evidence, such an anthropological optimism can be as-
sumed as a necessary and plausible starting point toward practicable 
policy solutions. Attempts at defusing the mechanism of corruption can 
prove worth the effort only if people can change their mind about how 
trustworthy policy-makers are – hence, if dis/trust is contingent on con-
texts. 
 
 
10.3 Formalize: hindering corruption 
 
Theory prospects the possibility of reverting the mechanism of distrust 
beneath the corruption trap by providing citizens with reasons to decide 
that the policy-makers are trustworthy. Neo-institutional theory and 
                                                          
33 Rose-Ackermann, 2001: 538. 
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corruption studies consider that these effective reasons depend on 
whether local institutional designs provide policy-makers with system-
atic incentives to stay clean even when faced with pressures to bend 
their decisions.  
The broad explanatory schema, then, can be summarized as in 
Hp.0.0, reading: 
 
[Hp. 0.0]  𝐼 → 𝐶̅  
 
where 𝐼 is for institutional incentives, 𝐶 is for perceived corruption, the 
overbar negates, and the arrow reads “is sufficient to.” 
Hp. 0.0 allows maintaining that a given set of incentives is sufficient 
to account for the perception of corruption. Sufficiency is backed by the 
processes captured by the interlaced concepts of one-sided dis/trust and 
un/fairness – all of which remain unobserved at a different analytic 
level. Please note that the mechanism underlying Hp.0.0 entails a con-
tinuity between the “black zone” where corruption takes the shape of 
crime, and the “gray zone” of malfeasance and policy capture. The con-
tinuity is justified from the perspective of hindrance, as malfeasance 
and capture contribute to undermining the perception of fairness that 
triggers distrust and convinces people to resort to corruption. 
Before we can test Hp.0.0, however, we have to establish whose in-
centive matter – that is, the reference class.  
 
10.3.1 Locating levers and pulleys 
Within the broader policy process that connects voters’ preferences 
to policy delivery, an adequate reversal strategy has to take into account 
the contribution of administration in setting the trustworthiness of the 
system. Even when initiated at the political level by some illicit ex-
change in the shadow of an “electoral machine”34, the delivery of cor-
rupt benefits requires at least the compliance of nonelected office-hold-
ers to the pressures to force or bypass the rules during implementation. 
Being this true, the counterfactual argument should also hold that of-
fice-holders can defuse corruption by resisting pressures35.  
The claim of the hypothesis does not change, but now we consider 
that the role of institutional incentives in hindering corruption is of sup-
porting administrative resistances to pressures. The driving question in 
                                                          
34 Scott, 1969. 
35 Dahlström et al., 2012; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2012. 
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the specification stage, therefore, asks under which institutional condi-
tions the appointed office-holders are prone to accommodate corrup-
tion, and under which they resist instead. 
Studies on the developmental role of the state argue that resistance 
to corruption is a typical trait of Weberian-like bureaucrats displaying 
ethical specificity and closedness. Good remuneration is also expected 
to play a role, as it shields bureaucrats from the temptation to comple-
ment poor wages with illegal earnings; and in a design that promotes 
the contrast of interests. In this stream, Dahlström et al.36 develop these 
features into two indexes.  
The first index captures “professionalism” and is based on the pres-
ence of meritocratic recruitment, the absence of political recruitment, 
and the possibility of internal careers. The second index captures 
“closedness” that arises from a formal examination system, lifelong ca-
reers, and special employment laws for public employees.  
Tested on the inverse of the World Bank indicator on the “control 
of corruption” from 2008, and controlled for economic, cultural, and 
constitutional confounders, they find professionalism meaningful. 
However, they conclude, merit-based recruitment alone is not enough 
to ensure the resistance of bureaucrats to corruption. The study con-
cluded, but left untested, the major explanatory claim that resistance 
unfolds when administrators develop separate interests from politicians. 
Such a desirable “contrast of interests” becomes a structural feature of 
the administrative systems when administrators are held accountable on 
a different ground from that of politicians.  
This conclusion leads to the reformulation of the hypothesis as in 
[Hp. 0.1] below: 
 
[Hp. 0.1] 𝐴 → 𝐶̅ 
 
where 𝐴 is for administrative accountability. 
Now, administrative accountability is the common name in the lit-
erature to indicate those rules designed to steer bureaucratic discretion 
in the making of policy decisions “from outside”37. The accountability 
perspective emphasizes that corruption is made possible by the bureau-
cratic monopoly of the rulemaking and the margins of discretion that 
                                                          
36 Dahlsom et al., 2012. 
37 e.g., McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins et al., 1987, 
1989; Lupia and McCubbins, 1994; Huber and Shipan, 2002; Majone, 2001; Gilardi, 
2002. 
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appointed officials enjoy38. Unsurprisingly, accountability constraints 
render the spirit of Rose-Ackermann’s incentives to ensure one-sided 
trust.  
A common tool employed to ensure administrative accountability is 
the obligation to justify decisions and behavior. These obligations con-
tribute to professionalism when they commit the rulemakers to expose 
their decisions and behavior to the scrutiny of third parties beyond the 
line of the political mandate. Following the principle of the contrast of 
interests, special gains are expected when the scrutiny is carried on by 
a plurality of account-holders different from the political principal39.  
The relevant types of third-party account-holders can be reduced to 
two: expert bodies, exerting a professional control; and the praising and 
blaming public40. The concerns that may be expressed by the expert 
bodies about the shape of a policy are possibly at odds to those of the 
general public. Exposition to the public is expected to mobilize affected 
interests or special constituencies – those unhappy with the distribution 
of costs and benefits and attentive to the fairness of the criteria that jus-
tified it. The expert bodies, instead, may be interested in the sustaina-
bility, legality, and cost-efficiency of the policy decisions. Each sepa-
rately may “capture” the rulemaking to serve a single concern, which 
opens to systematic unjustified biases toward a special group. When 
activated jointly, instead, they can compel some balanced decisions.  
The further specification of the hypothesis, then, reads as in [Hp.0.2] 
below: 
 
[Hp. 0.2] 𝐸 ∗ 𝑃 → 𝐶̅ 
 
The hypothesis maintains that non-corrupt systems are those in 
which the rulemakers are accountable to expert bodies 𝐸 and, together, 
to the general public 𝑃. The underlying theory maintains that the two 
constraints endow the bureaucracies with the incentives to resist undue 
pressures.  
The effectiveness of accountability obligations depends on the ex-
perts and the public having the right to access administrative infor-
mation, and the obligation of the rulemakers to release information and 
justification in response. Rights and obligations, however, may prove 
                                                          
38 Klitgaard, 1998. 
39 Damonte, 2018; Damonte et al. 2014; della Porta and Vannucci 2012. 
40 Schedler 1999; Bovens 2007; Hood, 2010. 
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erratic or void when they are not backed by some enforcing authority41. 
The consideration brings the judiciary into the picture as the authority 
of last resort that makes accountability obligations credible. In the case 
of noncompliant administrative bodies, an effective judiciary allows 
third parties to enforce their rights through the judicial process; ineffec-
tive courts, instead, can turn any right and obligation into empty shells. 
The last theoretical specification from the literature review, then, reads: 
 
[Hp. 0.2] 𝐸 ∗ 𝑃 ∗ 𝐽 → 𝐶̅ 
 
where 𝐽 indicates the presence of an effective judiciary and renders its 
contribution to making the obligations credible of being accountable to 
experts and the public.  
 
10.3.2 Setting theoretical expectations 
Given the literature, then, we can expect that the three conditions in 
the antecedent of [Hp.0.2] be inus components: no condition can plau-
sibly ensure the effect unless the remaining two are present, too. To-
gether, the three inus components may also prove a Salmon-complete 
compound in a universe of democratic systems – that is, provided that 
citizens are endowed with effective political, economic, social, and civil 
citizenship rights. 
Of the three conditions, moreover, we can expect that the accounta-
bility to the public and the experts provide the channel to the effect ac-
cording to the inus rationale of the “and” connective. The only positive 
effect is expected under their joined presence; in the absence of one or 
the other or both, the constraints should weaken and the rulemakers’ 
capacity to resist pressures with them.  
Finally, the judiciary can be expected to enhance the effect of con-
straints when the accountability rights and obligations are adequate. 
When accountability is inadequate, instead, legal prosecution without 
changes in the rules of accountability may unintentionally provide new 
reasons for distrusting the policymakers. 
 
10.3.3 Gauging levers and pulleys 
Unless we are in the happy condition of designing and gathering 
suitable data, the explanatory factors in the starting hypothesis may 
have to find their operationalization in existing measures. The topic of 
                                                          
41 Ostrom, 2005; Schillemans, 2008. 
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corruption and the quality of administration is, fortunately, relevant 
enough for justifying the systematic release of indicators. However, the 
overlapping between the index and the conditions in the model is often 
only partial. Thus, we may need more than an index – or than a sub-
index – to render the inus factor in the model. 
This study chooses its sub-indexes from the Rule of Law Index 
maintained by the World Justice Project (see Table 10 and notes). These 
gauges follow from systematic surveys and transparent cross-valida-
tion, although they are not released with a measurement error, and the 
series before 2015 cannot be compared cross-time, which defines the 
time boundaries of the analysis.  
From the dataset related to 2017, the following gauges will be used: 
 
- subindex 1.3. “Government powers are effectively limited by in-
dependent auditing and review,” for the condition ‹ATEC›. 
According to the metadata, the raw variable gauges whether 
comptrollers or auditors, as well as national human rights ombuds-
man agencies, have sufficient independence and the ability to ex-
ercise adequate checks on and oversight of the government. 
The condition will be interpreted as the presence of effective ac-
countability constraints from expert bodies, and an inus compo-
nent in the accountability mechanism.  
 
- subindex 1.5 “Government powers are subject to non-governmen-
tal checks,” to calibrate the condition ‹ASOC›.  
The raw variable gauges if independent media, civil society or-
ganizations, political parties, and individuals are free to report and 
comment on government policies without fear of retaliation. 
The condition will be interpreted as conditions enabling and pro-
tecting societal actors interested in scrutinizing the policymaking 
activities, and reporting vital information to the public at large. 
 
-  subindex 3.1 “Publicized laws and government data” to calibrate 
the condition ‹APUB›. 
The raw measure gauges whether basic laws and information on 
legal rights are publicly available, presented in everyday language, 
and made accessible in all languages. It also measures the quality 
and accessibility of information published by the government in 
print or online, and whether administrative regulations, drafts of 
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legislation, and high court decisions are made accessible to the 
public promptly. 
The condition will be interpreted as the availability of clear infor-
mation about policymaking activities and contents, and as a trig-
ger of the mobilization of general societal interest. 
 
-  subindex 3.2 “Right to information” to calibrate the condition 
‹RTA›.  
The underlying raw measure gauges whether requests for infor-
mation held by a government agency are granted, how timely, if 
the information provided is pertinent and complete, and if requests 
for information are granted at a reasonable cost and without hav-
ing to pay a bribe. It also measures whether people are aware of 
their right to information and whether relevant records are acces-
sible to the public upon request. 
The condition will be interpreted as the right to access government 
information enabling effective scrutiny. 
 
- subindex 7.6 “Civil justice is effectively enforced” as the condi-
tion ‹ENFOR›.  
The raw variable gauges the effectiveness and timeliness of the 
enforcement of civil justice decisions and judgments in practice.  
The condition will be interpreted as the primary enabling factor 
ensuring the effectiveness of any other element in the nomological 
arrangement. 
 
The operationalization of the effect as the condition ‹CLEAN›, in-
stead, relies on the Corruption Perception Index maintained by Trans-
parency International. This again provides a suitable gauge of the per-
ceived level of corruption of the administrative bodies, collected from 
surveys, and, since 2012, validated through a transparent methodology. 
The operationalization turns [Hp.0.2] into [Hp.1]: 
 
[Hp.1] 𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐴𝑆𝑂𝐶 ∗ 𝐴𝑃𝑈𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∗ 𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅 →  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑁 
 
Following theoretical assumptions and the operationalization, the 
analysis will maintain the presence of each condition is required for the 
compound to yield the positive effect, and the absence of any condition 
sufficient for it to fail – as summarized in Table 9. 
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Table 9. Directional expectations 
Contribute to CLEAN: Contribute to ~CLEAN: 
ATEC *Φ ~ATEC* Φ 
ASOC * Φ ~ASOC * Φ 
APUB * Φ ~APUB * Φ 
RTA * Φ ~RTA * Φ 
ENFOR* Φ ~ENFOR * Φ 
 
As the measures of the outcome and of the inus factors come from 
surveys and discount the variations in the year of reference, no need for 
lagging the effect is envisaged. The perception of the accountability of 
the administration and the perception of public sector corruption count 
as individual responses to the same state of the policymaking system. 
The relevant issue for the method is whether the state of accountability 
yields observation reports that support the claim as in [Hp.1]. 
The data of the Corruption Perception Index and the World Justice 
Project are all collected from a variety of world regions, although not 
from the same countries. When combined, the more comprehensive 
coverage is of the countries of the European Union and the European 
Free Trade Area, and the Anglophone countries. Together, the admin-
istrative and institutional systems provide enough diversity to support 
the patterns detected by the observational reports are meaningful. At the 
same time, they all are uninterrupted democratic systems, although at 
different degrees of maturity, which ensures the gauges of the condi-
tions in the model can be given unambiguous interpretations.  
After dropping the cases with missing values, the population suita-
ble for the analysis includes 26 cases – namely, Austria, Belgium, Bul-
garia, Canada, Czechia, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Great Britain, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, United States, 
Australia, New Zealand – labeled after the Alpha-3 country codes. The 
raw dataset reads as in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Raw data 
CODE CLEAN ATEC ASOC APUB RTA ENFOR 
AUS 0.77 0.814708 0.829643 0.910391 0.655894 0.743761 
NZL 0.89 0.837319 0.832978 0.855778 0.746930 0.734909 
AUT 0.75 0.756031 0.851111 0.714408 0.637350 0.835960 
BEL 0.75 0.842677 0.800369 0.684961 0.684168 0.783568 
BGR 0.43 0.412690 0.619295 0.576252 0.474647 0.593935 
CAN 0.82 0.799486 0.846941 0.875665 0.681263 0.765940 
CZE 0.57 0.719355 0.719058 0.667046 0.635679 0.678652 
DEU 0.81 0.856441 0.860407 0.752887 0.753014 0.897994 
DNK 0.88 0.915851 0.973083 0.843298 0.794127 0.914966 
ESP 0.57 0.704767 0.738899 0.704143 0.624528 0.527812 
EST 0.71 0.857182 0.794909 0.861620 0.730704 0.714395 
FIN 0.85 0.941276 0.905502 0.899718 0.811627 0.882495 
FRA 0.70 0.815772 0.755039 0.855324 0.767304 0.720260 
GBR 0.82 0.820408 0.849469 0.903424 0.694535 0.772559 
GRC 0.48 0.729397 0.683528 0.563534 0.616350 0.411051 
HRV 0.49 0.554981 0.682452 0.553799 0.672758 0.540608 
HUN 0.45 0.418136 0.490233 0.573962 0.451707 0.497701 
ITA 0.50 0.760439 0.685054 0.606626 0.651787 0.367565 
NLD 0.82 0.870628 0.853806 0.786342 0.803218 0.886952 
NOR 0.85 0.939140 0.925695 0.877084 0.880455 0.912023 
POL 0.60 0.589044 0.628946 0.618562 0.663268 0.617409 
PRT 0.63 0.789964 0.816835 0.541897 0.664296 0.549812 
ROU 0.48 0.548285 0.762163 0.610889 0.602299 0.655217 
SVN 0.61 0.627736 0.697531 0.692308 0.645424 0.492498 
SWE 0.84 0.942595 0.917292 0.792256 0.947463 0.927448 
USA 0.75 0.778349 0.808321 0.766653 0.707624 0.728341 
 
Key: AUT: Australia, BEL: Belgium; BGR: Bulgaria; CAN: Canada; CZE: Czechia; 
DEU: Germany; DNK: Denmark; ESP: Spain; EST: Estonia; FIN: Finland; FRA: France; 
GBR: Great Britain; GRC: Greece; HRV: Croatia; HUN: Hungary; ITA: Italy; NLD: the 
Netherlands; NOR: Norway; POL: Poland; PRT: Portugal; ROU: Romania; SVN: Slove-
nia; SWE: Sweden; USA: United States; AUS: Australia; NZL: New Zealand.  
Source: CLEAN reports the value of the Corruption Perception Index 2017 collected by 
Transparency International: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_per-
ceptions_index_2017. The other raw measures are from the Report 2017 of the World 
Justice Project, http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/ , respectively corresponding to Subin-
dexes 1.3 (ATEC), 1.5 (ASOC); 3.1 (APUB); 3.2 (RTA); 7.6 (ENFOR). 
   
  
 
 
11. Set-theoretic configurational analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
11.1 Calibrate the membership scores 
 
All the raw variables in our model are continuous. Hence, we can apply 
the direct method of calibration. With the assistance of a suitable pack-
age, we can inspect the single variables with the following procedure: 
(a) insulate a raw variable, (b) identify the gaps where the thresholds 
can be positioned meaningfully, (c) calibrate. The crux of the proce-
dure, as already noted, is the identification of the thresholds.  
Threshold setting is the solution to a k-cluster problem – one for 
each raw measure in the model. The related functions in the packages 
can apply a variety of clustering algorithms, none of which, so far, is 
unassisted optimizing. By design, the decision is intentionally left to the 
researcher about which variation is meaningful and which instead can 
be censored. The default setting for continuous variables performs a hi-
erarchical clustering based on the Euclidean distance calculated from 
complete linkage, which maximizes the distance between the elements 
in different clusters taken pairwise.  
Conventionally, the clustering algorithm operates on the raw varia-
ble without previous standardization. In the absence of specific 
knowledge to support the decision, but also as a strategy for confronting 
possible biases in our previous knowledge, we can iterate the function 
and call for increasing numbers of thresholds. This provides infor-
mation about which groups of units are geometrically closer to each 
other than to the rest of the population under different discrimination 
criteria. It should be noted that the first threshold to be identified often 
insulates the outliers. Thus, symmetry in the order of the gaps cannot 
lead our reading of the function’s output – the crossover is not neces-
sarily the third value retrieved by the setting function when we call for 
five gaps. Symmetry, however, may prove significant given the effect 
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that skewed distributions may have in construing conditions with al-
most trivial individual N.cons scores, which affect the PRI values in the 
truth table. Standard statistics of each raw measure can then be com-
puted to assist the decision on thresholds and avoid unjustified skew-
ness1. 
The guiding principle remains that the thresholds should assist the 
researcher’s decision on the raw values that separate the irrelevant from 
the relevant variation. The following section illustrates the craft of the 
calibration procedure of the outcome CLEAN. As the keystone of the 
analysis, this operation deserves special attention. 
 
a) From raw to fuzzy: calibrating the outcome 
From the statistics of the raw condition CLEAN, we can learn that the 
span extends from a minimum value of 0.43 to a maximum of 0.89; the 
median (0.73) is higher than the mean (0.68). Hence the distribution is 
skewed, and the first and the third quartile fall at 0.57 and 0.82, respec-
tively (see Table 11). This, however, conveys just a rough idea of the 
actual shape of the distribution. Visualization can improve our grasp, 
and, since long, it has been the recommended first approach to the issue. 
The intuitive strategy suggests to plot the ordered data and draw the 
statistics to better put the distribution in perspective, as in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 conveys that in 2017, according to the index from Trans-
parency International, the countries from our population with a lower 
perception of corruption were New Zealand and Denmark, while the 
perception was higher in Bulgaria and Hungary. The distribution in Fig-
ure 6 also shows interesting “natural gaps,” where the thresholds could 
be conveniently placed. The countries below the raw score of 0.5 – It-
aly, Croatia, Romania, Greece, Hungary, and Bulgaria – seem to be 
cases with high perceived corruption. Czechia, Spain, Poland, Slovenia, 
and Portugal seem to cluster together as countries where the perception 
of corruption is relatively high, to some degree. Then we have two cases 
in between the distribution, Estonia, and France, which lean toward the 
almost-certainly clean groups of Austria, Belgium, and the United 
States, but with a gap in between where the median also dwells. Be-
sides, the distribution of clean countries displays many small groups. 
From the distribution, we could be quite confident about the positioning 
of the exclusion threshold; however, we may not be able to dispel the 
doubts about the inclusion threshold and the crossover. 
                                                          
1 Ragin and Fiss 2017. 
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Figure 6. Ranking of cases by their raw scores on ‹CLEAN› 
 
Note: the vertical bars in the picture indicate, from left to right, the 1st quartile, the mean, 
the median, and the 4th quartile of the distribution. 
 
Then we can resort to the clustering functions to bring further con-
siderations into the picture and hopefully dispel the last doubts. Clus-
tering is based on two types of information, a matrix of distances, and 
the proximities detected during the process of aggregation.  
The distances can be displayed as a heatmap, as in Figure 7. The 
heatmap emphasizes the distances of a case from any other pairwise and 
renders the information as a different shade – here, of red for those 
closer to zero, and blue for the farther ones. This information comforts 
us in our grouping of France and Estonia. The matrix of distances be-
neath the heatmap says that France has a distance of 0.19 from the 
cleaner case and of 0.27 from the less clean one; while Estonia is 0.18 
from the clean pole and 0.28 from the less clean one, which supports 
the guess that they shall be above the crossover with the clean countries, 
despite the uncertainty. The results of the clustering algorithm dis-
played as a dendrogram in Figure 8 further confirms the intuition. The 
dendrogram groups France and Estonia with Austria, Belgium, the USA 
and Australia on the same side of the partition.  
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Figure 7. Cases’ distances on the raw measure ‹CLEAN› 
 
 
Keys: Each cell displays the Euclidean distance of the case in the row from the case in the 
column as a different shade. The shades correspond to the values as displayed in the leg-
end on the right side of the map. 
 
Figure 8. Cases’ clusters on the raw measure ‹CLEAN› 
 
 
Keys: The dendrogram reports the result of the aggregation of the cases by the maximal 
distance that they maintain within their cluster from another cluster.   
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Figure 8 suggests that the inclusion threshold can group as clean all 
the cases with a raw score of 0.8 or higher. The function for setting the 
threshold provides us with the values for calibration. The function sug-
gests the exclusion threshold at 0.535, the crossover at 0.665, and the 
inclusion at 0.790 – as reported in Table 11, together with the calibra-
tion decisions of every other condition in the model. 
The calibration of the raw variable into the fuzzy condition through 
the logistic filtering function yields the distribution, as in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  CLEAN: raw by fuzzy scores 
 
 
Table 11.  Raw variable statistics  
Raw variable Min Q1 Med Mean Q3 Max 
CLEAN 0.430 0.570 0.730 0.685 0.820 0.890 
ATEC 0.413 0.708 0.795 0.756 0.853 0.943 
ASOC 0.492 0.703 0.804 0.782 0.851 0.973 
APUB 0.542 0.613 0.734 0.734 0.856 0.910 
RTA 0.452 0.639 0.678 0.692 0.751 0.947 
ENFOR 0.368 0.561 0.724 0.698 0.823 0.947 
 
Table 12. Thresholds applied for calibration 
Raw variable Fuzzy label Exclusion Crossover Inclusion 
CLEAN CLEAN.Z 0.535 0.665 0.790 
ATEC ATEC.Z 0.666 0.742 0.807 
ASOC ASOC.Z 0.708 0.778 0.823 
APUB APUB.Z 0.643 0.734 0.818 
RTA RTA.Z 0.630 0.689 0.781 
ENFOR ENFOR.Z 0.572 0.696 0.810 
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The fuzzy membership values of the outcome are reported in Table 
13, together with the result of the same operations on all the other raw 
measures in the model. 
 
Table 13.  Fuzzy membership scores 
Cases CLEAN.Z ATEC.Z ASOC.Z APUB.Z RTA.Z ENFOR.Z 
AUS 0.918 0.962 0.965 0.998 0.166 0.770 
NZL 0.994 0.986 0.971 0.985 0.860 0.728 
AUT 0.877 0.651 0.991 0.350 0.074 0.972 
BEL 0.877 0.989 0.807 0.175 0.441 0.902 
BGR 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.085 
CAN 0.973 0.928 0.988 0.992 0.407 0.854 
CZE 0.108 0.298 0.081 0.107 0.069 0.401 
DEU 0.966 0.994 0.995 0.657 0.881 0.994 
DNK 0.993 1.000 1.000 0.977 0.964 0.996 
ESP 0.108 0.196 0.167 0.280 0.041 0.020 
EST 0.738 0.994 0.747 0.988 0.787 0.614 
FIN 0.986 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.979 0.991 
FRA 0.692 0.963 0.280 0.985 0.921 0.649 
GBR 0.973 0.970 0.990 0.997 0.543 0.874 
GRC 0.016 0.383 0.020 0.004 0.028 0.001 
HRV 0.020 0.001 0.019 0.003 0.311 0.026 
HUN 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.010 
ITA 0.025 0.694 0.021 0.017 0.140 0.000 
NLD 0.973 0.997 0.992 0.858 0.973 0.992 
NOR 0.986 1.000 1.000 0.993 0.998 0.996 
POL 0.191 0.003 0.002 0.025 0.221 0.139 
PRT 0.315 0.894 0.923 0.002 0.230 0.032 
ROU 0.016 0.001 0.342 0.020 0.014 0.279 
SVN 0.228 0.013 0.035 0.211 0.106 0.009 
SWE 0.983 1.000 1.000 0.881 1.000 0.997 
USA 0.877 0.834 0.875 0.754 0.642 0.694 
 
 
11.2 Assess the claim of individual necessity  
 
We can now inspect the set-relationship that the single conditions in the 
dataset entertain with the outcome. The “pofind” function of the R 
package yields the value of the N.cons (dubbed “inclN” in the output), 
the RoN, and the N.cov (dubbed “covN” in the output) calculated for 
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each condition and its negation against the effect. The operation is re-
peated against the negation of the effect, too, to be certain that we have 
considered the four possible combinations of presence and absence. The 
results are reported in Table 14. Given that the parameters of fit have a 
double meaning – the consistency of sufficiency and the coverage of 
necessity are calculated with the same formula, as the coverage of suf-
ficiency and the consistency of necessity – both meanings will be re-
ported in the headings. 
 
Table 14.  Analysis of individual necessity 
ID 
Condition  
tested 
CLEAN.Z clean.z 
N.cons 
S.cov 
RoN 
N.cov 
S.cons 
N.cons 
S.cov 
RoN 
N.cov 
S.cons 
 1 atec.z 0.106 0.685 0.170 0.760 0.956 0.916 
 2 ATEC.Z 0.948 0.776 0.840 0.311 0.411 0.207 
 3 asoc.z 0.147 0.639 0.202 0.884 0.942 0.914 
 4 ASOC.Z 0.937 0.893 0.915 0.228 0.460 0.167 
 5 apub.z 0.233 0.589 0.272 0.923 0.845 0.808 
 6 APUB.Z 0.836 0.937 0.935 0.168 0.528 0.142 
 7 rta.z 0.361 0.571 0.377 0.932 0.756 0.732 
 8 RTA.Z 0.744 0.950 0.936 0.207 0.599 0.196 
 9 enfor.z 0.203 0.610 0.252 0.924 0.894 0.861 
10 ENFOR.Z 0.888 0.934 0.940 0.197 0.503 0.157 
 
This stage of the analysis supports the theoretical intuitions that the 
selected condition is connected to the outcome by some meaningful set 
relationships – thus, they are inus factors to the effect. Moreover, the 
conditions display the connection in the expected sign: the presence 
empirically contributes to low perceptions of corruption, whereas their 
absence contributes to high perception. Among all the conditions, EN-
FOR.Z stands out as a rare necessary and sufficient condition to the oc-
currence of the outcome when present, and of its non-occurrence when 
absent. The connection weakens but is not lost when the fuzzy scores 
are transformed to mimic the different possible coder’s biases, as re-
ported in Table 15. 
However, as Figure 10 shows with the condition RTA, the fit is un-
surprisingly affected by the biases of the coder –simulated as generous 
in (b), strict in (c), confident in (d), and shy in (e). The comparison sug-
gests that the fit may change remarkably, and the challenging cases in-
crease in number with the coders’ hesitation to decide on the nature of 
the observations.   
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Figure 10. XYplot of RTA and the outcome  
under different fuzzy transformations 
(a) 
 
(b) (c) 
  
(d) (e) 
  
 
Keys:  in the labels of the conditions, the suffix “.C” is for concentration as in [29], 
“.D” is for dilation as in [30]; “.I” is for intensification as in [31], while “.M” is for mod-
eration as in [32]. “Inclusion” is for the values of N.cons and S.cov, “Coverage” is for the 
values of N.cov and S.cons, “Relevance” is for the values of RoN.  
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Table 15. Fit of transformed conditions 
(a) Conditions 
CLEAN.C clean.c 
N-con RoN S-con N-con RoN S-con 
1 atec.c 0.159 0.783 0.352 0.738 0.933 0.832 
2 ATEC.C 0.924 0.772 0.874 0.425 0.35 0.205 
3 asoc.c 0.184 0.749 0.356 0.874 0.933 0.863 
4 ASOC.C 0.929 0.889 0.935 0.347 0.387 0.178 
5 apub.c 0.252 0.72 0.418 0.933 0.875 0.786 
6 APUB.C 0.871 0.947 0.962 0.309 0.447 0.174 
7 rta.c 0.327 0.744 0.518 0.900 0.837 0.728 
8 RTA.C 0.829 0.925 0.942 0.404 0.483 0.234 
9 enfor.c 0.228 0.747 0.413 0.880 0.902 0.812 
10 ENFOR.C 0.896 0.900 0.936 0.363 0.417 0.193 
        
(b) 
Conditions 
CLEAN.D clean.d 
N-con RoN S-con N-con RoN S-con 
1 atec.d 0.117 0.623 0.142 0.783 0.961 0.943 
2 ATEC.D 0.953 0.793 0.815 0.287 0.483 0.244 
3 asoc.d 0.148 0.575 0.159 0.887 0.955 0.946 
4 ASOC.D 0.950 0.893 0.894 0.211 0.522 0.197 
5 apub.d 0.262 0.515 0.238 0.903 0.813 0.814 
6 APUB.D 0.794 0.919 0.892 0.154 0.599 0.172 
7 rta.d 0.453 0.455 0.351 0.951 0.669 0.732 
8 RTA.D 0.653 0.964 0.931 0.156 0.703 0.22 
9 enfor.d 0.264 0.526 0.244 0.953 0.868 0.873 
10 ENFOR.D 0.862 0.959 0.948 0.174 0.596 0.191 
        
(c) Conditions 
CLEAN.I clean.i 
N-con RoN S-con N-con RoN S-con 
1 atec.i 0.038 0.655 0.060 0.794 0.984 0.971 
2 ATEC.I 0.981 0.799 0.859 0.231 0.400 0.158 
3 asoc.i 0.092 0.602 0.120 0.899 0.943 0.920 
4 ASOC.I 0.939 0.907 0.923 0.14 0.457 0.107 
5 apub.i 0.173 0.545 0.191 0.962 0.851 0.831 
6 APUB.I 0.847 0.968 0.966 0.064 0.523 0.057 
7 rta.i 0.311 0.505 0.299 0.974 0.728 0.733 
8 RTA.I 0.723 0.981 0.972 0.070 0.602 0.073 
9 enfor.i 0.088 0.574 0.109 0.970 0.952 0.939 
10 ENFOR.I 0.950 0.972 0.976 0.079 0.470 0.063         
(d) 
 
CLEAN.M clean.m  
N-con RoN S-con N-con RoN S-con 
1 atec.m 0.243 0.757 0.414 0.732 0.910 0.820 
2 ATEC.M 0.895 0.769 0.835 0.477 0.437 0.293 
3 asoc.m 0.265 0.738 0.420 0.858 0.940 0.895 
4 ASOC.M 0.934 0.871 0.909 0.444 0.461 0.284 
5 apub.m 0.351 0.704 0.476 0.863 0.843 0.769 
6 APUB.M 0.829 0.891 0.902 0.412 0.532 0.295 
7 rta.m 0.466 0.720 0.583 0.883 0.797 0.727 
8 RTA.M 0.781 0.912 0.911 0.493 0.600 0.378 
9 enfor.m 0.388 0.710 0.514 0.871 0.831 0.758 
10 ENFOR.M 0.817 0.899 0.906 0.441 0.553 0.322 
 
Keys:  suffix “.C”, “.D”, “.I” , and “.M” as in Figure 10.   
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11.3 Analysis of sufficiency, first: assess the hypothesis 
 
The analysis of necessity confirms the theoretical expectations set at the 
theoretical stage about the sign of the contribution of each condition to 
the occurrence and the nonoccurrence of the outcome. The analysis of 
sufficiency, instead, probes the explanatory capacity of our hypothesis. 
However, as Schneider and Wagemann2 underlined, the analysis of suf-
ficiency has two distinct moments. The first concerns the assessment of 
the truth table, while the second concludes with the solutions from the 
three different types of minimizations. 
The truth table analysis may include the researcher’s direct adjudi-
cation on the nature of the logical remainders. In this way, even the 
parsimonious minimizations yield theoretically plausible solutions. The 
practice, however, lays the solutions open to the suspicion of confirm-
atory bias. Besides, directional expectations operate a correction whose 
effects can be appreciated in the different richness of the prime impli-
cants in the parsimonious solution when compared to the intermediate.  
From the explanatory perspective, instead, the truth table is a key 
step in the analysis of sufficiency as it already tells us whether the ob-
servational reports – that is, the configurations that the cases in the pop-
ulation make observed – dis/confirm our starting hypothesis. Bluntly, 
the criteria R1 to R4 set by Mill, the considerations about the confirma-
tion and disconfirmation of conditional hypothesis with different scope, 
and the principle of Salmon-completeness require that an explanatory 
truth table clusters the instances of the effect from the population into 
homogeneous groups.  
Recall that the homogeneity with fuzzy scores is again a matter of 
degrees and thresholds. It manifests itself at the configuration level as 
well as at the case level, and special criteria have been developed to 
pinpoint those “contradictory” cases that challenge the claim of suffi-
ciency of the configuration3. However, the real challenge to the claim 
of sufficiency and the Salmon-completeness of the solution arises from 
(b)-type of instances, as they violate R4. A naïve yet effective strategy 
to detect them turns the fuzzy membership scores into crisp-scores, and 
checks whether and where contradictions arise, if any, in the truth table.  
                                                          
2 Schneider and Wagemann, 2012. 
3 Rubinson, 2013. 
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Table 16.  Observational reports from crisp configurations 
N ID F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 CLEAN 
01 Z26 1 1 0 0 1 1 
02 Z30 1 1 1 0 1 1 
03 Z24 1 0 1 1 1 1 
04 Z32 1 1 1 1 1 1 
05 Z25 1 1 0 0 0 0 
06 Z17 1 0 0 0 0 0 
07 Z01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01 C30 1 1 1 0 1 1 
02 C28 1 1 0 1 1 1 
03 C32 1 1 1 1 1 1 
04 C25 1 1 0 0 0 1 
05 C05 0 0 1 0 0 0 
06 C18 1 0 0 0 1 0 
07 C03 0 0 0 1 0 0 
08 C10 0 1 0 0 1 0 
09 C17 1 0 0 0 0 0 
10 C01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01 D30 1 1 1 0 1 1 
02 D26 1 1 0 0 1 1 
03 D28 1 1 0 1 1 1 
04 D32 1 1 1 1 1 1 
05 D31 1 1 1 1 0 1 
06 D29 1 1 1 0 0 1 
07 D23 1 0 1 1 0 0 
08 D10 0 1 0 0 1 1 
09 D25 1 1 0 0 0 0 
10 D01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01 I26 1 1 0 0 1 1 
02 I30 1 1 1 0 1 1 
03 I24 1 0 1 1 1 1 
04 I32 1 1 1 1 1 1 
05 I25 1 1 0 0 0 0 
06 I17 1 0 0 0 0 0 
07 I01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
01 M28 1 1 0 1 1 1 
02 M30 1 1 1 0 1 1 
03 M32 1 1 1 1 1 1 
04 M14 0 1 1 0 1 1 
05 M31 1 1 1 1 0 C 
06 M29 1 1 1 0 0 1 
07 M25 1 1 0 0 0 1 
08 M05 0 0 1 0 0 0 
09 M18 1 0 0 0 1 0 
10 M10 0 1 0 0 1 0 
11 M03 0 0 0 1 0 0 
12 M17 1 0 0 0 0 0 
13 M01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Note: F1: ATEC, F2:ASOC, F3: APUB, F4: RTA, F5: ENFOR. The type of calibration (.Z, .D, 
.C, .I, .M) is indicated in the first column, with the identification number (ID) of the report 
as a row of the truth table   
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Table 17.  Observations in .Z, .C, .D, .I, and .M reports  
Id  Observations  
Z01 BGR,CZE,ESP,GRC,HRV,HUN,POL,ROU,SVN 
Z17 ITA 
Z24 FRA 
Z25 PRT 
Z26 AUT,BEL 
Z30 AUS,CAN 
Z32 NZL,DEU,DNK,EST,FIN,GBR,NLD,NOR,SWE,USA 
C01 BGR,HUN,POL,SVN 
C03 HRV 
C05 ESP 
C10 ROU 
C17 GRC,ITA 
C18 CZE 
C25 PRT 
C28 BEL 
C30 AUS,AUT 
C32 NZL,CAN,DEU,DNK,EST,FIN,FRA,GBR,NLD,NOR,SWE,USA 
D01 BGR,CZE,ESP,GRC,HRV,HUN,ITA,POL,ROU,SVN 
D10 AUT 
D23 FRA 
D25 PRT 
D26 BEL 
D28 DEU 
D29 USA 
D30 AUS,CAN,GBR 
D31 EST 
D32 NZL,DNK,FIN,NLD,NOR,SWE 
I01 BGR,CZE,ESP,GRC,HRV,HUN,POL,ROU,SVN 
I17 ITA 
I24 FRA 
I25 PRT 
I26 AUT,BEL 
I30 AUS,CAN 
I32 NZL,DEU,DNK,EST,FIN,GBR,NLD,NOR,SWE,USA 
M01 BGR,HUN,ITA,POL,SVN 
M03 HRV 
M05 ESP 
M10 ROU 
M14 AUT 
M17 GRC 
M18 CZE 
M25 PRT 
M28 BEL,DEU 
M29 USA 
M30 AUS,GBR 
M31 EST,FRA 
M32 NZL,CAN,DNK,FIN,NLD,NOR,SWE 
 
Note: configurations ID as in Table 16. In bold, the cases that preserve their asso-
ciation with the same configuration across different coding biases.  
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Table 18. Truth tables from .Z, .C, .D, .I, and .M conditions  
ID F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 n CLEAN PRI.P ~CLEAN PRI.N 
Z26 1 1 0 0 1 2 1.000 1.000 0.348 0.000 
Z30 1 1 1 0 1 2 1.000 1.000 0.291 0.000 
Z24 1 0 1 1 1 1 1.000 1.000 0.706 0.000 
Z32 1 1 1 1 1 10 0.999 0.999 0.135 0.000 
Z25 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.662 0.204 0.858 0.665 
Z17 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.333 0.009 0.994 0.991 
Z01 0 0 0 0 0 9 0.137 0.002 0.996 0.996 
C30 1 1 1 0 1 2 1.000 1.000 0.348 0.000 
C28 1 1 0 1 1 1 1.000 1.000 0.501 0.000 
C32 1 1 1 1 1 12 1.000 1.000 0.113 0.000 
C25 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.952 0.624 0.921 0.376 
C05 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.900 0.024 0.998 0.976 
C18 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.818 0.168 0.963 0.832 
C03 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.794 0.011 0.998 0.989 
C10 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.764 0.282 0.907 0.718 
C17 1 0 0 0 0 2 0.551 0.005 0.998 0.995 
C01 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.481 0.002 0.995 0.991 
D30 1 1 1 0 1 3 1.000 1.000 0.341 0.000 
D26 1 1 0 0 1 1 1.000 1.000 0.480 0.000 
D28 1 1 0 1 1 1 1.000 1.000 0.389 0.000 
D32 1 1 1 1 1 6 0.998 0.998 0.163 0.000 
D31 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.994 0.988 0.496 0.000 
D29 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.993 0.987 0.491 0.013 
D23 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.931 0.326 0.927 0.291 
D10 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.930 0.849 0.607 0.151 
D25 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.571 0.234 0.869 0.766 
D01 0 0 0 0 0 10 0.064 0.002 0.997 0.997 
I26 1 1 0 0 1 2 1.000 1.000 0.139 0.000 
I30 1 1 1 0 1 2 1.000 1.000 0.162 0.000 
I24 1 0 1 1 1 1 1.000 1.000 0.407 0.000 
I32 1 1 1 1 1 10 1.000 1.000 0.048 0.000 
I25 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.292 0.078 0.904 0.875 
I17 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.168 0.005 0.996 0.995 
I01 0 0 0 0 0 9 0.030 0.001 0.998 0.998 
M28 1 1 0 1 1 2 1.000 1.000 0.543 0.000 
M30 1 1 1 0 1 2 1.000 1.000 0.497 0.000 
M32 1 1 1 1 1 7 0.999 0.998 0.290 0.000 
M14 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.994 0.975 0.762 0.025 
M31 1 1 1 1 0 2 0.985 0.956 0.660 0.030 
M29 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.979 0.938 0.678 0.062 
M25 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.964 0.764 0.882 0.236 
M05 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.915 0.086 0.992 0.914 
M18 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.881 0.369 0.931 0.631 
M10 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.830 0.401 0.887 0.599 
M03 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.767 0.029 0.993 0.971 
M17 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.662 0.023 0.992 0.977 
M01 0 0 0 0 0 5 0.487 0.007 0.993 0.987 
 
Note:  Factors and type of calibration, as in Table 16.  
PRI.P: Proportional Reduction of Inconsistency against the positive outcome; 
PRI.N: Proportional Reduction of Inconsistency against the negative outcome. The col-
umns CLEAN and ~CLEAN report the S.cons of the configuration to the positive and the 
negative outcome, respectively.   
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Table 16 reports the observed configurations from the same truth 
table under different calibrations of the conditions: the original ones, .Z, 
then their transformation by dilation .D, concentration .C, intensification 
.I, and moderation .M. When read in the light of the cases that make 
configurations observed, reported in Table 17, we can notice how few 
cases remain in the same configuration under different coding biases. 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia always make configuration 01 
(00000) observed, while New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, the Nether-
lands, Norway, and Sweden always populate configuration 32 (11111). 
Stable membership across different calibrations also characterizes Aus-
tralia in configuration 30 (11101), and Portugal in configuration 25 
(11000).  
Table 16 also shows that no truth table displays crisp-contradictory 
primitive configurations except for .M. Recall that moderation is ob-
tained by square-rooting the fuzzy scores lower than 0.5 and by squar-
ing those higher than 0.5, which sorts a swapping effect on observa-
tions. The moderate coder adopts a changing crossover – one for the 
presence of the outcome, and a different one for the absence – that may 
end up designing unjustified contradictions. Moreover, the .M truth ta-
ble includes a higher number of observed primitive configurations – 13 
out of 32 that the five initial conditions make logically possible. In the 
light of the wisdom that considers the saturated truth table desirable and 
limited diversity problematic, the .M truth table should appear superior 
to any other. However, if we look at the cases in Table 17 that make the 
configurations observed, we realize that the higher saturation of the .M 
truth table follows from “pigeonholing” cases in the truth table without 
improving the consistency of the statements. Let us narrow on the con-
sistency values of the M and the .Z configurations in Table 18.  
The .Z truth table displays a promising symmetry: of the seven ob-
served configurations, four (Z26, Z30, Z24, and Z32) have full S.con-
sistency to the positive outcome with almost identical PRI.P values and 
clear null S.consistency to the negative outcome with null PRI.N. The 
remaining three reports (Z25, Z17, Z01) again take high S.consistency 
to the absence of the outcome, and negligible S.consistency to the pres-
ence of the outcome, all supported by consistent PRI values. Together, 
they suggest homogeneous partitions and, hence, the relevance of the 
explanatory model.  
Of the thirteen reports in the .M truth table, instead, consistent to 
CLEAN are the reports M28, M30, M32, M14, but also the crisp-contra-
dictory M31, and M29. Report M25 has high S.consistency to CLEAN 
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(0.964) but displays a drop in the related PRI.P (0.764), and, in fact, it 
also proves consistent to ~CLEAN (0.882) although the associated PRI.N 
is low (0.236). The adjudication of M10 is hard, with an S.consistency 
to CLEAN of 0.881 and a PRI.P of 0.401 but an S.consistency to ~CLEAN 
of 0.887 and the relative PRI.N of 0.599. Clear reports of the negative 
outcome are M03, M01, and M17. Thus, we cannot expect neat homo-
geneous partitions from .M calibration, and the empirical support for the 
starting hypothesis is inferior to the original one. Although the .I parti-
tions are more homogeneous, we may be wary of such cleanness, as it 
may come at the further loss of relevant information. 
The two remaining transformations, .D and .C, again qualify as wors-
ening versions of the original calibration: .C reports are more diverse, 
yet generally less consistent claims of sufficiency; .D consistent config-
urations are more numerous to the positive outcome, while those to the 
negative are reduced. 
The comparison between .Z and its transformations provides further 
arguments in favor of the original design with the possible exception of 
.I. The substantive merits of the models can now be adjudicated by min-
imization.  
 
 
11.4 Analysis of sufficiency, second: Minimizing solutions 
 
The truth table exposes the consistency of the observational reports to 
the claim that the hypothesis holds in the population; however, it does 
not tell which local conditions explain the occurrence of the outcome in 
which cases. Ascription is the task that minimizations perform instead, 
under different assumptions about the unobserved configurations in the 
truth table. Now, from the previous analysis of the truth table, we have 
learned that even the same hypothesis in the same population may leave 
different logical remainders due to calibration. So, deciding their plau-
sibility in the light of theoretical considerations may risk reinforcing 
some bias. The default strategy manages the logical remainders with 
three different types of expectations and yields three sets of solutions 
of different specificity – the conservative, the parsimonious, and the in-
termediate or plausible. 
Applied to the .Z truth table, the minimizations finds that the con-
servative solution of the positive outcome has two prime implicants, 
both with consistency and PRI above 0.999. The first reads 
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ATEC.Z*ASOC.Z*rta.z*ENFOR.Z and covers the first two consistent con-
figurations Z26 and Z30 by dropping APUB.Z. The second term reads 
ATEC.Z*APUB.Z*RTA.Z*ENFOR.Z and covers the two consistent config-
urations, Z24 and Z32, by dropping ASOC.Z. Together, they cover the 
whole of the instances of the outcome CLEAN.  
The conservative solution to the negative outcome again has two 
terms. The first term reads ATEC.Z*apub.z*rta.z*enfor.z and follows 
from the minimization of Z25 and Z17 by dropping ASOC.Z; the second 
term reads asoc.z*apub.z*rta.z*enfor.z and covers configurations Z17 
and Z01. The minimization uses Z17 twice, meaning that both impli-
cants will cover the instances of Z17 (in this example, Italy).  
The unconstrained minimizations to the parsimonious solutions find 
a single-factor term: ENFOR.Z to CLEAN, and enfor.z to clean.z. Indeed, 
the population can be sorted into two homogeneous partitions by only 
considering whether the factor is present or absent. This does justice to 
the consistency scores in the analysis of necessity reported in Table 14. 
The minimization to the positive outcome employs twelve logical re-
mainders (Z2, Z4, Z6, Z8, Z10, Z12, Z14, Z16, Z18, Z20, Z22, and Z28) 
under the assumption that they would lead to the outcome if observed. 
The minimization to the negative instead employs thirteen logical re-
mainders (Z3, Z5, Z7, Z9, Z11, Z13, Z15, Z19, Z21, Z23, Z27, Z29, 
Z31) to reach its result. Thus, the minimization to the opposite outcome 
does not make opposite counterfactual assumptions about the same re-
mainders, which would make the solution contradictory. All in all, the 
finding is formally sound, although essential. With an S.cons of 0.940 
and a PRI of 0.932, its fit proves lower than the worse solution term in 
the conservative solution.  
 
Table 19. Solution terms from the .Z truth table 
Outcome Type Id Term S-cons PRI 
Positive  Cons Int 1 ATEC.Z*ASOC.Z*rta.z*ENFOR.Z 1.000 1.000 
  2 ATEC.Z*APUB.Z*RTA.Z*ENFOR.Z 0.999 0.999 
 Pars 1 ENFOR.Z 0.940 0.932 
Negative Cons Int 1 ATEC.Z*apub.z*rta.z*enfor.z 0.923 0.886 
  2 asoc.z*apub.z*rta.z*enfor.z 0.997 0.996 
 Pars 1 enfor.z 0.861 0.832 
 
Key: Cons: conservative; Int: intermediate; Pars: parsimonious. Cut set at 0.85. 
 
The intermediate solutions are obtained by preventing the minimi-
zation with hard counterfactuals. Those to the positive outcome main-
tain that each condition contributes to the outcome when present; those 
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to the negative outcome, when absent. Under these constraints, in this 
analysis, the minimizations find the conservative solutions. 
The consistency scores also indicate that the plausible solution en-
sures higher homogeneous partitions than the intermediate. Hence, in 
this population, the plausible solution is more Salmon-complete than 
the parsimonious one. On a more general note, the minimizations con-
firm that the hypothesis holds in the population as a reduction statement 
that the observation reports from its development confirm and do not 
falsify.  
The standing of the hypothesis before evidence, however, is better 
conveyed by a graphical representation of the solutions. 
 
 
11.5  Plot solutions  
 
Many graphical solutions suit the representation of the findings from 
QCA, depending on the intent of the analysis4. An adequate rendering 
to the explanatory use of the technique is the XY-plot. This special Car-
tesian space emphasizes the ordering power of inus solutions. Its 
“zones” allow identifying the instances that violate Mill’s requirements 
at a glance, with further attention for the effect that fuzzy scores impress 
to the analytic space5. Recall that, with fuzzy scores, the sufficiency of 
a term to the outcome is understood as a lower-than relationship. This 
rotates the analytic space and establishes the bisector as the further rel-
evant axis for assessing the claim of sufficiency, with a slack of +0.1 to 
accommodate measurement issues6. The XY-plot, in short, provides a 
useful diagnostic of the fit of the solutions to the claim of sufficiency, 
although it does not tell whether the possible misfit is due to a weak 
hypothesis, mistakes in the selection of the gauges, or poor calibration 
decisions. 
Figure 11 uses the XY-plot to compare the distributions generated 
by the parsimonious and intermediate/complex solutions from the .Z 
data. Indeed, the graphs suggest that the indications from the parameters 
of fit are empirically sound. There is no instance in the top left corner 
to indicate that the compound has substitutes: hence, all the channels to 
the effect are captured by the conditions in the solutions. More im-
portant, there is no instance in the bottom right corner to falsify the 
                                                          
4 Rubinson, 2019. 
5 Schneider and Rohlfing, 2016. 
6 Ragin, 2000. 
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claim of sufficiency: the solutions are Salmon-complete. However, the 
intermediate terms display higher relevance than the parsimonious 
ones. The effect is especially visible on the instances of the negative 
outcome, which are pushed above the bisector when the solution term 
is better specified. This effect may be noted for later theoretical consid-
erations. 
 
Figure 11. XY-plots from .Z calibration 
  
  
  
 
Keys: Inclusion is for the S.consistency of the overall solution, calculated as the disjunc-
tion of the prime implicants. Coverage is for the S.coverage. The PRI again is calculated 
on the disjunction of the prime implicants. 
 
The XY-plots allow immediate comparisons with the solutions from 
alternative calibrations. For instance, from Figure 12, we can better ap-
preciate the effects that the intensification of the fuzzy scores exert on 
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the distribution. Intensification does not change the findings but height-
ens their consistencies by shrinking the distances of each observation 
from the corners of sure exclusion (0,0) and of sure inclusion (1,1). The 
effect of higher certainty in classification is the reduction of the incon-
sistencies: the observations that still fall below the bisector are moved 
in the +0.1 area of tolerance. 
 
Figure 12. XY-plots from .I calibration 
  
  
  
 
Keys: same as above. 
 
Just the opposite happens to the analysis with moderated fuzzy 
scores. Recall these membership scores pigeonhole the observations 
and make thirteen configurations observed out of thirty-two. The con-
servative solution to the positive outcome reports six terms, four more 
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than the same solution with .Z scores. The parsimonious positive solu-
tion has three terms, arising from multiple usages of the same configu-
ration for minimization. So, 14 instances are covered by different solu-
tions, and only in one of them, the single parsimonious factor from .Z 
minimizations appears. However, if we had to rely on the parameters of 
fit only, we could accept the solutions as sound: each term’s S.con-
sistency is higher than the conventional thresholds, and even their PRI 
values do not raise particular concerns. Full evidence of the little cred-
ibility of the solution only comes from the actual distribution, as dis-
played in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. XY-plots from .M calibration 
  
  
  
 
Keys: same as above. 
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Figure 13 shows the solutions from .M calibration to both the posi-
tive and the negative outcome, unsurprisingly, distribute instances in a 
shape that misfits the claim of the sufficiency of the hypothesis. Here, 
we know the falsification arises from the limited capacity of the mod-
erate coder to “carve nature at its joints”; beyond the particular circum-
stances, however, we might be wary of solutions with contradicting in-
stances as a severe warning about our research design first, and ulti-
mately about our hypothesis. 
 
 
11.6 Return to the configurational hypothesis 
 
The lesson from the comparison of the distribution under different cal-
ibration decisions is that, regardless of the decisions that we can make 
about membership, the conditions in the model do capture some rele-
vant facts of the causal link between institutional designs and percep-
tion of corruption. The operationalization of the starting hypothesis, 
therefore, stands in our selection of cases. The credibility of these re-
sults depends on raw measures. Despite our choice of sub-indexes, the 
gauges contain heterogeneous information about the same dimension. 
For instance, RTA scores are based on the fact that a right is established 
to access information, and people are aware of it, then its timeliness, the 
completeness of the information obtained, its cost. Thus, the score pro-
vides an overall compensation of many facets, and the same score may 
be due to different compensations. Absent finer measures, we have to 
stay content with the existing gauges. In their heterogeneity, the gauges 
still provide indications about which (aggregate) conditions prove lo-
cally capable of motivating, sustaining, and protecting the people’s per-
ceptions of low corruption of the public sector.  
The more credible solution comes from .Z observation reports. The 
parsimonious solution to the positive and the negative outcome agree 
that the single factor underlying the high and low perception of corrup-
tion is the quality of civil justice. The factor is linked to the outcome by 
a biconditional relation, such that the parsimonious solution reads as in 
[PS] below: 
 
[PS] 𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅 ≡ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑁  
 
The distribution from the single factor, however, shows that the fit-
ting improves when the solutions are built on those counterfactuals that 
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meet theoretical expectations. The constraint indicates that the lock-in 
effect on the positive outcome has a common part and two variants. The 
intermediate solution reported in Table 19 can be written as [IS.pos] 
 
[IS.pos] 𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅 ∗ (𝐴𝑆𝑂𝐶 ∗ 𝑟𝑡𝑎 + 𝐴𝑃𝑈𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝑇𝐴) → 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑁 
 
The common part indicates effective constraints on the public sec-
tor’s operation by audit and review activities of independent authorities 
(ATEC), together with the effectiveness and timeliness of civil justice 
enforcement (ENFOR). These provide the enabling and shielding unre-
placeable conditions for the two replaceable triggers. The one that can 
be dubbed “lively societal pulleys” follows from the existence of soci-
etal checks as free media, opposition parties, and civil organizations, all 
supported by the freedom of speech (ASOC), even when the right of in-
formation is weak (rta). This is the relevant trigger in Austria, Belgium, 
Australia, and Canada. The other emphasizes “legal levers” and passes 
through the transparency of the administration, as ensured by the right 
of information (RTA) and by the obligations that the government has to 
circulate clear and accessible information widely (APUB). The second 
trigger operates in cases as different as France, New Zealand, Germany, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Great Britain, the Netherland, Norway, 
Sweden, and the United States. 
The return to the configurational theory is incomplete without the 
recipes of failure. Here again, we find complex machinery with two 
parts. The solution can be written as [IS.neg]  
 
[IS.neg] 𝑎𝑝𝑢𝑏 ∗ 𝑟𝑡𝑎 ∗ 𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∗ (𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐶 + 𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑐) → 𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛  
 
The solution allows the interpretation of high levels of perceived 
corruption as engrained in weak legal constraints on the public sector – 
low obligation to circulate information (apub), weak right of access to 
information (rta), and ineffective enforcement of civil justice (enfor). 
Within such a dimmed rule of law, the triggers of perceiving corruption 
depend on the constraints exerted by the oversight bodies in Italy and 
Portugal; and on weak societal checks in Bulgaria, Czechia, Spain, 
Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Italy. 
Together, the two halves of the causal story suggest that the effec-
tiveness of civil justice is a crucial element to enable virtuous mecha-
nisms. However, its positive effects only follow when oversight rights 
are distributed to institutional actors, and societal actors are either lively 
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engaged or kept updated on government activities. Despite their gener-
ality, these findings provide a useful suggestion on how to intervene on 
the perception of corruption. These findings may open to further re-
search on the actual processes that occur under the different configura-
tions in single selected cases in nested designs. However, adding details 
may enrich a causal story that is already a self-standing credible inus 
“reduction” of a generative process. 
  
  
 
 
12. Bottom lines 
 
 
 
 
 
The current discourse on scientific explanation has shifted the ground 
on which we can develop credible accounts from law-like generaliza-
tions to mechanisms. The definitional debate on what precisely a mech-
anism is, where it is located, and how it can be captured far exceeds the 
purpose of this work. Nevertheless, the representations from the strand 
of the modelers in the philosophy of science converge on the picture of 
a flow of activities and interactions that occur under the right conditions 
and that, in the absence of obstructions, bring about the outcome.  
The picture is Aristotelean in its underlying assumption that special 
entities express the power to make the outcome happen when properly 
arranged. At the same time, the picture is not Aristotelean in its assump-
tion that the “mechanism” – understood as the organization of the right 
entities under the right conditions – is self-standing. As Mill long es-
tablished with his modes of explanation, we can only resolve one mech-
anism in its components, or abstract many specific mechanisms into a 
more general one, or specify which components are relevant to a par-
ticular effect. Each of these operations, however, deepens our 
knowledge of a situation, bridges sparse notions, and possibly improves 
our understanding as much as the effectiveness of our interventions. In 
short, the mechanistic perspective allows resolving causation into what 
happens under the right configuration; the right configuration is that 
which responds to our why questions. The analytic challenge consists 
of filling the picture with the relevant details that turn the picture into a 
usable yet reliable model of the occurrence of an outcome of interest. 
The possible points of attack to filling the sketch are many but can 
be reduced to a simple alternative. Models can capture the changes in 
the picture under the assumption that every variation counts. Alterna-
tively, they can be developed under the tenet that only a few critical 
points matter, as any of the remaining variations will keep the overall 
system in a state associated with approximately similar levels of the 
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outcome. In the latter mindset, the question of interest asks which con-
ditions – if any – keep the system in a state – either desirable or not. 
This is the particular question to which QCA can respond, mainly due 
to its language. Boolean algebra allows modeling the presence and ab-
sence of the features of the system, or its component, and developing 
hypotheses about the right configurations. The language also comes 
with principles of combinations, criteria to establish whether the hy-
pothesis holds or is wanting, and diagnostics that indicate the direction 
for improving it – undetected plurality, or omitted inus conditions. 
Moreover, the language allows for “observation reports” that ensure the 
testability of the logical hypotheses on populations of cases, as config-
urations can be rendered as intersections to which the cases belong. The 
technique also comes with an algorithm that applies a long-honored set 
of rules to dismiss those components in the hypothesis that prove irrel-
evant to explain the differences in the outcome across groups and in-
stances. 
On the whole, then, the analytic machinery of QCA is adequate for 
ascertaining inus causation. However, its results are as good as our start-
ing hypothesis. The starting hypothesis, in turn, has two weak points – 
issues that may invite to faulty interpretations. 
The first issue, and possibly the less serious at this stage, concerns 
the causal interpretability of QCA results. Of course, a non-contradic-
tory truth table and consistent solutions do not automatically endow a 
sparse bunch of conditions with any explanatory power. QCA is “ex-
planatory” as the old syllogistic machinery was: it is “truth-preserving” 
– yet not “truth-generating.” The outputs of its algorithms are as good 
as its inputs, and the claim of sufficiency stands when the hypothesis 
already offers a plausible account of the outcome. This requirement 
posits the question of what makes a hypothesis credible. As argued in 
the previous pages, mechanisms provide the mindset to model a plausi-
ble hypothetical account, and the language of logic supports our mod-
eling efforts straightforwardly. Logic has first been developed to assist 
our reasoning about the world: roughly, if you can say it, you can also 
model it – with literals, overbars, wedges, wees, and horseshoes. In-
deed, even a very general definition of a mechanism as the interaction 
of given entities with special attributes 𝐴s, in contexts with features 𝐶s 
and in the absence of obstructions 𝑂s, can be turned into a formal ex-
pression like [M] below: 
 
[M] (⋀𝐴  ∧  ⋀ 𝐶) ∧   ⋀ ?̅?   →  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  
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The reason that qualifies [M] as a plausible explanation, in turn, fol-
lows from our confidence that, at the best of our knowledge, these three 
types of components, together, suffice to capture the unobserved dy-
namic to the outcome. They include the entities with the capacity or 
potential to yield an effect, plus the triggering factors that actualize the 
capacity and make the process to the outcome as inevitable as a flying 
bullet – that is, inevitable unless obstacles arise. Hence, in modeling a 
plausible hypothesis, we may want to select those 𝐴s that signal a ca-
pacity, those 𝐶s that trigger that capacity and sustain its unobserved un-
folding, and those 𝑂s that defuse the triggers or weaken the support. 
The logical rendering also suggests narrower models. As long as we can 
assume that a good model of the triggers and supports dovetails the 
model of the capacity to “make” the effect, we can assume that ⋀𝐶 →
⋀𝐴. An abridged explanatory model [M’], then, can explain by taking 
into account contextual features and obstacles only: 
 
[M’] ⋀𝐶  ∧ ⋀ ?̅? →  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  
 
Thus, for instance, we can model the institutional constraints and 
their enforcement as in Part III, and assume that they interact with a 
particular type of opportunistic behavior, although we may not be able 
to observe actual opportunism in the making. Then, again as in Part III, 
we may discover that relevant 𝑂s capture much yet not all of the effects 
of the other components. This comes as little surprise, as a good model 
of 𝑂s dovetails the model of 𝐶s, so that the logical relationships among 
the component of a mechanism are as in [LR]: 
 
[LR]  ⋀ ?̅?  →  ⋀ 𝐶  →  ⋀𝐴  →  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  
 
It is worth noting that the chain of conditionalities in [LR] may or 
may not have the temporal dimension of flows – it only depicts logical 
relationships as in an Aristotelean syllogism. The message conveyed by 
[LR] is, we should be able to operate on the whole mechanism by re-
moving or adding obstacles. Which, of course, makes sense – especially 
from the perspective of policy design and choice architecture. However, 
here a second issue arises about the sharpness of configurational 
knowledge. 
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Indeed, these are models – useful reductions of real complex situa-
tions. The relationship with the actual world is established by the qual-
ity of the data on which the truth tables rely as the “observational re-
ports” of our starting hypothesis. Their quality, in turn, depends on two 
kinds of decisions: those to calibrate the raw data into membership 
scores, and those to select the raw data that render our 𝐴s, 𝐶s, 𝑂s to the 
outcome. Again, the former may raise fewer concerns than the latter.  
Calibration is a delicate operation that affects our findings; however, 
identifying suitable thresholds may itself be addressed as an empirical 
puzzle that we can tackle with the aid of proper techniques to keep our 
biases at bay. Moreover, if a reasonable calibration setting – one that 
pragmatically affords “certainty” and “relative uncertainty” in classifi-
cation – yields a “neater” truth table than others, we may want to draw 
conclusions from it, as worse calibrations may entail we are disregard-
ing tipping points and ill-carving the analytic partitions of our universe. 
Thus, carving does remain a core operation of a credible explanation 
that requires substantive knowledge. However, it can become a vain 
exercise without a suitable matter – that is, without adequate raw 
measures of our 𝐴s, 𝐶s, 𝑂s, and outcome. 
The selection of the raw measures is often guided by convention or 
constrained by the scarcity of reliable information. Even in the age of 
data deluge, the data about, for instance, the average government, its 
policy decisions, and their implementation can, unfortunately, be er-
ratic. Reliable series, as we have seen, may be intended to serve many 
purposes and include high degrees of heterogeneity. The heterogeneity 
engrained in the raw measures may then boost or spoil the set relation-
ships in a QCA, depending on the relationships between the raw data 
and the fuzzy construct. The ultimate bottom line, then, suggests an ac-
curate selection of the raw data, then the usual caution when interpret-
ing configurational findings. 
 
As a technique, QCA does afford explanations in the long-honored 
sense that its machinery exposes the weaknesses of our hypothetical 
because-answer and isolates those of its parts that prove relevant to the 
account of interest. This is not the only usage of QCA1, neither, of 
course, is the only kind of knowledge that we need to grasp causation2. 
Nevertheless, its explanations are one of a kind and useful to pinpoint 
                                                          
1 Thomann and Maggetti, 2017; Hino, 2009. 
2 King et al., 1994; George and Bennett, 2005; Brady and Collier, 2010. 
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the constraints that shape games, the right context of effective interac-
tions, the starting point of Markovian chains to the outcome – or, more 
simply, realistic risk models and ex-post evaluations of policy interven-
tions. Despite its popularity, its full potential may still have to be un-
locked. 
Plus, configurational thinking about generative mechanisms makes 
a great pastime.  
Please, try it at home. 
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